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ABSTRACT 
 
Crisis communication has emerged as a specialised study field for public 
relations scholars and practitioners in the past 17 years.  It is suggested that 
several gaps in current crisis communication literature exist.  A notable focus 
has been given to the planning, prevention and recovery stages with lesser 
attention placed on the crisis response stage. A comprehensive conceptual 
framework to guide communication decision-makers during this critical period 
has not yet been developed. In addition, crisis communication studies appear 
to be predominantly Western based.   
 
This qualitative study attempts to address these gaps. The focus is on the 
crisis response stage, with particular emphasis on communication with the 
journalists who work for media organisations. It is acknowledged that the 
success of a crisis management effort is profoundly affected by what an 
organisation says and does during a crisis – termed the crisis response 
(Benoit 1997; Coombs 2004).  Literature and data drawn from South African 
case studies is translated into a conceptual framework which acknowledges 
the importance of context, flexibility and constant feedback/monitoring of the 
environment on crisis communications. 
 
The findings of this qualitative study are in line with the current post-modern 
organisational values that are increasingly emphasised in national and 
international literature. The study especially makes a unique contribution by 
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applying these values to a conceptual model of communication between the 
organisation and the media during times of crisis.  
 
The model is designed to assist an organisation to protect its image during a 
crisis in the following ways: 
• Convince the media that there is no crisis (in the case of unfounded 
rumours); 
• Encourage them to view the crisis in a less negative light by 
acknowledging the organisation’s interpretation of events. 
• Influence the media to see the organisation more positively through 
the effective management of the crisis. 
 
Key terms:  communication, crisis, crisis communication, media, media 
communication, crisis management, organisational legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
TOWARDS A NEW MODEL IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
 
Research is absolutely critical to the emergence of the field of communication as 
a science (Du Plooy 2001:29).  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Du Plooy’s (2001:29) succinct statement underscores the necessity of research 
to accord the communication field scientific status.  With a respectful adherence 
to qualitative research methodology and principles, this study is expected to 
make a contribution in this regard.   
 
A conceptual model of communication between an organisation and the media 
during crisis periods is derived from a thorough review of recent crisis 
communication literature and information drawn from case studies. Its intention is 
to provide crisis managers with a comprehensive decision-making tool for the 
content of crisis communication, a lesser-developed area of research  (Coombs 
2004). 
 
Chapter one presents an overview of the study and explains the purpose, 
background, relevance and applicability of the topic to the field of 
communication.  An introductory literature review and outline of the methodology 
and type of study lays the foundation for the detailed chapters which follow. 
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1.2   Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to translate existing literature on crisis 
communication principles and theories, as well as the learning obtained from 
case studies of crises in the South African banking environment, into a currently 
relevant conceptual model for organisational strategies of crisis communication 
with the media. This will contribute to the body of public relations knowledge in 
South Africa and assist crisis communicators with the critical task of dealing with 
crises while preserving or even enhancing the reputations of their organisations 
during crises. 
 
Recent texts describe three stages of crisis management: prevention, response 
and recovery (Coombs 2004; Dulek, Hale & Hale 2005). While a large portion of 
the current literature on crisis communication thus far appears to have focussed 
on the prevention and recovery stages (Coombs 2004), this study will focus on 
the crisis response stage.  This is the point where crisis communicators make 
important decisions that could significantly influence public opinion about the 
crisis and an organisation’s handling of the crisis. 
 
In any given crisis situation, it should be assumed that the matter could well 
become public knowledge (Mersham & Skinner 2004). The reality today is that 
bad news travels at net speed. Potentially 60 million people will read about your 
organisation in the first hours after a crisis before you can even begin to impact 
your news coverage (Clawson-Freeo 2003:1). Communication to the journalists 
who work for media organisations during the crisis response stage (this process 
will be referred to throughout the study as crisis communication to/with the 
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media) can therefore be described as a critical aspect of any crisis management 
plan and is the subject of this study. 
 
The industry chosen for this study is the financial sector.  Due to the fact that the 
South African banking sector owns more than 80% of the total banking assets of 
the top 100 banks in Sub-Saharan Africa, its importance to the economies of the 
region cannot be underestimated.  In the words of Derek Cooper from the Nedlac 
Financial Sector Summit: The financial sector is like the oil in an engine.  Without 
oil, the economic engine will function defectively, if at all (Wu 2003:14).  
 
The financial sector is currently facing pressure from government, shareholders 
and customers alike. These pressures include (Vermeulen 2003): 
• Compliance with various new regulations such as the Financial Services 
Charter (FSC), the Financial and Advisor Intermediary Act (FAIS), the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) and the National Credit Act; 
• Government calls for black empowerment shareholding and financing; 
• Money laundering; 
• Increasing fraud and robberies; 
• Growing consumer dissatisfaction with high prices and poor service which 
led to the 2006 Competition Commission Enquiry; 
• Huge financial risks, such as providing finance to the traditionally 
underserved section of the population; 
• Bad debt; 
• Streamlining/cost-cutting exercises, which includes the closure of 
branches and retrenchments; 
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• Diversification of income streams from non-interest income to offset high 
cost-to-income ratios and increase shareholder return on investment; 
• Financial products traditionally offered only by banks being eroded by 
retail offerings; 
• The threat of take-overs by larger, overseas banks. 
 
Against this backdrop of possible stories that could attract the interest of 
journalists and thus result in potential negative publicity for the banks involved if 
they are not managed well, the purpose of this study is summarised as follows:  
to articulate a theory-based conceptual model for matching crisis response 
strategies to the crisis situation to best preserve organisational reputation. By 
synthesising the major approaches to crisis communication together with lessons 
learnt from local case studies, an integrated, methodological model or tool 
should result. 
 
1.3    Brief background to the study 
 
According to Clawson-Freeo (2000:1) a crisis is any situation that threatens the 
integrity or reputation of a company, usually brought on by adverse media 
attention. It can also be a situation, where, in the eyes of the general public, the 
media, shareholders, stockbrokers and analysts, the company did not react to 
any of the already mentioned situations in an appropriate manner. 
 
In the past few years alone, many South African examples abound. In 2003, First 
Rand financial services group faced a corporate governance crisis following 
Sunday Times newspaper allegations that its non-executive director, Mac 
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Maharaj, accepted bribes while serving as Transport Minister in the South 
African government (refer to Annexure C) . In roughly the same period Pick ‘n 
Pay supermarket chain confronted extortion through the poisoning of its non-
perishable foodstuffs. Absa Bank (refer to Annexure A) was hit by internet 
banking fraud which rocked consumer confidence and Standard Bank (refer to 
Annexure B) was faced with a hostile take-over threat from rival Nedcor which 
could have had devastating effects on investor confidence (Vermeulen 2003). 
 
A closer look at just two of the examples mentioned, namely FirstRand and Pick 
‘n Pay, shows that the manner in which a company communicates its 
perspective of any given story, potential scandal, or libellous accusation can 
either do damage, reinstate or alternatively, even enhance its reputation. For 
example, FirstRand was accused publicly of not expediting the said Maharaj 
investigation that had fuelled ongoing media speculation, connecting the bank by 
osmosis to suggestions of malfeasance, regardless of the reality. Vermeulen 
(2003:12) argues: Whereas FirstRand did not look at other examples on conduct 
damage control, Pick ‘n Pay was more prepared. She explains how Pick ‘n Pay 
imported a respected communications firm from Britain whose advice was to be 
brutally honest and transparent and keep the media and public informed at every 
juncture. Vermeulen (2003) argues that this strategy appeared to earn Pick ‘n 
Pay public sympathy and support.  However FirstRand carried the stigma of the 
Maharaj scandal for quite some time afterwards (Vermeulen 2003:12). One of 
the case studies examined for this research is the aforementioned FirstRand 
crisis.  The findings from the FirstRand case studies contradict Vermeulen’s 
(2003) analysis of the situation.  Although FirstRand was initially unprepared for 
media queries, it quickly appointed an experienced crisis communication advisor 
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to guide its executives.  FirstRand soon earned the respect of most of the 
journalists covering the story, by sharing as much information as possible, 
without prejudicing the case against Maharaj.  Although the legal restrictions on 
information appeared to curtail the journalists, FirstRand employed independent 
third party investigators and provided all evidence to respected third parties, 
such as the Reserve Bank and Financial Services Board.  This strategy 
appeared to earn FirstRand credibility in the eyes of the journalists (refer to 
chapter five and Annexure C for more details).   In September 2003, FirstRand 
showed solid growth in its retail, corporate and new business growth despite the 
year of controversy (Business Report 2003:1). 
 
1.3.1 Views of South African crisis communication experts 
 
According to Summers (2003:11), former CEO of Pick ‘n Pay, there are no 
suitable manuals to deal with big crises.  Duncan (2003), crisis communicator at 
Adrian Steed Communications explains: You can’t find the answers in a 
textbook.  It’s through hands-on experience that you learn how to deal with the 
media during a crisis. The biggest stumbling block is getting Mahogany Row 
(senior executives) to identify potential risks early.  Too often, it appears, the 
responsible executives deal with problems with an almost cavalier lack of regard 
for the consequences of their actions. When the trouble starts – they expect us, 
the communicators, to pull a rabbit out of a hat. One of the financial media 
communication specialists interviewed for this research, also highlighted these 
points: And no manual is going to help you. At the communication agency I 
worked for, we made money writing crisis manuals. Chuck it out the window! 
When the crisis starts rely on your instincts and experience.  
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From Duncan’s (2003) argument, one can assume that it would be necessary 
for a crisis communication expert to be represented on Mahogany Row so that 
the possible ramifications in the media of strategic and operational decisions 
made by senior executives could be explained in advance of their 
implementation.    The crisis communicator would therefore need to be part of 
the decision-making process at senior executive level. The abovementioned 
italicised quotes from South African crisis communicators also suggest that 
experience, rather than theory, is the key to learning how to manage a crisis 
situation in the media. A crisis communication manual or text book cannot 
supply the level of guidance to managing every crisis situation that only 
experience and practice can.  It is for this reason that case studies comprising 
interviews with experienced crisis communicators have been chosen as data 
collection tools for this research.  Researchers Du Plooy (2001) and Wimmer 
and Dominick (1991) advocate the use of case studies and interviews to 
provide researchers with a wide range of evidence and information on a topic.  
Case studies will help the researcher to understand why certain 
communication decisions were taken by the crisis communicators during each 
crisis examined. These experiences of positive and possible negative pitfalls of 
real life experiences will contribute to an informed model. 
 
1.3.2   Relevance of the topic 
 
According to authors such as Fearn-Banks (2002) and Mersham and Skinner 
(2002), it is inevitable that organisations will face crises.  Helping to manage both 
crisis and opportunity is one of the critical challenges for public relations 
professionals. Public relations has been frequently criticised  for its lack of theory 
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and for basing practice more on intuition than on scientific principles 
(Holtzhauzen 1995; Olson, Signitzer & Windahl 1992). According to 
communication scholar, David Berlo (1960), a good theory has practical 
application.  A new dynamic model of crisis communication management may be 
required because traditional linear models and theories of communication, 
persuasion and management do not fully explain the multi-channelled and 
sometimes chaotic communication environment which characterises crises in 
most organisations (Bloom, Crystal & Verwey 2002; Gayeski & Majika 1996: 22). 
Very often when a crisis breaks, it is unexpected and the organisation only 
becomes aware of it when a journalist enquires (Seitel 2001).  Many factors 
happen at once and crisis events escalate.  Information can be ambiguous or 
conflicting and chaos reigns (Seitel 2001). Crises do not generally follow an 
orderly sequence, as the traditional theories would have us believe, and cannot 
necessarily be controlled using traditional cause-effect persuasive techniques. 
 
Much of the literature provides rudimentary and what could be criticised as 
somewhat idealistic checklists for the crisis communication planner.  For 
example, a typical crisis manual will state that it is necessary to have a list of 
journalist and key management contact numbers and that the organisation 
should respond quickly to queries.  These checklists do not give details on the 
actual content of communications and do not cover the contingency of the 
communication planner having to change tactics midstream, perhaps in 
response to the ineffectiveness of messages.  This study will bring a different 
perspective to the phenomenon through the formation of a flexible, content-
driven model that can be adapted to suit different crises situations. 
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The majority of research in the field has been carried out on crises at large 
international organisations like Nike’s footwear, Johnson & Johnson’s pain 
medication Tylenol, Nestle’s infant formula and Perrier’s sparkling water. Limited 
information is available in the South African context.  This study, by 
concentrating on the South African business context, and on a particular industry 
vertical, the financial services sector, is expected to produce some locally 
relevant information that can be applied by public relations professionals in this 
country. 
 
An important characteristic of most crises is that the news media are highly 
interested (Fearn-Banks 2002; Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Mersham & Skinner 
2002).  Media attention and scrutiny is a fact of business life and journalists must 
be engaged with, whether the organisation likes it or not (Fearn-Banks 2002; 
Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Mersham & Skinner 2002).  Communication to the 
media is thus a critical aspect of any crisis communications plan.  Silence in the 
midst of a crisis implies guilt, whether justified or not, and reporters face 
deadlines hour by hour (Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Levine 2006).  Control of the 
situation requires that the organisation in crisis controls the message (Fearn-
Banks 2002).  Current literature on crisis communications management includes 
all the elements of a crisis communication plan (communication to staff, 
shareholders and the like).  This study will be unique as it focuses on one aspect 
of crisis communications, that is, communication to the media.  
 
According to Coombs (1999:125), a significant part of crisis management 
literature is devoted to detecting and preventing a crisis pro-actively because the 
best crisis is the one that is avoided. However, Coombs (1999) believes that an 
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organisation cannot avoid, prevent or prepare in advance for all possible crises.  
The success of a crisis management effort is heavily dependent on what the 
organisation says and does after a crisis begins – termed: the crisis response 
(Benoit 1997).  Hale et al (2005:131) suggest that communication models can 
prove most beneficial under such circumstances.  According to Bloom (2001:85): 
Inventing a response to a crisis as it breaks cannot be done to the best of a 
public relation consultant’s advantage under the pressure of events. Given this 
situation, a set of guidelines or model could help crisis communicators to 
formulate responses to the media during a crisis.   
 
1.4 Introductory literature review 
 
In this section the background to existing theories and models of crisis 
management is presented.  Crisis management refers to how organisations 
deal with crisis situations.  It comprises crisis communication to various 
stakeholders such as staff, shareholders, the public and the media. This study 
focuses on one aspect of a crisis communication plan – that is crisis 
communication to/with the media.  Crisis communication described by this study 
refers to a process of symmetrical communications during a crisis to the media 
that is carefully crafted to protect or even potentially enhance and organisation’s 
image. 
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1.4.1 Background to theories of crises management: traditional linear 
versus progressive systems theory approaches 
 
For the past century, both the natural and social sciences have been dominated 
by metaphors of well-regulated and predictable machines (Gayeski & Majika 
1996:22).  Much classic crisis communication and crisis management research 
has been based on a mechanistic view of control. For every action, there was a 
specific reaction and communicators believed that it was possible to predict how 
audiences would react to a carefully crafted message (Gayeski & Majika 
1996:22).  This traditional linear cause-effect view is being questioned by 
progressive systems approaches which take into account the dynamic 
interdependence of factors such as context and the mind in meaning-making 
(Bruner 1990; Gergen 1999).  The calculation of probabilities, rather than 
absolute prediction has become the norm (Gayeski & Majika 1996). The effect of 
these paradigm shifts on the field of crisis management can be briefly described 
as follows:    
 
• Traditional linear approaches: According to Keene (2000:15), in the 
traditional linear paradigm of seeing the world and organisations in a 
mechanistic way, crises were viewed negatively as signs of trouble.  
Organisations following this approach seek to control their environment 
and experience frustration when it behaves in a way that is incongruent 
and in conflict with the operation of the organisation.   
 
• Progressive systems approaches: In contrast, progressive 
organisations follow the premise that environments are dynamic and that 
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change and uncertainty will come to pass irrespective of organisational 
efforts to control and direct them (Keene 2000:16).  This approach views 
crises as opportunities for beneficial restructuring (Bloom et al 2002).  
 
In this study, the following theories and models of crisis management and crisis 
communication are discussed which can be classified on a continuum between 
the traditional linear approaches to the more progressive systems approaches: 
 
Models leaning towards the traditional, linear continuum of crisis management 
and crisis communication: 
• Meyers and Halusha’s model (1986) 
• Stage models of crisis:  Fink (1986), Mitroff (1988), Horsley & 
Barker (2002) 
• The linear crisis response model (Hale, Dulek & Hale 2005) 
 
Models leaning towards the progressive, systems continuum of crisis 
management and crisis communication: 
• The spiral crisis response model (Hale et al 2005) 
• Chaos theory  
• Situational crisis communication theory – SCCT/SCC theory  
 
The models and theories listed above are helpful in building a body of knowledge 
to further the understanding of crisis management.  While they all acknowledge 
the importance of communication decisions made during a crisis, none of them 
actually examine these decisions and responses.  The SCC theory addresses 
these responses and is thus the approach most relevant to the model designed 
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from this research.  Its limitations will be addressed in the proposed model 
discussed in chapter six.  
 
1.5   Type of study 
 
The study is both exploratory and descriptive as it aims to explore theoretically 
and with case studies, organisational communication to the media during a crisis. 
Through this process it endeavours to gain a new understanding of the topic, 
which can be formulated into a descriptive, conceptual model, with particular 
relevance to the South African financial services environment. According to Du 
Plooy (2001) and Neuman (2000:21), some of the goals of exploratory research, 
which are particularly relevant to this study, are to promote knowledge of a 
process, to determine the accuracy of a principle or a theory and to build a 
theory.  
 
Because this study will make use of an interpretive and case study approach it 
falls under the qualitative paradigm. The purpose of qualitative research can be 
summarised as the understanding or the illumination of meanings (Durrheim & 
Terre Blanche 2002; Hoshmand 1999).   For this reason qualitative research is 
described as an interpretive method (Du Plooy 2001).  Case studies provide 
researchers with a wide range of evidence and are useful as a retrospective 
learning tool of real-life situations.  In this research, case studies will assist the 
researcher to understand the decisions taken by communicators during a crisis 
and the implications of these decisions. 
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In comparison with the quantitative or positivist tradition of experimentation, 
theory testing and verification (Gergen 1999) - qualitative researchers place 
more emphasis on description, understanding and discovery (Du Plooy 2001; 
Gordon 1999).  The attitudes associated with this mode of inquiry have been 
described as open, reflexive and sometimes a-theoretical (Flick 2002; Hoshmand 
1989).  Neuman’s (2000:145) argument further confirms the qualitative nature of 
this research: Instead of converting ideas of the social world into general 
variables to form hypotheses, qualitative researchers borrow ideas from the 
subjects that they have included in their study to develop new ideas as they look 
at or examine a specific case in its context or natural setting. 
 
This study will not attempt to measure or quantify the phenomenon under study, 
but will rather draw themes from the case studies and elements from the 
literature study, to come to conclusions on which a new model of understanding 
crisis communications with the media will be based.  It is appropriate for the 
study to draw from a qualitative theoretical framework because the intent is to 
avoid speculative theory and to learn from real life case studies of how South 
Africa’s largest banks (by assets and customer numbers) dealt with their various 
media crises.  Scholars such as Babbie and Baxter (2004), Du Plooy (2001), 
Hammersley (1992) and Silverman (1993), have demonstrated that qualitative 
research is a justifiable and legitimate means of gathering information for 
additional insights and theory development. The application of this knowledge 
may make the difference between salvaging or destroying an organisation’s 
reputation, in spite of the fact that bad news attracts media audiences.   
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In the next section the research method used for this study will be described as 
well as the manner in which data was collected and interpreted. 
 
1.6   Methodology 
 
The study will comprise two elements: a literature survey and a case study 
component. According to scholars such as Babbie and Baxter (2004), Du Plooy 
(2001) and Rapmund (1996) in positivist, traditional research, the literature 
survey is undertaken, primarily to generate hypotheses.  However, such a goal is 
not congruent with the qualitative approach taken by the researcher.  In this 
study, the literature survey will reflect the research and thinking currently 
available in the field of crisis communication.  The literature survey will be 
compared with the emerging themes of this case study approach.  Its purpose 
will not be to prove or validate these themes - instead the literature survey will 
offer different perspectives on the topic (Du Plooy 2001; Rapmund 1996; 
MacLiam 2003).  The purpose of the case study approach in this dissertation will 
be to examine the responses/strategies employed by crisis communicators to the 
media in the South African context.  These will be supplemented by published 
newspaper articles on the case studies examined.  
 
1.6.1  Collection and interpretation of data  
 
The crisis events that will be studied have taken place in the period 1999 – 2003. 
They were chosen on the basis of the richness of the data they could provide, 
and on the basis of the availability of interviews with the key crisis 
communicators involved in making decisions about communication strategies 
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during the crisis.  The sample is thus described as purposive and convenience 
(Du Plooy 2001:14).  Supplementing news coverage of the events will be drawn 
from three major South African publications:  The Business Times (supplement 
of The Sunday Times), Business Report (supplement of Independent 
Newspapers) and Business Day. The Business Report supplement appears in 
the following national newspapers: The Mercury, The Star, The Saturday Cape 
Argus, The Pretoria News, Cape Times, Sunday Tribute, The Sunday Argus, The 
Sunday Independent, The Saturday Star and The Weekend Argus.  These 
publications were targeted because of their financial focus, the recommendations 
of the three interviewees and the publications’ wide readership (please refer to 
chapter five for circulation figures).  They are the predominant, pre-eminent daily 
and weekly financial publications in South Africa (Levine 2006).  Each of them is 
circulated nationally, as well as online.  At times the sensationalist financial 
stories of the day that may attract non-business readers are reflected on the 
pages of the main bodies of the Sunday Times and Independent newspapers 
drawing readers to the full stories inside the business supplements.  Although 
extensive publicity, some of it potentially scathing, was received in many other 
consumer-oriented publications, online and in the broadcast media, in terms of 
the financial sector, the selection of publications chosen is considered a 
balanced representation of overall coverage. 
 
Researchers such as Du Plooy (2001:121) and Wimmer and Dominick 
(1991:156) cite the following benefits of applying a case study methodology: 
 
• Case studies provide researchers with a wide range of evidence about the 
research topic. Documents, artefacts, interviews and direct observations 
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can be incorporated into the study.  By using multiple sources of data, the 
scientific validity of the research is enhanced. 
 
• The case study method can be used as a retrospective learning tool of 
real-life contexts. 
 
These advantages outweigh the possible disadvantages of the case study 
method, such as its time-consuming nature, lack of scientific rigour and ability to 
make generalisations. Partially structured interviews with specialist crisis 
communicators will be the main method used to obtain material.  Information 
about participants will be gleaned from their résumés. Questions will be open-
ended and discovery-oriented and participants will be encouraged to tell their 
stories or case studies with as much detail as they are willing and able to 
provide.  
 
An interpretive method termed hermeneutics - the art of interpretation - will be 
used to analyse the data. The goal of hermeneutics is to discover meaning and 
achieve understanding, not to extract theoretical terms or concepts at a higher 
level of abstraction (Van Manen 2002). It aims to interpret experiences through a 
text.  The researcher’s task is to uncover the shared common practices of the 
experience (Van Manen 2002).  Hermeneutics assumes that the meaning-giving 
process is influenced by social structures, as well as shared practices and 
language (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Van Manen 2002). Such a qualitative 
research approach will immerse the researcher in the data and encourage an 
open-ness to new findings (Babbie & Baxter 2004). 
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The following order will be used in the execution of the research process: 
 
• Interviews with crisis communicators involved in making decisions 
regarding communication strategies surrounding the crisis will be tape-
recorded and examined using the hermeneutic approach mentioned. 
 
• Media reports on each crisis will be obtained from the web-sites of the 
respective publications.  
 
• This material will be examined using traditional and non-traditional 
frameworks drawn from the literature.  
 
• Common patterns and themes gleaned from each of the crises will be 
identified and discussed by the researcher.  Some of the themes could 
include: lessons learned through experience, the strategies behind 
different case studies and their results. 
 
• A new conceptual model for organisational strategies of crisis 
communication with the media will be developed and proposed, based on 
these findings, as well as on the literature review conducted. 
 
• Shortcomings of the research and suggestions for future inquiry will be 
discussed. 
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1.6.2   Feasibility of study 
 
The data to be researched is relatively easily available through the internet and 
newspaper archives and participants are accessible to the researcher who 
currently works in the field.  There are no expected cost implications.  The only 
equipment needed for the study is a tape recorder for the in-depth interviews. 
 
Informed consent will be obtained from participants and their identities protected 
if requested.  Should any of the participants wish to retract statements made for 
fear of breaching company confidentiality at any stage of this interview, they will 
be at liberty to do so.  It is understood that many of the strategies employed or 
decisions made under crisis situations may not necessarily be of an ethical 
nature and thus participants may be reluctant to share these with the researcher.  
The researcher will however encourage disclosure for the sake of academic 
research, with anonymity being assured.  The guarantee of confidentiality may 
give participants the confidence to express their thoughts freely. 
 
Qualitative research is time and labour intensive.  Therefore it is not feasible to 
use a large sample and it is normal practice that only a few cases are studied 
intensively (Darlington & Scott 2002; Du Plooy 2001). In this research three case 
studies are examined. This type of research therefore often gains validity at the 
expense of its ability to make generalisations (Darlington & Scott 2002).   
 
In qualitative research, rather than upholding traditional standards of reliability 
and validity, where increased quantification and standardisation is the norm, 
criteria such as authenticity, or domain-referenced validity is more appropriate, 
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as is the usefulness of the interpretations gleaned from the research (Durrheim & 
Terre Blanch 2002). According to Stiles (1993:594), in qualitative research, 
[r]eliability refers to the trustworthiness of observations or data, while validity 
refers to the trustworthiness of interpretations or conclusions. 
 
1.7   Anticipated findings 
 
Based on the exploratory nature of this study, it is suggested that a greater 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation will be achieved.  The 
findings will be particularly relevant to the South African context and will contain 
rich descriptions of strategies employed to deal with chaotic crisis environments.   
As an initial investigation of crisis communication to the media during the crisis 
response stage, this study is designed to discover and organise concepts for 
appropriate decision-making into a conceptual model. 
 
1.8   Conclusion 
 
In summary, the study will comprise the following chapters: 
 
Chapter one provides an overview and introduction to the study. 
 
Chapter two will examine existing research in order to contextualise, define and 
describe terms and principals relevant to crisis communication with the media  
including crisis, crisis communication, organisational legitimacy, crisis management,  
crisis response and spin-doctoring.  
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Chapter three will contain a discussion of theories and models relevant to the 
field of crisis management. 
 
Chapter four will discuss the research approach and methodology of this study. 
The study is qualitative and the method of analysis will be hermeneutics. 
 
Chapter five will discuss the findings of the research conducted.   
 
Chapter six will describe a conceptual model for organisational strategies of 
crisis communication with the media, based on the case studies, literature and 
findings from the research. The study will be evaluated and recommendations for 
future research will be made. 
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        CHAPTER TWO   
 CRISIS COMMUNICATION WITH THE MEDIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in chapter one, the purpose of this study is to translate the existing 
literature on crisis communication principles and theories, as well as the learning 
obtained from case studies of crises in the South African banking environment, 
into a currently relevant conceptual model for organisational strategies of crisis 
communication with the media.  In this chapter, existing literature is examined in 
order to contextualise, define and describe terms and principals relevant to crisis 
communication with the media. This will lay the foundation for the study 
 
It is suggested that a notable part of the literature is focused on the structure or 
fundamentals of planning for a crisis such as the development of crisis 
communication manuals, media training and selecting a media spokesperson 
and that lesser attention is given to the actual content of crisis communications 
(Coombs 1994).  These fundamentals are discussed in the sections that follow to 
provide a background of literature on the topic. 
 
Media attention is identified in the literature as endemic to most crisis situations 
(Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Fearn-Banks 2002) and many scholars agree that an 
organisation’s response to journalists during a crisis (the content of 
communications) can have far-reaching effects on its reputation (Kempner 1995; 
Coombs 1994; Fearn-Banks 2002; Hale, Dulek & Hale 2005; Mersham & 
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Skinner 2002). The focus of this research - communication to the media 
during a crisis - is therefore given credence. The following sections of this 
chapter will discuss the varying definitions and descriptions in the literature of 
terms relevant to the topic. 
 
2.2  A contextualisation of crisis communication to the media 
 
In order to provide context for the focus of the study - crisis communication with 
the media - the following related concepts will be defined and described: crisis, 
common organisational crises, description of an organisation dealing with a 
crisis, crisis management and organisational legitimacy.  These concepts will 
help to build a framework for the study. 
 
2.2.1 Crisis defined 
 
The term crisis can often be ambiguous.  As Guth points out (2002:125): One 
person’s incident is often viewed as another person’s crisis. In a similar vein, 
Fearn-Banks (2002:2) asserts that many professionals claim they have daily 
crises and argues that a crisis is more serious than a problem. Fearn-Banks 
(2002:2) explains this as follows:  A crisis is a major occurrence with a potentially 
negative outcome affecting the organisation, company, or industry, as well as its 
publics, products, services or good name.  It can interrupt normal business 
operations and can threaten the existence of the organisation.  It can take the 
form of a strike, terrorism, fire, boycott, product tampering, product failure, an 
earthquake and so on. 
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Also focusing on the potential consequences of crisis, Artigue and Matera 
(1999:216) postulate that a crisis can be any non routine event that could be 
disruptive to business operation. According to Modzelewski (1990:12), referring 
specifically to the financial context: a crisis can be defined as a negative event 
which, amongst other factors, causes the financial organisation’s stock price or 
market share to go down.   
 
Clawson-Freeo’s (2000:1) definition builds on to the aforementioned definitions 
by incorporating media attention into the description of a crisis.  Clawson-Freeo 
(2001) also suggests that the manner in which an organisation handles a crisis is 
important and that inappropriate reactions to the crisis by management could, in 
itself, cause another crisis (2001). Clawson-Freeo (2001:1) describes a crisis as 
any situation that threatens the integrity or reputation of a company, usually 
brought on by adverse media attention. It can also be a situation, where, in the 
eyes of the general public, the media, shareholders, stockbrokers and analysts, 
the company did not react to any of the already mentioned situations in an 
appropriate manner. 
 
Crisis expert Fink (2005:129) also points out that all crises run the risk of coming 
under scrutiny of the media, escalating, interfering with normal operations, 
jeopardising the positive public image of the organisation and affecting a 
company’s bottom line. Gonzalez-Herrero (1994) concurs that an important 
characteristic of most crises is that the news media are highly interested.  Media 
attention and scrutiny is a fact of business life and journalists must be dealt with 
whether the organisation likes it or not (Gonzalez-Herrero 1994:10).  
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What is evident from most of the discussed definitions of crisis is the negative 
connotation given.  In a slightly different light, Webster’s dictionary (1995:225) 
defines a crisis as a turning point for better or worse, a decisive moment or 
crucial time.  This suggests a possibility that a crisis may have a positive 
outcome. Therefore a crisis may not necessarily be viewed as being negative 
(Darling 1994). According to Fink (2005:15): It is merely characterised by a 
certain degree of risk and uncertainty.    
 
Developed from the aforementioned descriptions, the following definition applies 
to this study and takes into account the focus on media attention and the 
possible opportunity for a favourable outcome:  A crisis is a turning point for an 
organisation, usually brought on by adverse media attention, which, if managed 
properly, can maintain or even enhance the reputation of a company. 
 
2.2.2 Crises described 
 
One way to describe a crisis is, according to Cantor (1989:166), based on its 
time-scale. Examples relevant to the financial industry have been included as 
illustrations. 
 
• A sudden fire, accident or other noticeable event with immediate impact is 
termed an exploding crisis (Cantor 1989: 166). An example could be the 
acts of terrorism at the World Trade Centre in New York on September 
11, 2001, which destroyed the headquarters of many financial institutions, 
killing more than 2000 people, including many leading financiers. 
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• An immediate crisis (Cantor 1989: 166) describes an event that may 
come without warning, such as the sudden resignation of the CEO of a 
bank.  Very often no time is allowed for research as to the cause because 
the media want comment immediately.  
 
• A building crisis (Cantor 1989: 166) can be termed an emerging crisis or 
an anticipated crisis which gives communicators time to research and plan 
a response.  For example, a media office may anticipate that the increase 
in banking fees may cause public dissent, and can thus prepare well-
researched responses.  However, the disadvantage is that it cannot 
always be determined exactly when the crisis will strike – it might take 
many months, or just a few weeks for the crisis to hit. 
 
• A continuing crisis (Cantor 1989: 166) is a chronic problem that usually 
develops over a longer period of time and is not easily resolved.  The 
media may carry speculative stories and rumours may be persistent. For 
example, when local bank Nedbank made a hostile bid for Standard Bank 
in 1999 it was necessary for Standard Bank to develop a strategic longer-
term crisis-response plan to mitigate the effects of the protracted media 
attention that was evident throughout the months preceding the rule of the 
Competition Commission in 2000. 
 
All crises differ in terms of the length of time they last, the damage caused and 
the measures required to deal with them.  Different crises require different 
management techniques and the crisis manager must identify the type of crisis 
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and its accompanying time constraint (Cantor 1989).  It could be argued that 
Cantor’s descriptions of crises are only useful retrospectively as it is not possible 
at the outset to know whether a crisis will be protracted or not. 
 
Nevertheless, what is evident about current crises is that, given the proliferation 
of electronic media, they are so much more visible than ever before.  According 
to Calloway and Keen (1996), in the world of fast-response, real-time 
communication, perceptions become reality very quickly. Calloway and Keen 
(1996:14) state: The fluctuations in today’s financial marketplace rely on fast-
responses of less than 20 seconds.  Foreign exchange markets are coordinated 
worldwide by information technology-based services like Reuters.  
 
Technology ensures that a damaging message about an organisation, even if 
only partly true, can be spread within minutes to millions of people, including the 
news media (Irvine & Millar 1998). Irvine and Millar (1998:8) warn:  You may not 
know about the problem until your switchboard is being flooded by calls from 
irate customers, contributors and reporters wanting to know what is going on. It 
is therefore necessary for companies to galvanise their operational 
communication systems and decision-making processes for dealing with 
potential crises.  The next section describes common crises in organisations that 
have typically made newspaper headlines. 
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2.2.3   Organisational crises 
 
A large part of recent negative crisis publicity is caused by personnel in the 
financial services sectors: scandals, questionable policies, unethical actions and 
white-collar crimes such as bribery, fraud and insider trading (Bloom et al 2002). 
Irvine and Millar (1998) suggest that many smouldering crises are often the 
result of questionable management decisions. The Centre for Business and 
Ethics at Loyola Marymount University (2006:3) cites examples such as the 
culture at Enron and Worldcom.  These two renowned companies had to declare 
bankruptcy because of immorality on behalf of executive management, which led 
to severe crises. The emphasis was on the numbers and immediate success 
rather than on long-term values of ethics and morality.  There was a gradual 
descent into poor judgment, denial, failure to challenge the system, greed, 
deceit, ego, wishful thinking, poor communications and lax oversight (Centre for 
Business and Ethics 2006:3).  The implication of these factors in terms of 
developing guidelines for handling future crises is that organisations will have to 
be absolutely ethical and moral in their crisis communications to counter-act the 
negative actions and perceptions that created the crises in the first place.  
Stevens (1999) also found that organisational cultures that blurred ethical 
boundaries contributed to financial crises and that the crises could only be 
addressed effectively after senior staffers were replaced and cultural changes 
implemented.  Given these examples alone, one could deduce that the profit 
motive may frequently induce a lesser morality standard than that of societal 
norms.  This suggests that organisations may be prone to scandal at some time 
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or other and that crisis communications will need to be honest, ethical and 
demonstrate what the organisation is doing to rectify the situation.   
 
According to Irvine and Millar (1998) western-based commercial banks featured 
among the top five crisis sectors during the 1990s.  In the past number of years 
South African examples abound. The case studies examined in this research are 
based on those crises that have typically made the news headlines of the 
financial media in recent years. They include an internet hacking crisis 
(Annexure A), a hostile take-over by a competitor bank (Annexure B) and a non-
executive director being charged of corruption (Annexure C).The next section 
describes what typically occurs when an organisation is forced to deal with a 
crisis. 
 
2.2.4 A typical description of an organisation in crisis 
 
Seitel (2001:541) provides a typical description of an organisation in crisis.  The 
views of additional scholars have been added to Seitel’s (2001) descriptive 
framework. 
 
• Surprise:  When the crisis breaks, it is often unexpected and the 
communication team of an organisation only becomes aware of it when a 
journalist calls and wants to know what is being done about the issue. 
 
• Insufficient information:  According to Mersham and Skinner (2002), 
one of the biggest liabilities in any crisis is that often all the facts are not 
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available, especially in the early stages, and the danger is to act on that 
lack of information.  Often information is ambiguous or conflicting. 
Augustine (1995) notes that companies sometimes misclassify a problem, 
focusing on the technical aspects and ignoring issues of perception. It is 
often the public perception that causes the crisis (Augustine 1995:153). 
 
• Escalating events: The crisis starts to grow and people want answers. 
 
• Loss of control:  This begins to happen when many factors start to 
happen at once and chaos seems to predominate. 
 
• Siege mentality:  The organisation feels surrounded.  Legal advisers are 
saying one thing and the organisation may feel that the easiest response 
is to say nothing.  Seymour (1996) states that when panic sets in, 
management could refuse to acknowledge the fact that they are in a 
crisis.  Kempner (1995:44) says an organisation’s first instinct during a 
crisis may be to draw in the wagons and withhold comment from the 
media. 
 
• Panic:  The pressure mounts and a sense of panic pervades.  It is difficult 
at this stage to get management to take immediate action and to 
communicate what is transpiring. 
 
• Increased outside scrutiny:  The media, employees and the public in 
general feed on rumours, the media want a response and investors 
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demand details.  Seymour (1996) is of the opinion that there can also be 
an increased scrutiny of management, in particular by the media and 
shareholders.Effective crisis management is required to handle the 
somewhat chaotic situation endemic of many crisis situations.   
 
2.2.5   Crisis management defined 
 
Crisis management basically refers to the management or handling of crises by 
organisations (Lagadec 1990; Goodman & Marcus 1991). Crisis management 
comprises crisis communication to various stakeholders such as the public, 
employees, government and the media.  It also includes consideration of 
operational issues such as emergency evacuation procedures, the establishment 
of crisis communication hotlines and planned schedules for back-up equipment 
and staff resources. 
 
Darling (1994:4) describes crisis management as follows: In essence, crisis 
management provides a business firm with a systematic, orderly response to 
crisis situations.  This response permits the organisation to continue its day-to-
day operations while the crisis is being managed.  Furthermore, systematic crisis 
management creates an early detection or warning system.  Many crises can be 
prevented – or at least coped with more effectively – through early detection.  
Darling’s (1994) definition of crisis management is both practical and operational 
and stresses the need for crisis management to be ongoing in order to provide 
early detection of crises, so that the organisation can prepared. Darling (1994) 
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even goes so far as to suggest that a crisis can be curtailed through effective 
crisis management.  
 
Augustine (1995) incorporates into his definition of crisis management his belief 
that every crisis contains the potential for success as well as the risk of failure: 
Finding, cultivating, and harvesting that potential success is the essence of crisis 
management (Augustine 1995:148).   Through this definition Augustine gives 
crisis management the additional responsibility of improving the organisation. 
Mersham and Skinner’s (2002) definition, in contrast to that provided by 
Augustine (1995), has, perhaps, a more realistic approach to crisis management 
in that they ascribe it a protective role rather than an enhancement role.  
Mersham and Skinner also place the emphasis on the public relations or 
communications element of crisis management (2002:19): Crisis management 
involves public relations-led techniques to protect the company’s reputation 
and/or licence to operate when under threat from negative outside influences. 
 
Fearn-Banks (2002) contains her description of crisis management, and its aims, 
to reducing some of the risks and ambiguity posed by a crisis.  Like Darling 
(1994), Fearn-Banks (2002) includes planning as a key component of this 
definition.  Fearn-Banks (2002:2) states that: Crisis management is a process of 
strategic planning for a crisis or turning point, a process that removes some of 
the risk and uncertainty from the negative occurrence and thereby allows the 
organisation to be in greater control of its own destiny.  
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Kempner (1995) also acknowledges that proper preparation is a key factor in 
diminishing the potential negative impact of a crisis.  Kempner (1995) claims that 
it is not the crisis that causes the potential downfall of the organisation, but 
rather, the poor handling of it.  Anticipating potential problems and determining 
how to present them to the media will not just save valuable time during a crisis 
but will help an organisation to portray itself in the best light possible (Kempner 
1995). Herein, Kempner (1995) stresses the aspect of crisis management that 
pertains specifically to communication to the media. Kempner (1995:48) further 
argues that successful crisis management can have a beneficial effect on the 
organisation’s bottom line/profits.   
 
For the purposes of this study, the following brief definition, which incorporates 
the key elements identified by the aforementioned authors, is applied:  Crisis 
management is the preparation and management of an organisation’s response 
(including its communication to the media) during a crisis in a beneficial manner.  
 
According to Rockett (1999:7), crisis communication should not be viewed as a 
separate/speciality discipline to be managed only by public relations officers, 
communication practitioners or media specialists, but should be regarded as a 
corporate discipline directly overseen by the chief executive officer, and should 
be instilled into management at all levels.  In a similar vein, Darling (1994:4) 
suggests that organisations should capitalise on the expertise of appropriate 
individuals from various operational areas in order to plan for and manage the 
crisis situation. As discussed in the section that follows, an organisation that 
does not manage a crisis well may risk its legitimacy, or license to operate. 
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2.2.6   Organisational legitimacy described 
 
The concept of organisational legitimacy suggests than an organisation is 
granted legitimacy if stakeholders or the public believe an organisation is good, 
responsible and/or has the right to continue operations (Allen & Caillouet 1994; 
Hearit 1995).  According to Allen & Caillouet (1994), an organisation with a 
negative perception in the media as a result of the poor handling or management 
of a crisis may forfeit its organisational legitimacy.  Organisational legitimacy can 
therefore be linked to crisis management in the sense that both are regarded as 
managerial issues. 
 
Gouws, Grobler and Schoonraad (2005:284) describe the concept of 
organisational legitimacy as a licence to operate afforded by 
society/stakeholders. Stakeholders can be the general public, social groupings, 
regulatory bodies, organisational shareholders, staff and the like. Legitimacy is 
built by conforming to the social rules and expectations of stakeholders and is 
critical to the successful operation of an organisation (Coombs & Holladay 2006).  
Society judges the legitimacy of an organisation based on its image (Puth & 
Steyn 2000) and the image of an organisation has been linked to significant 
outcomes such as attracting customers, generating investment interest, access 
to infrastructure and resources, attracting top employee talent and positive 
media coverage (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Gouws et al 2005). 
 
A crisis is a threat or challenge to an organisation’s reputation, and thus to its 
legitimacy, and an organisation will use communication strategically in response 
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to threats to its legitimacy, in the hope of influencing how the public view the 
organisation (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Barton 2001; Marcus & Goodman 1991).  It 
could be said that a legitimacy gap arises if new information about the activities 
of an organisation suddenly becomes known, particularly if it differs dramatically 
from the image (Puth & Steyn 2000).  Crisis management is employed to restore 
an organisation’s legitimacy. 
 
According to Boyd (2000:342), the corporate desire for public legitimacy has not 
always existed.  In fact, before this century, corporations were not at all 
accountable to the consumer public, legally or otherwise, given that most of the 
regulatory agencies that govern corporate activity today did not exist (Boyd 
2000:342).  It was the investigative journalists of the early 20th century that 
changed the situation (Boyd 2000).  Several exposés about companies that 
carried out oppressive labour conditions and were corrupt, forced big business to 
counteract the negative publicity that had up to that point been avoided (Boyd 
2000).  Since then, new regulatory agencies, greater competition and increased 
awareness have reinforced the idea that corporations do require some degree of 
public support (Boyd 2000). Corporate governance, or the responsible 
leadership and management of an organisation (Naidoo 2002:1), has become an 
essential requirement of business.  It encompasses an organisation’s 
accountability to the broader society in which it operates.  Halal (2000:10) 
explains that corporate governance has evolved from a traditional profit-centred 
model to one which includes social responsibility.  The 1994 South African King 
Report on Corporate Governance was one of the first of its kind, worldwide, to 
advocate an integrated approach to corporate governance that goes beyond 
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financial and regulatory aspects to include good social and environmental 
practice – the triple bottom line (Gouws et al 2005; King Committee on Corporate 
Governance 2002).  
 
Nowadays, organisations attempt to influence public sentiment by various means 
such as identifying with legitimate external power figures, obtaining 
endorsements, making cash contributions to charity, complying with laws and 
standards, changing procedures, opening and closing communication channels 
and arguing that the organisation serves ends beyond its own (Gouws et al 
2005; Mersham, Skinner & Von Essen 2001). A crisis could disrupt this 
productive work and it therefore is necessary that an organisation learns how to 
manage a crisis successfully to prevent its legitimacy from being upbraided.  The 
next section on crisis communication with the media, an essential component of 
crisis management, deals with this issue. 
 
2.3 Crisis communication with the media 
 
This section deals with the aspect of crisis management that is the focus of this 
research: crisis communication with the media. Beginning with a definition of 
communication, relevant terms are described and defined for the purpose of 
clarity.   
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2.3.1 Communication defined 
 
Basic scientific or mechanistic definitions of communication describe it as the 
linear transmission and reception of information (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; 
Griffin 1997:1). An exclusively mechanistic approach suggests a rigid portrayal of 
communication (Angelopulo & Barker 2006).  Other more humanistic, 
approaches describe communication purely as the generation of meaning (Griffin 
1997:1). Building on from this, contemporary theory and definitions regard 
communication not only as a dynamic process of exchanging meaningful 
messages, but as a transaction between participants during which a relationship 
develops (Angelopulo 2000; Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Mersham, Skinner & 
Von Essen 2001:73). Relationship building and maintenance is therefore 
considered to be a critical component of communication. 
 
Most relevant to this study, because of its focus on organisational crises, is the 
definition of organisational communication provided by Puth and Steyn (2000:4) 
Corporate communication is communication on behalf of an organisation.  It is 
managed communication with the aim of increasing organisational effectiveness 
(and its reputation) by creating and maintaining relationships with stakeholders. 
This definition will be used for the purposes of this study because it incorporates 
the intentional aspect of communication, as well as the relationship component 
identified by scholars such as Angelopulo and Barker (2006).  However, an 
addition to the definition has been made in brackets in order to stress the 
influence that communication can have on an organisation’s reputation.  
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2.3.2    Media defined 
The term media, the plural of medium, generally refers to the means (or 
intermediate agency) for the dissemination of communication (Webster’s 
Dictionary 1995; Windahl, Signitzer & Olson 1992). Often the term is used 
synonymously with mass media (Webster’s dictionary 1995:615), where the 
organised means of communication such as radio, television, the press and the 
internet, is aimed at the widest possible audience (Federman 2004).  An 
individual corporation within the mass media is referred to as a media institution 
(Federman 2004). For the purposes of this study, the term media will refer 
collectively to the journalists who work for print media such as newspapers and 
magazines, digital media such as on-line/internet websites and broadcast media 
such as television and radio and news agencies (The Media List 2003).   
 
2.3.3 Crisis communication to/with the media 
 
Early definitions of crisis communication focus on the concept of persuasion and 
suggest that communication is asymmetrical, or one-way – from the organisation 
to the media. This reflects the sentiments of organisational power and control.  
For example, Sturges states (1994:303): The objective of crisis communication, 
beyond coping with the aftermath of the crisis, is to influence public opinion 
development to the point that opinions held after the crisis are at the same level 
or greater in positive opinions and at the same level or lower in negative 
opinions.                                          
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Coombs and Holladay’s (1996:280) definition reflects a similar paradigm: 
Communication can be used to influence how stakeholders interpret a crisis and 
the organisation in crisis.  In contrast, a basic, practical definition is offered by 
Mersham, Skinner and Von Essen (2001:287): Every large organisation must be 
prepared to handle enquiries from the media or other interested parties arising 
from a variety of crisis situations. These scholars suggest that crisis 
communication is largely reactive in response to approaches from journalists, 
and fail to mention the potential of crisis communication to influence public 
perceptions of the organisation.  
 
Fearn-Banks’s (2002) definition incorporates the concept of two-way 
communications between the public and the organisation, but suggests that 
crisis communication is merely akin to damage control.  In this, Fearn-Banks 
(2002) appears to ignore the opportunity for crisis communicators to enhance an 
organisation’s reputation by the effective management of a crisis:  Crisis 
communications is the dialogue between the organisation and its publics prior to, 
during, and after the negative occurrence.  The strategies and tactics are 
designed to minimise damage to the image of the organisation (Fearn-Banks 
2002:2). 
 
What can be interpreted by synthesising the essential components reflected in 
the definitions proposed by the aforementioned scholars, is that crisis 
communication, apart from having a practical role to dispense information to 
various publics during a crisis, can, like organisational communication (refer to 
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section 2.3.1) also be used proactively to guide and influence media and public 
perceptions about the organisation during a crisis.      
 
For the purposes of this study, crisis communication to the media shall 
therefore refer to a pro-active process of symmetrical and informative 
communication to the media during a crisis situation, carefully crafted to protect 
or even potentially enhance an organisation’s public image.  This description 
adequately incorporates the essential components of crisis communication. 
Crisis communication to the media forms an integral part of an overall crisis 
management plan (refer to section 2.3.7), which includes communication to other 
stakeholders such as government, clients and employees. Because the focus of 
this study is on communication to one particular stakeholder during a crisis – the 
media – the next section discusses the value of this process and why it is the 
strategic focus of this study. 
 
 
2.3.4   A contextualisation of the media and crises  
 
Although the importance of communication to the media in a crisis has already 
been discussed, the following quote from Fearn-Banks (2002:67) succinctly 
illustrates its significance: Do not assume that the crisis story will go away.  The 
media can do their stories without you.  They can build a case against your 
organisation, portrayed as “the bad guy,” by talking with disgruntled employees, 
volunteers and customers, and even more often, by seeking out disgruntled 
former employees, former volunteers, and former customers.  The media can 
also use computer files and call up long-forgotten problems and mistakes, and, 
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in a few seconds, regurgitate them and place them before the eyes and ears of 
the public.  The people thus hear the negative story. 
 
The media often transmit the opinions of the general public, as well as moulding 
public opinion, based on what they publish (Bloom 2001).   While the media 
respond to public awareness and opinions, it is the media themselves who are 
the major force in creating public opinion, according to agenda setting theory 
(Bloom 2001). The media dominates public information by serving as filters 
through which the public receives news and interpretations of crisis events 
(Bloom 2001).  The media can thus create a crisis out of an event by putting it in 
the spotlight or play down the event by ignoring it (Skinner 1995).  The 
information it chooses to publish, its visual and verbal symbols and the tone of its 
presentation can define the meaning of events and shape the attitudes of its 
audience (Bloom 2001).  The timing, content and tone of media coverage can 
upset or reassure the public or even create fear and complacency (Bloom 
2001:177). This persuasion technique is called the agenda setting theory and is 
closely related to the gate-keeping theory, which describes the function of editors 
who decide what and how a story is going to appear in the media (Bloom 2001). 
 
Although the prevailing view today is that media audiences are active 
participants and the media do not merely inject information into users (Bloom 
2001), organisational executives are highly sensitive about what gets published 
in newspapers and what is broadcast to the public about their organisation 
(Smith 2006). It is true, unfortunately, that bad news sells (Fearn-Banks 2002).  
A negative story is deemed more newsworthy than a positive one; the media 
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consider an organisation’s positive news as puffery (Fearn-Banks 2002:65). 
Positive news is looked upon as a form of advertising and the media believes 
that all advertising must be paid for (Levine 2006).  Bad news inevitably garners 
more public interest than good news.    
 
The media’s agenda in a crisis is to solicit facts and background information 
(Bloom 2001), in order to write a story with the purpose of meeting deadlines.  
By not providing a journalist with any facts, he or she will likely publish an article 
based on speculation (Bloom 2001).  According to Fink (2005), there can often 
be an adversarial relationship between the media and the subjects it covers. 
Negative perceptions occur in the media when a crisis is occurring, and most of 
these are based on misunderstandings (Bloom 2001).  According to Fearn-
Banks (2002), this is ultimately why the media warrants management.  Failure to 
manage the media suggests that the media will manage the organisation through 
bully tactics (Fearn-Banks 2002). When journalists request information the 
organisation in crisis must not ignore this, but rather view the request as an 
opportunity for the organisation to disseminate its message to the widest market 
of recipients (Gonzalez-Herrero 1996). The media will acquire a newsworthy 
story, regardless of the assistance of an organisation. An organisation has a far 
better chance of controlling the message and minimising the damage if it shares 
at least some information with journalists (Fink 2005). 
 
Fearn-Banks (2002:48) describes gotcha/in-your-face journalism, often not 
accurate journalism at all, as a relatively new source of crises, emerging in the 
1990s on television news shows and talk shows. Unlike the reputable 
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investigative news teams that have been doing consumer protection pieces for 
years, “gotcha” journalism has a new irresponsibility:  a drive to entertain the 
viewer more than to protect the consumer (Fearn-Banks 2002:48).  Levine 
(2006), trainer from the South African Institute for the Advancement of 
Journalism, warns of another development in the local media.  Levine (2006) 
notes that the young generation of new journalists tend to test the thin red line of 
slander while striving for celebrity status. The quality of journalism is on the 
decline and severe cost cutting exercises mean that fewer journalists are 
employed with less time to do research on stories.  Given this situation, 
organisations could, as part of their media relationship-building programmes, 
sponsor relevant educational seminars for young journalists.  For example, 
financial institutions could host training sessions for journalists and use various 
in-house specialists to give interactive presentations on their field of expertise.  
Topical events and information on relevant issues such as economics, the retail 
housing boom, interest rates, black economic empowerment and so on, could be 
discussed. This could serve to introduce new journalists to the banking field and 
encourage them to produce informed material.  It could also help to build positive 
relationships between the journalists and the organisational specialists which 
could lead to positive publicity, at no charge.  Journalists could be encouraged to 
contact the specialists for comment on various news stories and in this way, the 
organisation could become known as an expert or authority on financial matters.   
 
The media can be used as part of a strategy to contain the effects of the crisis 
(Mersham et al 2001:289).  Messages can be sent to customers and the public 
through interviews with journalists or placed on internet sites. The public can 
 44
perhaps even be invited and encouraged to provide feedback or comment.  
However, having an online blog (comment) site could provide ideas for additional 
negative angles to newspaper and broadcast journalists covering an 
organisation’s crisis.  A hypothetical example of a newspaper article follows:  
Today on Absa’s crisis hotline site, an irate customer, Mr Blog, posted a 
complaint that showed that despite Absa’s reassurances about the safety of 
online banking, his account has been hacked into three times in the last month. 
A comment or feedback process from customers to an organisation in crisis can 
provide valuable insights, but need not be posted on a public site. Two-way 
communication can help companies to know and understand their audiences 
and their grievances. Mersham et al (2001) suggest that an organisation can win 
the confidence of adversaries or critics such as journalists by asking for their 
help in developing solutions to problems. 
 
In summary, being accessible to the media and proactively communicating with 
journalists during a crisis is critical, according to Fink (2005:109) for the following 
reasons: 
• It allows the organisation to be proactive rather than reactive. 
• There is a greater chance of controlling the message. 
• There is a 100 percent greater chance of correcting misinformation than if 
there is no communication with the media. 
• Not engaging with the media sometimes makes the organisation look like 
it is not in control of the situation, and, furthermore, arrogant. 
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2.3.5   Communicating with the media during a crisis 
 
During a crisis, executives typically receive two opposing chunks of advice 
(Kaufmann, Kesner & Hazen 1994).  On the one hand, corporate lawyers may 
encourage extreme caution in speaking out publicly about a crisis.  On the other 
hand, academics and crisis communicators suggest that executives should make 
full and immediate disclosures about the circumstances surrounding the crisis 
(Kaufman et al 1994).  Though these two sides may not agree on what and how 
much should be said during crises, they both concur on one aspect:  What you 
say or do not say will determine the outcome of the crisis for the organisation 
(Kaufmann et al 1994). 
 
A policy of full disclosure during a crisis refers to communicating information 
about the crisis that is complete and timely to internal and external publics. 
Questions are answered completely and without delay.  As Augustine (1995:155) 
states:  One’s objective should be to get it right, get it quick, get it out, and get it 
over. Trust and open communication with customers, above all other 
organisation concerns, are critical (Augustine 1995:154).  When a response 
cannot be given immediately, investigations commence and a response is to be 
issued as soon as possible. The purpose of this open, timeous response 
appears to be to maintain credibility with an organisation’s key stakeholders such 
as shareholders, employees and the public.   Full disclosure is thought to 
minimise long-term damage to the organisation (Kaufmann et al 1994).   
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Another fundamental assumption of the argument for full disclosure is that all 
relevant information regarding the crisis will eventually emerge (Kaufmann et al 
1994).  Given this assumption, it is therefore essential for companies in crisis to 
deliver any bad news.  If the public were to hear such news from third parties, 
they may assume that the organisation is attempting to withhold important 
information from them and thus be deceptive.  Augustine states (1995:155): My 
experience has been that it is preferable to err on the side of over-disclosure, 
even at the risk of harming one’s legal position.  Credibility is far more important 
than legal positioning. Augustine (1995:155) goes on to say that sometimes a 
CEO must override the lawyers and that even in the face of contradictory 
evidence and confusing advice, one cannot simply remain silent. 
 
Kaufmann et al (1994) suggest that a policy of full disclosure might encourage 
an organisation to be forgiven for its role in the crisis (Kaufmann et al 1994). 
Advocates of full and immediate disclosure also contend that the need for such a 
policy is even more acute when dealing with the media (Kaufmann et al 1994).  
Journalists are under tremendous pressure to meet deadlines in covering crisis 
situations (Bloom 2000; Mersham & Skinner 2002).  If the information required is 
not provided swiftly by the organisation, they will seek it from other sources 
(Mersham & Skinner 2002).  The effect of this on the organisation can be serious 
especially if the other sources are less knowledgeable, less reliable, or less 
sympathetic.  Journalists may also approach sources that have a vested interest 
in wanting the organisation to appear in the worst possible light, such as 
attorneys for victims, competitors and special interest groups (Kaufmann et al 
1994). A policy of full and immediate disclosure may therefore afford the 
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organisation an opportunity to control how the message is presented to the 
public (Darling 1994; Kaufmann et al 1994). 
 
According to Kempner (1995), reporters should be given as much information as 
possible without jeopardising the organisation’s reputation or disclosing highly 
confidential information.  Although supporters offer compelling arguments for full 
disclosure, it is by no means an appropriate solution for all crisis situations 
(Kaufmann et al 1994).  This is predicated on the assumption that all relevant 
information will come out eventually.  The question is raised as to whether this is 
always the case. Kaufmann et al (1994:38) make the following point:  We have 
no way of knowing when an organisation has been successful in withholding 
information.  The fact that the public may not have heard about a particular 
episode may mean that the company has successfully handled its crisis 
internally and averted a more public incident.  What we do not see are 
companies that have adopted successful nondisclosure strategies. 
 
Although some lawyers acknowledge that their concern over litigation may 
subordinate other costs of the crisis, such as reputation loss, it is suggested that 
advocates of full disclosure may significantly underestimate the legal costs 
involved (Kaufmann et al 1994). The scope of potential negative publicity 
associated with a series of extensive public trials is inestimable (Kaufmann et al 
1994). Although open and complete communications during a crisis may 
reassure consumers and the public at large, it may ignore other groups to which 
management maintains a fiduciary responsibility, such as stockholders and 
creditors (Kaufmann et al 1994).  As such, decision makers who only consider 
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the interests of victims of a crisis may breach these necessary obligations 
(Kaufmann et al 1994).   
 
Thus a policy of full disclosure policy has its own costs and risks.  When crisis 
communicators encourage managers to act one way, while corporate lawyers 
advise them to act in an opposite fashion, senior executives may become 
confused. This raises the question as to which strategy executives should use to 
handle crisis communications.  Given that there is no single answer to this 
question, it is suggested that these decisions are contingent upon the situation.  
Kaufmann et al (1994:35) propose five questions that could help the executive to 
make these decisions.  They are: 
 
• Could non-disclosure be fatal or lead to further injury? 
If so, there can be no response other than full or timely disclosure.  This is 
the ethical stance that an organisation should assume in a crisis. Augustine 
(1995:155) suggests that senior executives set aside for a few minutes the 
voices of trusted advisers and, in as calm and dispassionate a manner as 
possible, evaluate in human terms the real issues and the real message.  
 
• Is your organisation the culprit or the victim?  
If the cause of the crisis is external to the organisation, full disclosure is 
advised because the organisation can present itself as a fellow victim. Given 
the low probability of an organisation being blamed for failures originating in 
its remote environment, it would appear relatively easy for an organisation to 
engage in two-way symmetrical information processing with parties in its 
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environment during such a crisis (Engelhoff & Sen 1992:263). If the 
organisation is the culprit, for example through negligence, it may be forced 
to pay huge punitive damages. Symmetrical information processing with 
outside parties is likely to be more difficult when failure originates in the 
firm’s relevant environment.  In this case the firm is more likely to be held 
responsible for the failure (Engelhoff & Sen 1992:470).                             .                         
 
• Are the fictions surrounding the crisis worse than the facts?  
Rumours about a crisis can be more negative and damaging than the truth.  
In this case it is far better to reveal the story in as rapid a manner as 
possible. However, communicators also need to be aware of and prepare 
for any deep-seated issues or organisational skeletons in the closet that 
may be exposed as a result of the crisis.  
 
• Can the organisation afford to respond after the crisis? 
An organisation that makes full disclosure but then fails to take corrective 
actions may significantly increase its liability.  Once liability is admitted, an 
organisation is legally liable to compensate victims for damages.  
Organisations not in a position to withstand the costs of such actions may 
want to rethink a strategy of full disclosure. 
 
• Can the organisation afford not to respond? 
Executives should remember that there are also costs of not responding.  
Disclosure is more important when used as a means of clearing the 
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organisation’s name in order to protect its overall reputation or other 
products in its dominant businesses. 
 
The preceding factors are important in helping managers identify an appropriate 
policy of crisis communications. Only with a complete understanding of the 
situation can executives do an effective job of weighing the total costs and 
benefits of disclosure.   
 
According to Fink (2005:112), regardless of whether a spokesperson faces 
friendly or hostile media in a one-on-one interview or press conference, honesty 
is an important consideration. He states: Being dishonest or less than honest 
with the media will only escalate your crisis into proportions that will stagger you. 
It will serve to destroy your present and future credibility with the media. 
However, it could be argued that sometimes it is necessary, for the 
organisation’s reputation, to withhold certain truths or information from the 
media. The crisis communication experts interviewed for this study all agree that 
honesty is paramount in dealing with the media, but at times appear to contradict 
this statement in their described actions, such as by withholding certain 
information.  While the spokesperson does not necessarily have to tell 
everything they know, whatever they say must be the truth (Smith 2006). 
Patterson (1993:48) warns:  Once a reporter is lied to, a financial organisation 
spokesperson will have destroyed their reputation with all of the reporters 
covering the crisis. A perceptive, investigative journalist is often able to detect 
deceptive or contradictory statements, as has been demonstrated countless 
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times by the cynicism, questions and incredulous attitudes reflected in media 
interviews and articles. 
 
Whatever the decision chosen, most scholars agree that as far as the actual 
response is concerned, spokespeople should be cautious of phrases such as no 
comment (Fearn-Banks 2002; Kauffmann et al 1994:39; Mersham & Skinner 
2002). These words are often interpreted as a confession of guilt. Even when no 
information is available, every effort should be made to ensure that reporters 
view the information as being provided as quickly as is possible (Kempner 1995; 
Mersham & Skinner 2002).  If the answer to a question is not yet known, 
responding with a reply such as we’re still examining that issue (Kempner 
1995:44) is acceptable, as long as a pledge is made – and kept – to relay the 
information to the reporter as soon as possible.  Mersham et al (2001:289) 
recommend that the organisation seize early initiatives by rapidly establishing 
the organisation as the single authoritative and reliable source of information 
about the crisis.  Birch (1994) advocates this approach even when the 
organisation has little information to impart.  How quickly and effectively an 
organisation responds affects its reputation, credibility, integrity and market 
performance (Calloway & Keen 1996:13). Organisations are advised to 
communicate regularly throughout the crisis but only with confirmed facts 
(Mersham et al 2001:289). The majority of the crisis communication literature 
wisely advises communicators not to speculate, not even minimally (Irvine & 
Millar 1999). 
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Even if an organisation intends to follow a controlled disclosure policy, 
professionals such as legal counsel, crisis experts and communication 
consultants should be used to construct an organisation’s message, to ensure its 
careful crafting so as not to alienate the public (Kaufmann et al 1994; Mersham 
& Skinner 2002).  To maintain or even enhance an organisation’s reputation 
despite the crisis, Mersham et al (2001:289) recommend that an organisation be 
prepared to demonstrate human concern for what has happened. Mersham et al 
(2001:289) advocate messages to the media that impart care about what has 
happened and clearly demonstrate that the organisation is trying to put matters 
right.  Augustine (1995) also stresses that the interests of the consumer must be 
top priority in all communications and advises against the use of jargon to ensure 
understanding of messages.  
 
The careful crafting of a message to protect an organisation is the work of crisis 
communicators, but this work, as will be discussed in the next section, can be 
viewed by journalists in a derogatory manner to be spin doctoring. 
 
2.3.6 Spin doctoring 
 
In South Africa, the media are assigned the role of watchdogs of industry (Bloom 
2000).  There is a strong belief in the business community that an anti-business 
bias exists among journalists and reporters, that prevents businesses from 
getting fair and objective public exposure (Bloom 2000). On the other hand, 
journalists consider crisis communicators or public relations practitioners in a 
derogatory sense, that is, to be spin doctors (Esser, Fan & Reinemann 2001).   
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The term spin doctor was coined by journalists to describe the work of political 
public relations experts or media manipulators (Esser et al 2001).  It has 
ominous, negative connotations, as a manipulator, conspirator and propagandist 
(Esser et al 2001:26).  Esser et al (2001:26) describe a spin doctor as someone 
(they make special reference to someone in politics), who attempts to influence 
public opinion by putting a favourable bias on information presented to the public 
or to the media. In an objective sense, that is precisely what a media department 
or public relations department undertakes to do.  It can be argued that the 
framing of a piece of information within the advocacy of an organisation is the 
essence of public relations practice (Mersham & Skinner 2001). 
 
Spin doctoring has become a widely used term, particularly by journalists, to 
discredit the work of communicators.  It suggests that communicators try to 
control the media’s coverage and interpretation of crises and problems (Esser et 
al 2001). Nonetheless, according to Esser et al (2001:40) the media are 
dependent upon the essential information provided by media strategists or 
communicators, and the journalistic use of the term spin doctor can be 
problematic if it is used to discredit the legitimate interest of politicians, parties 
and governments in asserting themselves against an autonomous and powerful 
journalism that pursues an agenda of its own and whose mechanisms and 
motives are not always exclusively oriented toward the public welfare.  
 
Putting the best light on a situation is, according to Mersham and Skinner (2002), 
a legitimate activity of media communicators.  Perhaps a more suitable word 
than spin should be used to describe this activity.  It is not lying: You should 
 54
never lie to the media (Smith 2006). Fink (2005:116) explains that crisis 
communications really is about what you say and how you say it and therefore 
truth or honesty, may be couched or framed in ways that protect the organisation 
from irreparable damage.  Following a crisis, a corporation attempts, in the words 
of Giacalone and Payne, (1990:24) to provide the public with a reasonable 
explanation for the event, carefully posturing the explanation to minimise the 
organisation’s blameworthiness.  In other words, the crisis communicators 
redefine an understanding of the “facts” surrounding a crisis. 
 
Woodward (2000:256), in his work on Transactional Philosophy, suggests that 
public relations has responded to criticisms against it by moving from one-way to 
two- way communication – and from emphasising knowledge and persuasion to 
relationship-building. Grunig’s (2000) theory of excellence also stresses a two-
way symmetrical approach to building relationships between organisations and 
their publics.  Grunig (2000:34) states: Recently, my research has moved toward 
the development and maintenance of relationships as the central goal of public 
relations.  This suggests that maintaining good relationships with journalists, as 
one of the key stakeholders of communication, is becoming a priority of 
organisational communicators, and should be a key feature of planning in 
advance for effective crisis communication, with the media. Symmetrical 
communication implies a greater emphasis on social responsibility and ethical 
behaviour on the part of communicators (Grunig 2000). 
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2.3.7   Planning in advance for crisis communication with the media   
 
In contemporary society, business crises are no longer a matter of if, but when, 
no longer the exception, but the expected – even the inevitable (Bloom 2001:79; 
Mersham & Skinner 2002).  Given that crises can damage – even terminally – 
careers or an organisation (Pinsdorf 1999) it is not unexpected that much of the 
literature on crisis management is focussed on planning for a crisis.  Planning in 
advance is an important element in a crisis management programme, so that 
when a disaster does strike, the crisis team will know exactly what to do about it 
and can be pro-active (Bloom 2001).  Formulating a response to a crisis when 
the pressure is intense is not the best option (Bloom 2001).  Failure to plan 
suggests that an organisation may go into defensive mode and react negatively 
(Regester & Larkin 1997).   
  
According to scholars such as Angelopulo and Barker (2006), Bloom (2001), 
Fearn-Banks (2002) and Skinner et al (2001), to lay the groundwork for 
successful crisis communications with the media, the crisis communications 
head should be an important part of the top management of the organisation. In 
addition, Angelopulo and Barker (2006) and Kaufmann, Kesner and Hazen 
(1994:38) recommend that a useful starting point for pre-crisis planning is to 
appoint a crisis management team composed of people who are creative, 
knowledgeable of the business, powerful (have the authority and responsibility to 
make decisions and allocate resources quickly), and are able to bring a variety of 
unique perspectives to bear on solving issues. Included in this team should be a 
lawyer, to explain the legal implications of disclosing information, and a public 
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relations expert, to explain the consequences of disclosure for the organisation’s 
image.  The team should also comprise a senior manager whose responsibility it 
is to combine the two types of advice and make a final decision on the optimal 
level of disclosure for an organisation during crisis (Kaufmann et al 1994:38). 
Programmes should be designed to build ongoing relationships prior to the crisis 
with all key stakeholders of an organisation such as the media, employees, 
unions, special interest groups, consumer advocates and other relevant parties 
(Puth & Steyn 2000). Training sessions to educate journalists about the 
organisation and its business can serve to build credible relationships with 
journalists (refer to section 2.3.4).  Sometimes these relationships can help 
prevent crises.  At other times, they can help lessen the severity of crises. 
According to Coombs and Holladay (2006) prior relationships with key 
stakeholders is an important consideration in protecting an organisation’s 
reputation during a crisis, and also helps to facilitate its repair.  
Identifying exactly which people could be affected by the crisis is an important 
consideration during the planning phases (Bloom 2001). Questions should be 
asked such as:  Who could be affected?  Who could affect us? Who needs to 
know? (Bloom 2001:102). This includes the internal staff as well as the public.  In 
this way the target population is segmented into smaller groups so that 
messages can be communicated with each of these groups. 
A two-way symmetrical programme of communications should be the basis of all 
organisational communication (Grunig 2000).  This is also referred to as the 
mutual understanding model in that the practitioner attempts to achieve a 
dialogue with strategic publics, not a monologue (Mersham & Skinner 2002). 
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Either management, or the publics, may make changes in behaviour as a result 
of this two-way model of communication.  This is in contrast to one-way models 
of communications that are premised on persuasion and very little feedback. 
Symmetrical communication means that the intended effect of the 
communication is of benefit to both parties equally, through an open and frank 
exchange of information (Grunig 2000). Asymmetrical communication implies a 
screening of the information communicated in order to favour one’s own position 
(Engelhoff & Sen 1992).   
 
As part of the planning process, the crisis team should anticipate issues that 
could turn into potential crises and rank them according to the probability and 
possible damage that might occur (Fearn-Banks 2002). This is termed issues 
management (Darling 1994; Fearn-Banks 2002; Mersham & Skinner 2002).  
Strategies and tactics are developed and implemented to lessen the likelihood of 
issues turning into crises (Angelopulo & Barker 2006).  The crucial element here 
is early identification of potential issues or crises and this is dependent on having 
symmetrical communications in place. Issues management is thus proactive 
(Puth & Steyn 2000). The solution might involve forming allies with potential 
adversaries or meeting with community activists to explain an issue that might be 
construed as damaging by consumers (Fearn-Banks 2002; Puth & Steyn 2000).  
The successful handling of an issue may prevent a crisis from occurring. What 
may assist this process is if the organisation conducts public opinion research or 
an audit on the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses (Bloom 2001; Puth & 
Steyn 2000). It is essential to have a full understanding relating to the potential 
threats to the business (Seymour 1996).  According to Fearn-Banks (2002), the 
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importance of the crisis inventory is to force organisations to consider the 
possibilities.  The ranking procedure may encourage ideas for prevention 
programmes. When formulating strategies to deal with crises, it is important to 
keep in mind the worst-scenario approach (Regester & Larkin 1997). Questions 
must be asked such as: Where are the greatest risks?  What are the implications 
if a crisis strikes? (Katz 1987:46).  Involved in this process is the reviewing of all 
previous crises faced by the organisation or its peers in the industry (Mersham & 
Skinner 2002). A news clipping service to pick up industry/product stories can be 
employed, but key to this is to analyse the information into a source of 
intelligence for the organisation (Irvine & Millar 1998).  
 
Next to the listing of potential crises, the information that the organisation is 
prepared to communicate should be noted (Fink 2005).  For example, in the 
case of internet fraud (refer to the Absa example in annexure A), backup 
statistics such as those listed below could enable the crisis team to quickly issue 
statements:  Prior to this incident of fraud, in the past five years only xxx 
incidents of fraud have been reported, which represents one percent of the total 
number of transactions done during this period. We have world-class security 
systems in place as reported by industry bench-marker, World Wide Works. 
 
The crisis communication plan forms part of a larger crisis management plan – 
which includes information such as evacuation procedures, emergency staffing, 
places to rent emergency equipment – or it could be a stand-alone document.  
Fearn-Banks (2002) states that it should be manageable and easy to read. A list 
of factors that should be included in the crisis communication manual includes: 
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• Names of members of the crisis team, their responsibilities/duties and 
phone numbers (Baird 2006). 
 
• The plan should identify the various stakeholders (such as the media, 
government, the public) for each potential crisis and appropriate contact 
details such as telephone and e-mail addresses must be readily 
available (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Baird 2006). 
 
• Pre-prepared messages or guidelines indicating what can be said in the 
first media statement (Baird 2006; Baker 2000) are helpful.  It is useful 
to have a straightforward one-paragraph statement that can be used 
until further information is available such as (Irvine & Millar 1998:40):  
Regarding the news report of a xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx this is what we 
can confirm at the present time.  At approximately xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx we 
were alerted that xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (fire, explosion, shooting, looting 
etc.). We have called for assistance from xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (police, 
fire, etc.) and have notified management.  At this point we do not have 
any details regarding what happened but will update you as soon as we 
have additional verified information.  Please bear with us in the 
meantime.  Thank you for your consideration. 
 
• Resources (where things are):  Establishment of a communication 
system and preparation of appropriate facilities and equipment 
(Mersham et al 2001; Baird 2006). 
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• Briefing notes (processes and how things work), or a clear definition of 
the organisation’s policy and procedures for handling a crisis 
(Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Mersham et al 2001; Puth & Steyn 2000). 
The briefing notes could include issues such as what medium of 
communication is most useful under what circumstances:  a press 
interview, press conference, holding statement, or media release. Added 
to this should also be a communication response list of actions that may 
need to be taken at the outset of the crisis (Mersham et al 2001). The 
crisis team must have knowledge of who the target audiences are likely 
to be, who the key people are in the organisation, what the internal 
briefing procedures are and what the external communications 
procedure is (Bloom 2001).  
 
• Facts and figures about the organisation, such as the number of staff 
employed and amount of bank branches, ATMs and their locations, 
amounts donated to charities, position papers representing the 
organisation’s view on various controversial topics such as bank 
charges, black economic empowerment, social responsibility and such 
relevant information, should be kept constantly updated  (Baird 2006). 
 
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of actions taken and the effects of the 
crisis on the organisation’s reputation (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Baird 
2006). 
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Being prepared involves planning, training, exercises and corrective action.  
Once the media training has taken place, the whole crisis plan needs to be 
tested (Regester & Larkin 1997:120).  This is carried out by conducting 
simulation and mock crisis drills to assess an organisation’s state of 
communication’s readiness (Bloom 2001; Baird 2006). The concept of realism is 
a crucial aspect and when a drill or exercise is developed it should be tailored to 
the exact needs of the financial organisation (Bloom 2001).   
 
According to Bloom (2001), the fact that an organisation has a set plan to deal 
with a range of issues and crises does not mean that it is ready to tackle any 
crisis. It should also be noted that a communications plan should be flexible 
(Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Bloom 2001), as circumstances change constantly 
and these must be managed to the organisation’s advantage. Flexibility is 
necessary, as responses need to adapt to new information coming in and to 
changes in circumstance (Carney & Jorden 1993).  Stevens (1999) warns 
against rigidity as no crisis will ever adhere to a preconceived blueprint.  Delaney 
(1991) concurs that a good crisis plan, no matter how detailed and complete, 
should only be used as a framework to consider issues and make informed 
decisions.  Bloom (2001) states that plans should never be used as a substitute 
for clear and firm decision making. Kaufmann, Kesner and Hazen (1994) agree 
that response policies, even if identified early, should be treated as guidelines 
rather than invariable rules carved in stone.  In a crisis, the key is to maintain 
flexibility so that the response fits the situation (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; 
Kaufmann et al 1994:38).  Flexibility, however, requires that crisis decision 
makers understand the full range of response options explained in section 2.3.5.   
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Media training, as discussed in the next section, is an important part of preparing 
for a crisis in advance. 
 
2.3.7.1   Media training 
 
Because of the potential influence that the media has on public perceptions it is 
necessary that a comprehensive media training programme forms part of any 
crisis plan. Mersham and Skinner (2002) claim that media training is vitally 
important, because if a spokesperson cannot handle a media interview, they can 
come across totally lacking in credibility and honesty.  Regester and Larkin 
(1997) concur that media training is important because it can influence 
perceptions about the organisation’s handling of a crisis.  Being media trained 
will help the spokesperson to be effective in communicating the organisation’s 
messages to its various publics.  The fact that the media can carry a 
spokesperson or their organisation’s image world wide in a split second 
underscores the necessity for media training. The alternative could be serious 
damage to an organisation’s reputation. 
 
One of the most highly regarded methods of media training, according to Baird 
(2006), is the effective development of question and answer sessions. It is in 
these sessions that potential probing questions that the media may ask the 
spokesperson are brainstormed and accurate, well-conceived answers 
developed to prepare the spokesperson in advance (Baird 2006; Bloom 2001; 
Carney & Jorden 1993; Mersham & Skinner 2002). Role-play is another valuable 
tool for media training (Baird 2006).  This is where a crisis team member adopts 
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the role of a journalist and puts the organisation’s spokesperson through a series 
of strenuous and aggressive interviews (Bloom 2001; Fearn-Banks 2002).  This 
is when the question and answer session, already mentioned, is applicable.   
 
A spokesperson can be trained to diffuse difficult or tricky questions and manage 
journalists who may be hostile (Baird 2006; Fearn-Banks 2002).  A skilled 
communicator will know how to turn an interview to his or her advantage by 
using the opportunity to promote the organisation’s key crisis messages, no 
matter how leading or antagonistic the questions from the interviewer (Baird 
2006; Fink 2005).  One tactic is for the spokesperson to refer only slightly to a 
negative question and then make a positive statement about the situation 
(Englehardt et al 2004).  For example, First Rand’s CEO (refer to Annexure B) 
used this tactic when he acknowledged the allegations against the organisation 
chairman but then assured the public that First Rand’s board followed the 
principles of independence.  
 
When dealing with broadcast reporters, corporate spokespeople should ideally 
answer questions with key messages in easily digestible 15-to-20-second sound 
bites, rather than longer statements that can be taken out of context through the 
video editing process (Baird 2006; Kempner 1995:47; Mersham & Skinner 2002).  
Should the spokesperson need a moment or two to derive a positive, informative 
reply, repeating the question buys a little more time (Kempner 1995:47).   
 
According to Mersham and Skinner (2002:100), the spokesperson is the key 
individual in crisis communication. They state: In the eyes of the public and the 
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media, this person represents the total company and what it stands for.  Due to 
the importance of selecting a spokesperson carefully, the following section 
provides some guidelines for this process. 
 
2.3.7.2   Selecting a media spokesperson 
 
Mersham and Skinner (2002) suggest that centralising all media contacts with a 
single spokesperson minimises the possibility of conflicting statements.  
Kaufmann et al (1994:38) also recommend that a single person should be 
identified to handle public communications because organisations that do not do 
this in advance may find themselves facing a confusing array of mixed 
messages when a real crisis hits. Coombs (1999b) also suggests that 
responding consistently during a crisis is advisable to make messages credible.   
 
Very often it is recommended, in the case of serious crises, that the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) becomes the spokesperson for the organisation (Fearn-
Banks 2002; Mersham & Skinner 2002).  In contrast, Irvine and Millar (1998:88) 
argue that the CEO should not be the primary spokesperson for the organisation 
during a crisis. The reason they give for this is that if the CEO makes a mistake 
or does not convey the important points in a convincing, compassionate way, no 
one else in the organisation is in a position to undo the damage (Irvine & Millar 
1999). Kaufmann et al (1994) propose that the spokesperson should vary 
depending on the crisis.  Although the media would prefer this person to be the 
CEO, it may not always be the most appropriate choice.  This is because the 
CEO may be weak in certain areas, such as technical knowledge, and thus may 
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be less effective (Kaufmann et al 1994:38).  However, Augustine (1995) argues 
that in situations that truly threaten the organisation’s reputation or existence, the 
CEO belongs in the front lines.  The crisis communication consultants in the 
case studies (refer to Annexure A, B and C), regarded the CEO as the most 
appropriate person to handle the crises that they were confronted with because 
of their perceived severity (internet fraud: Absa; hostile take-over: Standard 
Bank; actions of non-executive chairman: First Rand). It thus appears that the 
choice of spokesperson should be dependent on the nature and severity of the 
crisis situation.   
 
An important criterion for any spokesperson is that he/she must be accessible 
throughout the crisis to meet with journalists and to answer their questions 
(Engelhardt et al 2004).  The CEO of Standard Bank’s (refer to Annexure B) 
willingness to answer questions, and even personally meet with journalists and 
receive phone calls from reporters in the weeks following Nedbank’s hostile take-
over attempt, is an example of Druckenmiller’s (1993) protection of corporate 
image via accessibility to the CEO in action.                                                     
  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on crisis communication with the media and defined and 
described crisis, crisis communication and crisis management from different 
scholarly perspectives.  It is suggested that a notable part of the literature is 
focused on the fundamentals of planning for a crisis, media training and 
selecting a media spokesperson and that lesser attention is given to the actual 
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content of crisis communications.  Media attention is identified in the literature as 
endemic to most crisis situations (Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Mersham & Skinner 
2002) and scholars such as Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2004) concur that an 
organisation’s response to journalists can have far reaching effects on its 
reputation. The focus of this research – communication to the media during a 
crisis – is therefore given credence.   
 
The following definition of crisis communication to the media was developed to 
incorporate its essential components: Crisis communication is a pro-active 
process of symmetrical and informative communication to the media during a 
crisis situation, carefully crafted to protect or even potentially enhance an 
organisation’s public image.  
 
The argument is made that although prior planning is essential to good crisis 
communication management, the key in a crisis is to maintain flexibility so that 
the response suits the situation and can adapt to changes in circumstances. 
Flexibility requires that crisis decision makers understand the full range of 
response options.  
 
A point raised in this chapter is that in a crisis, executives usually receive two 
opposing recommendations (Kaufmann, Kesner & Hazen 1994).  On the one 
hand corporate lawyers may encourage extreme caution in speaking out publicly 
about a crisis.  On the other hand, academics and crisis communicators suggest 
that executives should make full and immediate disclosures about the 
circumstances surrounding the crisis (Kaufman et al 1994).  Though these two 
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opinions may not agree on what and how much should be said during crises, 
they both concur on one aspect:  What you say or don’t say will determine the 
outcome of the crisis for the organisation (Kaufmann et al 1994). 
 
The careful crafting of a message to protect an organisation is the work of crisis 
communicators but, as explained, this work is often described in a derogatory 
sense by journalists as spin doctoring. It was suggested that reframing or putting 
the best light on a situation to protect an organisation, without lying, is 
acceptable public relations practice.  
 
Theories and models relevant to the field of crisis management and 
communication are discussed in chapter three which follows. Many of the 
principals discussed in this chapter are incorporated into the theories and 
models discussed in chapter three. 
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CHAPTER THREE   
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND 
MODELS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter two, principles relevant to the study of crisis management and crisis 
communication to the media (a component of crisis management) were 
discussed and contextualised. Media attention was identified as a common 
thread running through all organisational crises and the importance of 
communicating to the media during a crisis was highlighted.  It was 
acknowledged that the content of crisis communication – what an organisation 
says to the media or does – can have a critical impact on an organisation’s 
reputation.  
 
In this chapter, theories and models relevant to the field of crisis management 
and crisis communication are discussed in order to lay a foundation for the 
conceptual model of crisis communication to the media as proposed in chapter 
six. These theories range from the traditional linear to the more progressive 
open systems approaches. While these approaches acknowledge the 
importance of communication decisions made during a crisis, none of them 
actually examines the content of these decisions in detail.  The exception is the 
situational crisis communication theory, elements of which have been adapted 
for the basis of the conceptual model designed from this research. 
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3.2 Dominant theoretical approaches to crisis management and crisis 
communication:  traditional linear versus progressive systems 
approaches 
 
This section presents an overview of selected theoretical approaches to crisis 
management and discusses the most prominent models emanating from these 
approaches. According to Hale, Dulek & Hale (2005), crisis management is 
multidisciplinary, uniting management theory with psychological, social political 
and public relations perspectives. A theoretical approach, in the context of this 
study, refers to ways of conceptualising and practicing crisis management 
(Angelopulo 1997). Models derived from theories refer to simplified ways of 
representing the thinking on crisis management and crisis communication, 
much of which has been discussed in chapter two. These models can also be 
described as pictures but could be criticised because they tend to over-simplify 
dynamic communication processes.  However, they provide order to sometimes 
complex issues which allows for clarification and interpretation. Theoretical 
approaches and models are often tested for their viability. 
 
For the past century, both the natural and social sciences have been dominated 
by metaphors of well-regulated and predictable machines (Gayeski & Majika 
1996:22).  According to Gayeski and Majika (1996:22) much classic crisis 
management research has been based on a mechanistic view of control.  For 
every action, there was a specific reaction and communicators believed that it 
was possible to predict how audiences would react to a carefully crafted 
message (Gayeski & Majika 1996:22).  This traditional linear cause-effect view 
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is questioned by progressive systems theory which takes into account the 
dynamic interdependence of factors such as context and the mind in meaning-
making (Bruner 1990; Gergen 1999).  The calculation of probabilities, rather 
than absolute predictions has become the norm (Gayeski & Majika 1996). 
 
The application of the traditional linear approach to crisis management and 
crisis communication suggests the following:  
 
• In the old traditional paradigm of seeing the world and organisations in a 
linear, mechanistic way, crises were seen as signs of trouble (Keene 
2000: 15).  Organisations following this approach seek to control their 
environment and experience frustration when it behaves in a way that is 
incongruent and in conflict with the operation of the organisation.   
 
• The organisation is viewed as a closed system with information only 
flowing out of it in a linear, one-way fashion (Grunig 2000). Such 
asymmetrical or persuasive communications (Grunig 2000) is the key to 
control or manipulation. These dyadic, sender-receiver models 
emphasise transmissions and their effects (Woodward 2000:258).  
 
• Traditional organisations are essentially conservative and resist change 
at all costs (Grunig 2000). The crisis communicator’s role is to defend the 
status quo (Holtzhausen 1995). 
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• The linear assumption is that there are defined steps or actions the crisis 
communicator can take to control the situation during a crisis. The 
traditional view focuses on ways to simplify things in an effort to get 
control (McDaniel 1997:26). 
 
In contrast progressive, systems approaches to crisis communications are 
premised on the following assumptions: 
 
• Environments are dynamic and change and uncertainty will come to pass 
irrespective of organisational efforts to control and direct (Keene 
2000:16).  Crises are viewed as leading to opportunity or beneficial 
restructuring (Bloom, Crystal & Verwey 2002).  
 
• The organisation is viewed as a system open to other interpenetrating 
systems and freely exchanges information with those systems. The 
emphasis is on relationships, two-way communication, inter-
connectedness and interdependence (Pearson 1989b:72) while taking 
into account social, economic and political contexts (Woodward 2000). 
 
• Crisis communication encourages understanding between the 
organisation and its publics, is ethical and socially responsible; 
persuasion and one-way or asymmetrical communication is less 
desirable (Grunig 2000). Crisis communicators practising symmetrical 
public relations tend to have an interactive and cooperative relationship 
with the media whereas asymmetrical or traditional practitioners usually 
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try to manipulate the media agenda and continually experience conflict 
with journalists (Grunig 1990). 
 
• The crisis communicator’s role is to assist the organisation to co-operate 
and adjust to the outside environment through negotiation not through 
linear, controlled steps or force (Holtzhausen 1995:52).  Mersham et al 
(2001) believe that the crisis communicator should solicit the public’s 
involvement in the problem as they can assist in solving the crisis. 
 
The following table illustrates the main differences between the two contrasting 
approaches. 
 
Table 3.2:  
Summary of differences between the traditional linear versus progressive 
systems approaches 
 
Views  Traditional Linear 
Approach 
Progressive Systems 
Approach 
Organisations Closed systems Open, interconnected 
systems 
Communication Asymmetrical (one-way) Symmetrical (two-way) 
Crises Signs of trouble.   
Seeks to control. 
Opportunities for 
improvement. 
Co-operate and adjust to 
changes through 
stakeholder negotiation 
and support. 
 
 73
The progressive systems approach is in itself a criticism of the traditional linear 
approach in that it presents an alternative, contrasting view.  Unlike the linear 
approach, the systems approach acknowledges the interconnectedness of 
organisations to their dynamic environments.  It recognises that in order to 
succeed organisations need to understand and adapt to situations, rather than 
to resist in favour of the status quo. Two-way symmetrical communication is 
favoured as a means to engage with publics and solicit their support, instead of 
one-way persuasive communication styles - the preference of traditional 
organisations. 
 
Based on these differences, the models and theories discussed in the next 
section can be classified on a continuum between the linear, traditional 
approaches to the more progressive systems approaches.   
 
3.3. Models leaning towards the traditional continuum 
 
The following models can be described as leaning towards the traditional 
continuum: 
• Meyers and Holusha’s model  
• Stage models of crisis:  Fink, Mitroff, Horsley and Barker  
• Hale, Dulek and Hale’s linear crisis response model 
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3.3.1. Meyers and Holusha’s Model (1986) 
 
Meyers and Holusha’s model (1986) can be viewed as a traditional model 
because of its bias towards control. The relevance of it to the field of crisis 
communication is that it provides a framework for practitioners to understand 
crises and act accordingly.   
 
Meyers and Holusha’s model analyses a crisis on the basis of four major 
considerations (Meyers & Holusha 1986:207-216): 
• Dimension:  the size of the crisis 
• Control: the ability of the organisation to influence the environment 
• Time: the time in which the organisation has to manoeuvre 
• Options: the number and quality of options available to the organisation 
 
According to Meyers and Holusha (1986), the way in which these factors relate 
indicate what management tools should be applied.  For example, a crisis that 
can be categorised as low dimension, low control, means that the outcome 
does not greatly depend on how management acts or what communication is 
issued to the media (Gonzalez-Herrero 1994).   
 
A crisis that can be categorised as high dimension, high control signifies that 
the situation is of greater seriousness, but the organisation is still able to 
effectively manage the crisis.  However, an incorrect action or badly compiled 
communication could put the organisation at risk (Coombs 2004). 
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The most threatening categorisation is that of high dimension, low control.  In 
this case the type of communication actions taken are extremely critical, as the 
risks to the organisation are great (Meyers & Holusha 1986).  
 
Like Cantor’s (1989) description of crises based on their time-scale (refer to 
section 2.2.2), Meyers and Holusha’s model (1986), while providing a useful 
categorisation of the nature of a crisis and the available time and necessity for 
response, does not offer anything further.  Its value is restricted to mere 
description and categorisation and it provides no guidelines or tools on how to 
manage stakeholders such as the media or staff in each crisis category.  It 
could also be argued that Meyers and Holusha’s model (1986) can only really 
be applied retrospectively, after a crisis.  This is because it is not always 
possible to know at the outset what the dimensions of the crisis will be or how 
long it will last.  
 
It could also be argued that every crisis, no matter how small or insignificant it 
may initially appear, should be dealt with as if it was in the most dangerous 
category as proposed by Meyers and Holusha (1986).  This is because a small 
crisis or issue could develop into a larger, more serious challenge.  In fact, the 
control of issues, before they get to crisis point, is acknowledged in the literature 
as an important component of crisis management (Fearn-Banks 2002; Fink 
1986).  Issues management is discussed in section 2.3.7 titled planning in 
advance for crisis communication with the media.  Meyers and Holusha’s (1986) 
belief that the outcome of low dimension, low control is not dependent on 
how management act or what communication is issued to the media - is 
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challenged.  It is proposed that an incorrect action or inconsiderate/ill-
considered communication to the media can create additional bad publicity for 
an organisation.  The views of authors such as Bloom (2001), Mersham & 
Skinner (2002), Fearn-Banks (2002), Hale, Dulek and Hale (2005) presented in 
section 2.3.4 support this statement by underscoring that an organisation’s 
response to journalists can have far reaching effects on its reputation.  It could 
thus be disputed that the categorisation proposed by Meyers and Holusha 
(1986) could be more damaging than useful. The limitations of Meyers and 
Holusha’s model (1986) preclude its inclusion into the model to be developed 
through this research.   Fink’s model (1986), to be discussed, highlights the 
importance of recognising prodromes or warning signs and thus addresses 
one of the chief criticisms of Meyers and Holusha’s (1986) model which is the 
lack of attention to issues that could evolve into crises. 
 
3.3.2 Stage models of crisis:  Fink (1986); Mitroff (1988); Horsley and 
Barker (2002) 
 
In this section, three influential stage models of the entire crisis management 
cycle will be discussed. These models lean towards the traditional continuum 
because of their step-by-step linear description of crises. They include Fink’s 
(1986) stage model of crisis, Mitroff’s (1988) stage model of crisis and Horsley 
and Barker’s (2002) synthesis model of crisis management.  The principals of 
these models are reflected in the literature on crisis management discussed in 
chapter two. 
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3.3.2.1 Fink’s stage model of crisis 
 
Fink’s (1986) stage model of crisis uses the metaphor of illness and details four 
distinct stages or stages through which a crisis evolves: 
•  Prodromal or prevention  
• Acute  
• Chronic  
• Crisis resolution 
 
His emphasis is strongly on the prevention or prodromal stage. He believes 
that crises, like illnesses, usually present warnings which he terms prodromes 
(Calloway & Keen 1996). Long before a triggering event occurs, symptoms 
appear as precursors to a crisis (Sturges 1994).  These precursors represent 
repeated messages and persistent sets of clues that, if recognised, may help an 
organisation to implement activities intended to anticipate a crisis in order to 
exploit its benefit or reduce its negative consequences (Sturges 1994).  
Sometimes these may be as obvious as union leaders informing management 
that members will strike in 24 hours.  Other prodromes can be oblique and hard 
to recognise (Calloway & Keen 1996) and it is incumbent on management to 
uncover and address these. Any measure, such as a risk audit, that minimises 
the uncertainty in a given situation and thereby allows for more control of an 
outcome is, according to Fink (1986:19), a form of crisis management. Fink 
(1986) suggests that it is much easier for the crisis team to address a crisis in 
its prodromal stage. 
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The literature supports Fink’s (1986) focus on prevention.  For example, 
Gonzalez-Herrero (1994) suggests that an organisation should scan the 
environment looking for trends that may affect it in the near future – also called 
issues management.  Organisations that remain sensitive to their environments, 
to important audiences, and to relevant trends are better positioned to 
recognise a crisis (Sturges 1994).  Refer also to discussions on issues 
management which support Fink’s model in section 2.3.7. 
 
The acute stage evolves when efforts at avoidance fail and events trigger a 
crisis.  This stage is described by Fink (1986) as high in intensity and speed and 
it is believed that the ability of management to control this stage depends on the 
quality of planning undertaken in the earlier stage.  Nevertheless the key, 
according to Fink (1986:23), is to try and control as much of the crisis as 
possible by, for example, deciding to release the bad news to the media after 
journalist deadlines on a Friday afternoon.  This would mean that the media 
would have to go with the story as presented by the organisation, or maybe not 
even use the story at all. 
 
The chronic crisis stage is, according to Fink (1986:23), a period of recovery, 
healing or self-analysis. During this time the crisis is turning the corner and the 
organisation is perceived to be resolving the issues (Glascock 2004).  It could 
also be a time of financial upheaval, management shake-ups, hostile take-overs 
or bankruptcy (Fink 1986).  A skilful crisis manager will analyse the 
management of the crisis and take appropriate actions to rectify any mistakes.  
The chronic stage can linger indefinitely, but according to Fink, those 
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organisations without a crisis management plan suffer the lingering effects of a 
crisis much longer than those that are prepared. While Fink (1986) offers no 
clear-cut distinction between the acute and chronic stages, one criterion might 
be the intensity of media coverage, which may lessen during the chronic stage 
(Glascock 2004). 
 
The crisis resolution stage in Fink’s model means that the crisis is over.  
Using Fink’s analogy of illness, the patient becomes well and whole again 
(Glascock 2004:42). However, Fink warns that crises historically evolve in a 
cyclical fashion and that another prodromal signal may be on the horizon, 
thereby suggesting the start of a new crisis (Fink 1986). In this, Fink (1986) 
suggests that an organisation should always be on guard for signs of crisis, a 
warning that is reflected in the literature on crisis management discussed in 
chapter two. 
 
The influence of Fink’s model on the field of crisis management is clear in that 
much of the literature is focused on the prevention/planning stages (refer to 
chapter two).  Fink’s model offers a useful description and understanding of the 
stages of a crisis but does not appear to provide much detail on how an 
organisation should respond to a crisis in the media, or the content of such 
communication. 
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3.3.2.2   Mitroff’s stage model of crisis 
 
Mitroff’s (1988:15-21) stage model is similar to that of Fink’s with the exception 
of an additional stage.  Mitroff’s (1988) five-stage model is based on the stages 
through which a crisis moves and on the corresponding types of crisis 
management:   
• signal detection,  
• preparation/prevention,  
• containment/damage,  
• recovery and  
• learning.  
 
By describing two stages before the actual crisis event takes place, as opposed 
to Fink’s (1986) single prodromal stage before the crisis hits, Mitroff (1988) 
places even more emphasis on the prevention stage of crisis management.  
 
Signal detection and preparation/prevention constitute proactive types of 
crisis management and are aimed at preventing crises from occurring (Mitroff 
1988). Actions during this stage could include the creation of crisis teams, crisis 
training and simulation exercises as discussed in chapter two. 
Containment/damage limitation and recovery are reactive activities conducted 
after a crisis to contain its damage or recover from its effects. Like Fink (1986), 
Mitroff (1988) believes that the success of containment depends on the 
planning stage as it is difficult to innovate during the crisis. During the recovery 
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stage the organisation reinstates its normal business operations (Calloway & 
Keen 1996).  
 
The two stage models of crisis management by Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988) 
clearly emphasise the importance of the planning stage to the success of crisis 
management and are thus pro-active in approach. A constructive insight 
gleaned from both authors is the value of issues management – to prevent 
issues from becoming crises. This insight has found its way into crisis 
management literature (refer to 2.2.5). However as Pearson and Claire (1998) 
warn, executives may develop a false sense of security around their crisis 
prevention plans and may be taken completely off guard when a crisis strikes.  
Both Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988) do appear to place more emphasis on the 
stages prior to the crisis, rather than on the actual crisis stage which occurs 
when efforts in previous stages have failed to curtail the onslaught of a crisis. It 
could also be said that a crisis cannot always be planned for because it is not 
expected. 
 
A further criticism is that these scholars describe a linear, orderly progression of 
stages, from signal detection to the recovery of normal operations after the 
crisis - which may not necessarily describe the evolution of a dynamic crisis. 
According to scholars such as Seitel (2001), discussed in section 2.2.4, 
escalating events, floods of queries from journalists and chaos are 
characteristic of most crises environments.  Nevertheless, Fink (1986) and 
Mitroff (1988) make the important point of stressing the inevitability of crises and 
the necessity for vigilance. 
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The next stage model by Horsley and Barker (2002) appears to build on the 
models described by Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988) by including in the planning 
stage the important criteria of relationship building or public relations prior to the 
crisis and on an on-going basis.  These criteria are neglected by the 
aforementioned models. By suggesting that relationship building is a continuous 
process, Horsley and Barker’s (2002) model appears to be a slightly less linear 
and step-by-step as compared to the models proposed by Fink (1986) and 
Mitroff (1988). 
 
 
 
3.3.2.3   Horsley and Barker’s synthesis model of crisis management: 2002 
 
Horsley and Barker’s (2002) synthesis model of crisis management provides a 
partial insight into the understanding of crisis management and crisis 
communication.  Horsley and Barker’s (2002:416) synthesis model includes the 
following five interconnected stages or stages: 
• ongoing public relations efforts;  
• identification of and preparation for potential crises;  
• internal training and rehearsal;  
• the crisis event or crisis response stage;  
• the evaluation and revision of public relations efforts.  
 
Highly notable is that Horsley and Barker (2002) allocate three stages to the 
preparation for a crisis, to highlight its importance, which differs from Mitroff’s 
(1988) allocation of  two preparation stages and Fink’s (1986)  specification of 
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only one stage prior to the actual crisis event which he terms the prodromal 
stage.  
 
 
Stage one: planning or prevention/ongoing public relations efforts 
 
Like Mitroff (1988) and Fink (1986), Horsley and Barker (2002) advocate a pro-
active approach to crisis communication and crisis management.  However, 
Horsley and Barker (2002) retain a focus on diligent image building and 
continuous thought to public and media relations in good times so as to ensure 
that communication systems are in place when they are really needed – during 
a crisis (Horsley & Barker 2002).  A constructive relationship with the media 
helps companies to relay their messages during a crisis, and a good 
relationship with customers and shareholders increases the credibility of those 
messages (Horsley & Barker 2002). Companies that constantly cultivate a 
positive image are, according to Mersham and Skinner (2002), better able to 
withstand a crisis because they are already perceived as being honest and 
candid in their communication efforts.  Sturges (1994) argues that one of the 
key objectives in crisis management and crisis communication is damage 
control, but acknowledges that planning only for damage control results in 
activities that may be too late to secure positive relationships important to the 
organisation.  The real work of influencing relationships should be conducted 
well before a crisis arises (Horsley & Barker 2002; Sturges 1994).  Some 
organisations invest considerable resources in advocacy or institutional 
advertising and community welfare programs with the objective of creating 
positive opinions about the organisation in the minds of the public before a crisis 
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event occurs (Ruiters 1999; Skinner 1995; Sturges 1994). Horsley and Barker’s 
(2002) stage one reflects and organises much of what has been discussed in 
section 2.3.7 around symmetrical communication. 
 
Stage two - planning: identification of and preparation for potential crises   
 
The literature (refer to chapter two) stresses the importance of having an 
effective crisis communication plan in place well before a crisis even occurs 
(Bloom et al 2002; Gonzalez-Herrero 1994; Horsley & Barker 2002) (refer to 
section 2.3.7). Planning is the bedrock of crisis management (Gonzalez-Herrero 
1994). In this process, good communicators identify potential threats or risks to 
the organisation (Mersham & Skinner 2002), their possible impacts and prepare 
for them. “What if” scenarios might be likened, in geopolitical terms to war-
games (refer to section 2.3.7).  A coherent approach to planning for a crisis 
begins with the identification of potential crises, including issues that may turn 
critical, crises that have beset the organisation in the past and may recur, and 
crises that are known to have affected comparable organisations (Fearn-Banks 
2002; Regester  & Larkin 1997). All crises, or worst-case scenarios cannot 
possibly be predicted, but good plans that have top management support 
(Fearn-Banks 2002; Seitel 2001) can be used as a flexible framework to make 
informed decisions. This stage of Horsley and Barker’s (2002) model is very 
similar to the early planning stages described by Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988). 
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Stage three - planning: Internal training and rehearsal   
 
A written crisis communication plan in conjunction with preparation actions such 
as media training and mock crisis drills ensures that all members of a crisis 
team know their roles and are prepared to handle their allocated tasks (Horsley 
& Barker 2002). Training of spokespeople to deal with journalists is critical in 
this stage because when the crisis spills over into the public eye, the 
organisation spokesperson will have to face the media and give an opinion on 
the crisis (refer to section 2.3.7.1). It is important that the spokesperson knows 
exactly what the journalists seek, and will need to know how to answer both 
aggressive and friendly queries from the media (Bloom 2001).  The importance 
of selecting the right spokesperson for the job has been discussed in section 
2.3.6.2. Once again this stage can be likened to the early planning stages 
described by Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988). 
 
 
Stage four – crisis response: The crisis event   
 
 
The crisis response stage which has been selected as the focus of this study is 
entered into when all avoidance efforts fail and events trigger a crisis (Hale et al 
2005). This is the stage that involves the immediate minutes, hours, days or 
weeks after the crisis and is characterised by short decision time, complexity 
and ambiguity (Hale et al 2005; Pearson & Claire 1998). Quality decisions are 
the result of quality information (Coombs 1999) and it is thus important that the 
crisis team receive up-to-date information about the crisis from reliable sources.  
According to Hale et al (2005), it is dangerously common to receive incorrect, 
incomplete and inconsistent data during crisis response.   
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The importance of the manner in which an organisation reacts and 
communicates at this stage has been discussed in chapter two.  As succinctly 
expressed by Calloway and Keen (1996) how quickly and effectively an 
organisation responds often affects its reputation, credibility, integrity of 
operations and market performance. Most organisations depend on crisis teams 
for decision-making during a crisis and it is necessary for these teams to be 
supported by appropriate information and communications technology 
(Calloway & Keen 1996).  After a crisis occurs, prompt, open and concerted 
two-way communication, firstly to staff, and then externally to the media, 
prevents rumours and speculation. As advocated by Fearn-Banks (2002) (refer 
also to section 2.3) using the media to diffuse information is a key element in 
maintaining good public relations (Fearns-Banks 2002).  Silence in the midst of 
a crisis implies guilt, whether justified or not, and reporters face deadlines hour 
by hour (Gonzalez-Herrero 1994). Resolving the crisis in an ethical and 
compassionate manner is crucial (Horsley & Barker 2002). Media attention is 
prevalent at this stage and crisis response communication involves making 
decisions regarding whether and what amount of information to share (refer to 
section 2.3.5).   
 
Stage five – recovery: evaluation and revision of public relations efforts   
 
Over time, the risk of additional direct damage subsides and organisations enter 
the final stage of the crisis management process, namely recovery (Hale et al 
2005).  Recovery involves attempts to learn in hindsight from the event 
internally and managing public perceptions externally (Horsley & Barker 2002).  
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An organisation’s leaders need to demonstrate that they have recovered from 
the crisis, have made changes to prevent it from re-occurring, and are prepared 
to deal with future potential crises (Horsley & Barker 2002). It could be argued 
that these actions should be taken during the crisis and not after it, in order to 
influence public sentiment and to resolve the crisis at the critical time. An 
organisation can create additional media opportunities by providing follow-up 
stories and progress reports and thus handle negative situations in a positive 
way (Horsley & Barker 2002).   
 
Like Fink (1986) and Mitroff (1988), Horsley and Barker (2002) do not place 
much emphasis on the crisis event or crisis response stage other than to 
describe it. Crisis management literature (also refer to chapter two) recognises 
the need to approach each of the crisis stages with a focus to meeting the 
different management needs and challenges represented by different dynamics 
and dimensions in each stage (Sturges 1994).  But communication during the 
crisis situation remains relegated to generalities about accuracy and timeliness, 
without regard to meeting the audience’s psychological needs during the 
passage of a crisis (Sturges 1994). The steps leading up to the crisis and after 
the crisis in the recovery stage are given more emphasis.  The next model to be 
discussed addresses this gap by including a description of the communication 
decision-making process involved in the crisis response stage during the actual 
crisis. 
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3.3.3   Hale, Dulek and Hale’s linear crisis response model: 2005 
 
Hale et al (2005) propose a process-oriented approach to crisis management.  
Their linear crisis response communication model suggests that crisis response 
communication actions follow a pattern of five sequential but interdependent 
steps (Hale et al 2005:119) as shown below: 
 
Triggering event→Observation→Interpretation→Choice→Dissemination               
 
Figure 3.3   Hale et al’s linear crisis response model  
 
Following a crisis, fast and accurate information about the crisis is gathered 
(observation).  The next step involves assigning meaning to the data by 
assessing its accuracy and relevance. The members of the crisis management 
team discuss the viability of action alternatives and choose which actions to 
implement.  Faced with limited resources, ambiguity, time pressures and stress, 
the crisis team has to understand the current crisis situation, acknowledge that 
various actions will prevent or reduce crisis damage and arrive at a decision. 
Once an action is decided upon, the next step of dissemination involves 
informing those responsible for implementing the decisions.  This step also 
involves exchanging information with the public through the media. The former 
action involves operational directives, whereas the latter action often influences 
subsequent events within the crisis and frequently defines the organisation for 
years to come. It is thus a critical action and is also the focus of the proposed 
model in chapter six. 
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The value of this model is that it focuses solely on the crisis response stage of 
crisis management, which is absent from the stage models discussed 
previously.  It thus provides valuable insight into the processes involved which 
contributes to the model developed as part of this thesis. However, Hale et al’s 
(2005) model, by suggesting that a linear, orderly process is followed in order to 
make decisions concerning a course of action to be communicated, does not 
adequately describe the rapidly changing crisis environment. In this, Hale et al’s 
model tends towards idealism, rather than realism. Hale et al’s (2005) model 
also implies one-way persuasive communications from top management to staff 
and the media. These limitations will be addressed by Hale et al’s (2005) 
second model, entitled the spiral crisis response communication model that will 
be examined in the section describing the more systemic approaches to crisis 
management and crisis communication. While describing the process involved 
in making communication decisions during a crisis, this model does not focus 
on the content of these decisions. This anomaly will be addressed by the model 
in chapter six. 
 
3.3.4 Critical analysis of more traditional views of crisis management and 
crisis communication 
 
Although valuable in providing some structure to the process of public relations 
or corporate communications before, during and after a crisis, the models 
presented provide what can be described as a traditional, linear view of crisis 
management.  These models suggest that effective management of a crisis can 
only occur if all the structures are in place such as a crisis plan and an orderly 
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progression of steps. The crisis plan ensures effective communication occurs 
with stakeholders, including the media, while the organisation supposedly 
carries on functioning as normal.  Once the crisis is over, the organisation must 
communicate with a view to restoring its image and adopt a business as usual 
attitude to ensure that the organisation’s reputation is rebuilt to its status before 
the crisis.  The crisis plan is evaluated and necessary changes are made in 
anticipation of the next crisis.  If the crisis team is effective, according to these 
approaches, it minimises the chance that a crisis can occur and that if it does, it 
is quickly and efficiently managed.  While these approaches to crisis 
management may be effective in linear systems where a crisis can be controlled 
and predicted, they may not be appropriate in complex, dynamic systems 
(Bloom et al 2002), which is often how crisis situations are described.  These 
approaches also assume asymmetrical views of communication rather than 
symmetrical two-way communications, the preference of current public relations 
scholars such as Grunig (2000).  By not focussing enough on the actual content 
of crisis communications, these models cannot assume that the recovery stage 
will necessarily follow the crisis.  Through poor communication during the crisis 
it can be said that an organisation may face another crisis within a crisis or may 
never permanently recover from the crisis or from negative perceptions about its 
handling thereof.  The models leaning towards the traditional linear approach 
characteristically give crises negative connotations – as events that have to be 
controlled in order to return the organisation to its former status quo.  Unlike the 
more progressive systems approaches to be discussed next, the traditional 
models do not see the possibility for growth and improvement in the reputations 
of their organisations through effective crisis management. The section on 
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chaos theory (refer to section 3.4.2) is also, in essence, a criticism of this 
traditional view of crisis management reflected in the models discussed.  
Nevertheless, it can be said that the traditional models provide a useful 
framework for understanding the much of the literature on crisis communication 
discussed in chapter two. 
 
3.4 Models leaning towards the progressive open systems continuum 
of crisis management and crisis communication 
 
The approaches discussed in this section move away from the traditional, linear 
approaches discussed towards a progressive systems approach. 
 
3.4.1 The spiral crisis response communication model 
 
Hale et al (2005:120) acknowledge that their linear model discussed earlier, 
failed to illustrate the complexities of the communication process during the 
crisis response stage and thus adapted it into the spiral crisis response 
communication model.  
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Figure 3.4 Spiral crisis response communication model (Hale, Dulek & Hale 
2005:123) 
 
The spiral crisis response communication model illustrates more accurately how 
in reality, as additional information and data is obtained and greater 
understanding is achieved of the crisis, the members of the team repeat the 
decision-making process during a crisis.  Each new observation step involves 
the assignment of new values or interpretations of the information about the 
crisis.  If during the choice step a decision cannot be made due to ambiguity, 
missing or conflicting information, the interpretation step is evoked. Participants 
in Hale et al’s (2005) research describe rapid, judgement based evaluations and 
acceptance or rejection of distinct, non-competing solutions.  This is arguably a 
more realistic description of how decisions are made in reality during the 
pressure of a crisis, rather than the careful analysis and comparison of 
competing solutions suggested by the linear model discussed earlier. 
 
Hale et al (2005:123) also note that although the steps are discussed as 
separate and distinct, they will overlap (a single conversation being used to 
Triggering  
event 
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gather and disseminate information, and to add insight to a proposed action) 
and will be conducted in parallel (people assigned to data gathering, 
dissemination and choice roles working next to each other).  This clearly 
distinguishes the spiral crisis response communication model from the linear 
step-by-step version described in section 3.3.3. 
 
It can be argued that the spiral crisis response communication model provides 
an accurate description of the rapid iteration through the decision-making steps 
needed to keep pace with a rapidly changing crisis environment (Hale et al 
2005). It suggests an open systems approach to communication allowing for the 
inflow and digestion of information and feedback from the environment into the 
decision making process.  The communication is thus symmetrical rather than 
one way or asymmetrical, an important consideration for scholars such as 
Grunig (2000) and Woodward (2000). Refer to chapter two for further 
discussions on symmetrical communication. The spiral crisis response 
communication model does not however address the actual communication 
decisions to be taken by the crisis team during the crisis.  Rather, it focuses on 
describing the process involved. These gaps will be addressed by the proposed 
model discussed in chapter six.  
 
Another less linear approach to crisis communication is offered by chaos theory 
which is also premised on an open systems approach reflected in the spiral 
crisis communication model.   
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3.4.2 Chaos theory 
 
Murphy (1996:103) suggests that chaos theory is particularly useful for 
understanding a crisis because its dynamic resembles that of a chaotic system 
as it moves through increasingly complex stages towards a disordered state. 
Murphy (1996:105) describes a crisis as a sequence of events, which, over 
time, appear to gather volume and complexity with increasing speed. Seital’s 
(2001) description of a typical description of an organisation in crisis in section 
2.2.4 elaborates on Murphy’s (1996) description. 
 
As a derivative of systems theory, chaos theory attempts to understand and 
describe the behaviour of non-linear, unpredictable systems. A basic concern in 
chaos theory is how nonlinear systems change over time.  Therefore Bechtold 
(1997:13) maintains that it seems an appropriate model to inform crisis 
communication strategy development in today’s dynamic and ever-changing 
business environment. 
 
Murphy (1996) argues further that chaos theory defies a planned approach to 
public relations because a key assumption of chaos theory is that crises have a 
life and logic of their own which leaves little room for intervention (Murphy 
1996:108). McDaniel (1997:25) concurs that a fundamental insight from chaos 
theory is that the unfolding of the world over time is unknowable. This 
assumption contradicts the basis of much of the crisis management literature on 
planning and prediction of crises (refer to models leaning towards the traditional 
approach in section 3.3). 
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However, according to Bechtold (1997), by encouraging an open flow of 
information between the organisation and the outside environment, the 
organisation can stay connected to its simultaneously evolving environment and 
is better able to handle changes or issues that may in time lead to a crisis. 
While it is not possible to plan, forecast or control a crisis, it is, according to 
chaos theory, possible to monitor small changes, interpret their context and 
determine reactions in the short term (Bloom et al 2002). This is the key to 
successful crisis management from the perspective of chaos theory. The 
organisation must rely on constant feedback to ensure that it adjusts to even 
minor environmental demands and changes (Bloom et al 2002).  
 
Chaos theory is particularly relevant to public opinion – the understanding of 
how issues emerge and how individuals and groups are transformed from 
states of inactivity to activism using the media as an ally (Bloom et al 2002).  
Because chaos theory suggests that crisis communicators remain alert to small 
changes outside the organisation, they can capture changes in public opinion 
and deal with issues before they escalate into crises (refer also to section 2.3.7 
for a discussion on issues management). In the longer term, organisations 
should seek to identify any similarities or irregularities in elements of patterns of 
change, and determine from these, acceptable courses of action (Edgar & 
Nisbet 1996:7). According Bloom et al (2002:31):  The organisation would tap 
the information and intelligence of all its members, connect itself with the 
evolving environment and draw that information into its self-generation.  In this 
way, crises can be seen as opportunities for change and beneficial restructuring 
of the organisation. 
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A key principal of chaos theory is that monitoring change and interpreting its 
context may be more realistic public relations goals in complex, dynamic 
systems than prediction and control suggested by traditional crisis management 
systems (Murphy 1996).  According to a study led by Bloom et al (2002), Swiss 
banks in general were criticised for the way they handled money invested by 
Jews during World War II. These banks did not manage their crisis effectively, 
as they did not remain alert to the environment. By ignoring the court of public 
opinion and placing strict control on communication flowing into or out of the 
organisation, the problems they faced became magnified and resulted in 
extremely bad media coverage and an enormous drop in share price and profits 
for the banks.  The decision to restrict communication was an effort to contain 
the uncertainty resulting from the crisis, typically an action of a traditional 
organisation (Bloom et al 2002).  In organisations that understand the dynamics 
of chaos, the crisis communicator’s role should be to establish communication 
channels that encourage dialogue, diversity of ideas and participative decision-
making. By not remaining connected to the external environment the Swiss 
banks were unable to monitor changes and seize the opportunities to respond 
in an innovative manner. This implies that the Swiss banks were unprepared to 
identify emerging issues, much less capitalise on the business or 
communication opportunities that may have been present. They chose instead 
to practically ignore the media, which proved to their detriment. Bloom et al 
(2002:40) conclude that the Swiss banks’ inefficiency in managing the crisis 
stemmed not from the crisis event itself but from their rigid corporate structures 
and processes.  This example demonstrates the influence of an organisation’s 
values on its style of crisis management. 
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3.4.2.1 Summary:  key points of crisis management/crisis communication 
suggested by chaos theory 
 
The value of chaos theory is in its description of the field of crisis management 
and crisis communication which is interpreted as follows:  
 
• Gayeski and Majka (1996:5) suggest that the crisis communicator’s role 
is to establish communication channels that facilitate dialogue, diversity 
of ideas and participative decision-making.  The issuing of advice in one 
direction, is, according to Grunig (2000), doomed to fail. Practicing 
symmetrical communication helps organisations adjust their own 
behaviour and communications in order to accommodate the beliefs and 
concerns of their publics throughout the crisis (Bloom et al 2002). This is 
in sharp contrast to the more traditional approaches to crisis 
communication followed by organisations that seek only to predict and 
control their environments rather than adapt to them. 
 
• Open lines of communication between members of the organisation and 
between the organisation and the public and journalists are of marked 
importance throughout the process of prevention, according to chaos 
theory (Comfort 1994; Bechtold 1997). The idea is that the responsibility 
for crisis management should not only rest on the shoulders of the crisis 
team.  The entire organisational structure, from the customer care 
department through to the client-facing staff should be on the alert for 
possible issues that might, if not addressed, escalate into crises. 
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• Support for the plan and the whole process of crisis management must 
come from top management throughout the organisation to ensure its 
application (Bloom et al 2002).  
 
• Chaos theory warns that over-reliance on a plan or an analysis of past 
events should be minimised and that the focus should be on building an 
innovative, creative and spontaneous approach to strategy (Bloom et al 
2002). This contrasts with the more traditional views of crisis 
management mentioned, in which adherence to a crisis plan or manual, 
prepared in advance of a crisis is paramount.     
 
• Chaos theory posits that continuous tracking with a view to identifying 
changes through constant feedback, to ensure that the organisation 
adjusts to environmental and organisational demands, is critical (Comfort 
1994).  This cybernetic approach to management can provide an early 
warning system for crises (Bloom et al 2002). Analysing media coverage 
on a day-to-day basis can help the organisation to anticipate and tackle 
potential problems before they arise (Bloom et al 2000). 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Critical analysis of chaos theory 
 
Chaos theory provides a substantially useful alternative framework for viewing 
crises to the more traditional approaches of crisis communication management 
prevalent in the literature.  It acknowledges that it is not always possible to plan 
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for a crisis and that it may be more useful to devise strategy based on 
information received at the time.  This may also help avoid the development of 
an issue into a crisis.  Murphy (1996:108) also contends that the value of public 
relations may come less from attempts to influence audience’s perceptions in a 
planned direction than from the ability to capitalise on unplanned opportunities. 
This sheds a new light on the field of crisis management and crisis 
communication – one that appears to be missing from the linear approaches 
discussed in section 3.3.   
 
The approach is unique in that it entrusts everyone in the organisation with a 
responsibility for crisis management, instead of only a core team of crisis 
communicators.  Staff members on every level are encouraged to share 
information through open communication channels and to be alert to possible 
changes in the environment.  In theory, this could be constructive for the 
organisation in terms of monitoring and adapting to situations.  However, it may 
not be practical and many organisations appear to apportion responsibility for 
crisis communication to a small team of specialists. 
 
In addition to an image restoration strategy, chaos theory postulates that 
effective crisis management requires a business mindset and strategy that can 
take advantage of the prospects that occur as a result of the crisis (Seitel 2001).  
This suggests that senior executives would need to form part of the crisis 
management team as crisis management decisions could impact on the various 
operations of the organisational system.  In this regard, chaos theory 
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underscores the influence that crisis management decisions can have on the 
organisation. 
 
Chaos theory’s reframing of a crisis as a positive opportunity for restructuring is 
also uniquely opposed to the more traditional view of crises as negative events 
that need to be managed quickly so that the organisation can return to its 
former state of equilibrium.  The results of the research conducted for this study 
demonstrate that most of the organisations examined in the case studies indeed 
experienced positive changes as a result of their crises (refer to chapter five for 
further details).  They appeared to learn from their crises and made 
fundamental changes to the way in which they view relationships with the media 
and their clients.     
 
Because of the benefits of chaos theory some of its elements will be used as a 
framework for analysing the responses of the crisis communicators in this study.  
Its value appears to lie in analysing a crisis after it happens, rather than in 
advising crisis communicators on the course of action during the crisis. While it 
may describe the role of crisis communicators operating on the edge of chaos, 
what appears to be missing from chaos theory is guidance on what 
communicators should say to the media about the crisis – the content of crisis 
response. 
The aforementioned models and theories discussed are helpful in building a 
body of knowledge to further the understanding of crisis management and crisis 
communication with the media.  They are also helpful in providing a structure or 
framework for understanding and describing the principals drawn from crisis 
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communication literature discussed in chapter two.  While the majority of them 
acknowledge the importance of communication decisions made during a crisis, 
they omit to examine these decisions and responses.  The forthcoming model, 
which can also be described as being predicated on systems epistemology, 
addresses these responses and is thus the approach which will be adapted for 
the model designed from this research.  Attempts will be made to address the 
limitations in the proposed model discussed in chapter six. 
  
3.4.3 Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT or SCC 
theory) 
 
In summary, the area of crisis management devoted to what organisations say 
(and their actions) to publics or the media after a crisis occurs is termed crisis-
response or crisis communication strategies (Coombs 1995; Goodman & 
Markus 1991; Ice 1991). Communication to the media at this stage shapes 
public perceptions of a crisis and the organisation involved in the crisis (Russ 
1991).  The literature predominantly argues against stonewalling when accused 
of a wrongdoing (Bradford & Garrett 1995; Coombs 1995; Hearit 1994).  Hearit 
(1994:115) argues that the speech of self defence or apologia presents a 
compelling counter description to situate alleged wrongdoing in a more 
favourable context. This is a valuable line of research because crisis-response 
strategies are an important resource for crisis managers (Coombs 2004).     
 
As already discussed, the crisis response stage is characterised by high 
consequence and short decision time that creates a unique and threatening 
decision-making environment that must be conscientiously supported (Hale et al 
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2005). During this stage, events occur quickly, and critical, stressful, decision-
making takes place (Hale et al 2005). In the definition of a crisis (refer to section 
2.2.1), it was acknowledged that each crisis contains degrees of both success 
and failure and that the actions of the organisation significantly affect the 
relative number of these successes and failures. 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the latest thinking in this dynamic area 
of research under the rubric of situational crisis communication theory (SCCT).  
This perspective has also been dubbed the symbolic approach (Coombs 1999), 
because it describes how communication can be used as a symbolic resource 
to protect an organisation’s image. In other words, from this perspective, crisis 
communication strategies are viewed as the symbolic resources with which 
crisis managers help protect or repair the organisation’s image. 
 
The roots of the symbolic approach are found in the rhetorical concept of 
apologia.  Apologia examines how individuals use communication to defend 
their character (image) from public attacks (Coombs 1999). The SCCT model 
links crisis response strategies to crisis types and according to Englehardt, 
Sallot and Springston (2004:128):  Coombs’ repertoire seems to promise the 
greatest utility for practitioners facing crises in the field. 
 
3.4.3.1     Theoretical Foundation of SCCT 
 
The foundation of this theory rests on the assumption that an organisation’s 
reputation or image is a valued resource that can potentially be threatened by a 
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crisis (Barton 2001).  The reputation or image of the organisation is described 
as the perception that the public has of the organisation (Barton 2001) and 
which affects its organisational legitimacy (refer to section 2.2.6) or sanction to 
operate. 
 
SCCT postulates that the image of an organisation or its organisational 
legitimacy can best be protected by crisis communicators if they assess the 
crisis situation, (which is conceptualised as the frame used by the public to 
interpret the event), and then select a crisis response strategy that fits the crisis 
situation. The crisis strategy chosen, should, according to the theory (Coombs & 
Holladay 1996:283), have the following effects: 
• Convince stakeholders there is no crisis or 
• Have stakeholders see the crisis as less negative and/or 
• Have stakeholders see the organisation more positively 
 
The crisis situation is, according to SCCT, most effectively evaluated according 
to attribution theory, which is derived from interpersonal communication 
research (Benoit 1995a; Cupach & Metts 1990 & 1989; Sharkey & Stafford 
1990). Attribution theory posits that people will make judgements about the 
causes of events, especially unexpected events with negative outcomes such 
as a crisis (Coombs 1995).  Attributions are perceptions of the causality or the 
perceived reasons for a particular event’s occurrence (Weiner 1985: 280).   
.   
The public will ask themselves whether the crisis was something the 
organisation could control or prevent (Coombs 2004).  Control implies 
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responsibility (Weiner 1995). If the public assume that an organisation could 
control a crisis, they will pass the responsibility for the crisis onto the 
organisation (Coombs 1995). When a crisis event is repeated (stable), the 
public is more likely to attribute responsibility to the organisation (Coombs 
1995). The messages people develop to explain an event can shape 
attributions, which in turn shape feelings (Weiner 1995).   Greater attributions of 
responsibility lead to stronger feelings of anger and more negative views of 
organisations (Coombs 1995).  Crisis attributions are therefore important 
because they mould feelings and behaviours toward the organisation involved 
in the crisis (Coombs 2004).   
 
3.4.3.2 Identification of crisis clusters/crisis types 
 
Using crisis responsibility to form crisis clusters, that is, groupings of similar 
crisis types, has further refined thinking about crisis types (Coombs 2004).  The 
development of crisis clusters is based on the premise that similar crises can be 
managed in similar fashions (Coombs 2004).  Because crisis types within each 
crisis cluster will produce similar attributions of crisis responsibility, crisis 
managers can use similar crisis response strategies to deal with crisis types 
within the same cluster (Coombs 2004).  Thirteen crisis types have been 
categorised into three distinct clusters (Coombs 2004): 
• victim  
• accidental  
• preventable (Coombs 1999) or intentional crisis cluster (Coombs 2004).   
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The victim cluster involves crisis types in which the organisation is an innocent 
party but harm is inflicted on it and its stakeholders (Coombs 1995). Examples 
of this type of crisis could be a natural disaster, workplace violence, acts of 
terrorism or damaging rumours about an organisation (Coombs 1995). The 
accidental cluster involves unintentional actions by an organisation such as a 
technical failure or misdeeds attributed to a staff member (Coombs 1995). It is 
assumed that the organisation could do little to prevent the crisis and did not 
intend for it to happen (Coombs 2004). However, research shows a general 
bias towards internal causes for accidents (Coombs 2004). The preventable 
cluster involves intentionally placing stakeholders at risk, knowingly violating 
laws or regulations, or not doing enough to prevent an accident or a defective 
product from reaching the market (Coombs 1995).  
 
According to the theory the stronger the potential damage to the organisation’s 
reputation, the more the crisis response strategy must try to accommodate 
those adversely affected (Coombs 2004). Publics will expect an organisation to 
do more for victims of a crisis when the organisation is held more accountable 
for that crisis (Coombs 1995).  The crisis response strategies should then 
mitigate damage to its reputation by showing that the organisation is concerned 
for the victims and is willing to make amends for its questionable behaviour, 
thereby accommodating the public’s expectations (Coombs 2004). A full 
apology and publicly accepting responsibility escalates costs because the 
organisation will be found liable (Coombs 2004; Tyler 1997).  Thus a crisis 
manager would use more expensive crisis response strategies in a human error 
accident than in a technical error accident (Coombs & Holladay 2006).  
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Scholars such as Benoit (1995a) frequently recommend highly 
accommodative/mortification strategies that feature apologies for the crisis.  
However, the universal application of highly accommodative strategies is 
problematic because of the legal and financial liabilities incurred (Coombs 
1999).  Apologies require an organisation to publicly accept responsibility for a 
crisis, thereby weakening its legal position in the case of a lawsuit (Fitzpatrick 
1995; Tyler 1997).  However, current business thinking maintains that financial 
interests should not be the only deciding factors in all crisis situations (Naidoo 
2002).  Refer to section 2.3.5 for further discussion on these issues. 
 
Crises that prompt little to no attributions of organisational crisis responsibility, 
such as natural disasters, or rumours, can be managed using just instructive 
information - telling people what to do to protect themselves from the crisis, as 
the crisis response (Coombs 2004). In the case of an act of terrorism, the 
organisation can be portrayed as a victim and the public might even feel 
sympathy for it (Coombs 2004).  Sympathy from the public can help build a 
more positive view of the organisation (Benoit 1997). In the event of false 
rumours, crisis managers are recommended to add the denial crisis response 
strategy which is the most defensive strategy (Coombs 1995).  But the crisis 
manager should have some concrete evidence to show that there is no crisis or 
that the rumours are unfounded before applying this response (Newsom, Scott 
& Turk 1992).   
 
Crises that prompt moderate to low attributions of crisis responsibility, such as 
accidents, are effectively managed via moderately defensive crisis response 
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strategies such as excuse (Coombs 1999). The crisis manager might try to 
emphasise the organisation’s lack of responsibility for the crisis or the minimal 
damage created by a crisis (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Benoit 1995).  In both 
instances, the crisis manager attempts to place distance between the 
organisation and responsibility for the crisis event.  For this strategy to be 
effective there must however be some aspect of the crisis responsibility that 
indicates that there is limited responsibility or minimal damage (Coombs & 
Holladay 2006). Distance accepts the crisis but tries to weaken the association 
between the organisation and the crisis (Coombs & Holladay 2006).  
 
Crises with strong attributions of organisational responsibility, such as 
organisational misdemeanours, require strongly accommodative responses 
such as corrective action and full apologies (Coombs & Holladay 1996). This 
step might also involve creating new practices to prevent a crisis event from 
being repeated (Glascock 2004).  This remedial action (also termed rectification 
by Coombs 1995) helps to re-establish legitimacy by demonstrating 
organisational concern for societal norms (Allen & Caillouet 1994).  Coombs 
and Holladay (2006) advise crisis managers to take the 
remedial/accommodative route when the organisation cannot distance itself 
from the crisis.  
 
Identifying the crisis type enables an initial assessment of the amount of crisis 
responsibility that publics will attribute to a crisis situation.  Adjustments are 
then made to this initial assessment by considering two factors – severity and 
performance history (Coombs 2004).  Severity is the amount of damage created 
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by a crisis in terms of factors such as financial, human and environmental 
damage (Coombs 1999). Performance history refers to the past actions or 
conduct of an organisation, including previous crises, and relationship history 
especially how well or poorly it has treated stakeholders – that is the media, its 
clients, shareholders, the government and community in which it operates. 
(Coombs 2004). Performance history and relationship history can also be 
described as prior reputation which is, according to Coombs and Holladay 
(2006:124) the balance of reputation capital an organisation has in its account 
prior to a crisis. 
 
Relationship and performance history (prior reputation) affects how the 
public interpret current events (Coombs & Holladay 2006).  The crisis is 
therefore not seen in isolation and prior reputation adds to an understanding 
of the crisis situation dynamic (Coombs & Holladay 2006).    As severity 
increases or performance history worsens, publics will attribute greater crisis 
responsibility to the organisation and may discount the organisation’s 
interpretation of the crisis.  In contrast, favourable pre-crisis relationships can 
serve as buffers for accused organisations and can thus be a valuable asset to 
crisis management (Huang 2005:6).  According to Coombs and Holladay 
(2006:124), prior reputation helps to protect and repair an organisation’s image 
during a crisis.  A crisis may cause an organisation to experience some loss of 
reputation.  It is possible that a prior reputation can offer more than just a large 
reserve of goodwill from which to withdraw during a crisis.  According to 
researchers such as Fombrun and Van Riel (2003) a favourable reputation may 
actually create a halo effect, which might change how much crisis responsibility 
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the public attributes to an organisation in crisis.  Coombs and Holladay 
(2006:125) go so far as saying that organisations might be afforded the benefit 
of the doubt and not be assigned as much crisis responsibility, as would be 
attributed to an organisation with an unknown or unfavourable reputation.  The 
halo as shield explanation is part of a larger psychological phenomenon of 
expectancy confirmation.  Research suggests people are reluctant to revise 
initial expectations even when confronted with clear disconfirming evidence 
(Frey, Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt & Traut-Mattausch 2004).  For favourable 
reputations, the public or media may ignore or dismiss the recent negative 
information created by the crisis and continue to support the organisation 
(Coombs & Holladay 2006:125). However, what should be noted is that a 
favourable reputation does not protect an organisation if it uses an inappropriate 
response (Dean 2004).  
 
In summary, the assessment of a crisis is a two-step process.  In the first step, 
the crisis team identifies the crisis type (Coombs 2004).  After assessing the 
level of crisis responsibility, crisis managers then choose a crisis response 
strategy appropriate to the level of crisis responsibility, taking into account 
contexts such as relationship history, prior reputation and severity of damage 
(Coombs 2004). For example, repeated or severe technical breakdown 
accidents should be treated more like the preventable cluster than the accident 
cluster (Coombs 1999). If a crisis keeps happening, the public likely think it 
could be avoided (Coombs & Holladay 2006). An example of this could be the 
regularity of global mine disasters.  For the purposes of clarity, a table 
summarising a list of SCCT response strategies appears in the next section. 
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3.4.3.3   SCCT crisis response strategies 
 
A detailed explanation of the table is provided below.  
Table 3.4:  SCCT Crisis response strategies and tactics to match crisis 
clusters 
Crisis clusters Strategies Tactics 
Victim Non-existent  
Suffering 
Denial, clarification, 
attack, intimidation 
Accidental Distance Excuse (e.g. 
scapegoating), 
justification 
Culprit Mortification Remediation, 
repentance, rectification 
All Ingratiation Transcendence, 
bolstering, praising 
others 
 
 
As indicated in the above table, Coombs (1995:453) propose the following list of 
crisis-response strategies which crisis managers can apply in making decisions 
when communicating to the media. Examples pertinent to the financial services 
industry have been included. 
 
• Non-existence strategies 
These strategies seek to eliminate the crisis.  If no crisis exists there is 
no reason for the organisation to be tarnished by the supposed crisis.  
This strategy can be used as a response to rumours that are evidently 
false and consists of four tactical options, namely: denial (a simple 
statement that nothing happened), clarification (extends the denial 
strategy with proof of why there is no crisis), attack (confronts those who 
wrongly report that a crisis exists) caution and intimidation (use of 
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lawsuits against those who are spreading the rumours). According to 
Hearit (2001) an attack strategy is deemed highly risky because it 
portrays the organisation as aggressive. This strategy should therefore 
be used with caution. 
 
Companies or even powerful individuals have frequently used both the 
attack and intimidation strategies even at times when they have been at 
fault. For example, executives from the now defunct multi-national giant, 
Enron, initially denied that they had been involved in unlawful actions. 
Hearit (2001:509) states that an organisation might have an initial 
impulse to start with a strategy of denial and to try other approaches only 
once it is clear that denial no longer works for an organisation.  However 
crisis managers may need to take into account that protestations of 
innocence may be treated with scepticism by a wary media. 
 
• Distance Strategies 
These strategies acknowledge the crisis and act to create public 
acceptance of the crisis, while weakening the link between the crisis and 
the organisation.  If the link is weak, the negatives attached to the crisis 
will have a reduced chance of tarnishing the organisation’s image. 
Distance strategies comprise tactics such as excuse, which tries to 
minimise the organisations’ responsibility. Excuse tactics include denial 
of intention and denial of volition. Scapegoating is an example.  An 
organisation cannot control an event if some third party is responsible for 
the crisis or has acted without organisational sanction (Ihlen 2002). 
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However, one could question the efficacy of shifting blame and it is 
suggested that this strategy should, in general, be avoided. Arguably 
these tactics do depend on the context of mediation and are influenced 
by the validity of charges, the existence of a scapegoat and the degree of 
guilt (Ihlen 2002:189). 
 
Justification seeks to minimise damage associated with the crisis and 
includes denying the seriousness of the crisis or claiming that the crisis 
event has been misrepresented. The aim is to reduce the offensiveness 
of the act and to persuade the public that the act or crisis is not as bad as 
it might seem (Glascock 2004:37). Benoit (1995a), having researched 
interpersonal communication, asserts that a major goal of crisis 
communication discourse is to save face.  Therefore when an 
organisation’s reputation is threatened, the natural inclination is to 
present a response consisting of denial, justifications or excuses for the 
offence (Benoit 1995a).   
 
• Ingratiation strategies  
These strategies seek to gain public approval for the organisation by 
connecting the organisation to things positively valued by the public, 
such as corporate social investment policies.  Examples include the 
following:  Transcendence as an ingratiation tactic attempts to place the 
crisis in a larger, more desirable context.  For example, large-scale 
retrenchments could be justified as a necessary step for the long-term 
sustainability of a organisation. Bolstering reminds publics of the 
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existing positive aspects of the organisation and praising others is used 
to win approval from the target of the praise (Englehardt et al 2004).  In 
the study conducted on Absa as part of this research (refer to chapter 
five) statements using ingratiating strategies employed by spokespeople 
after the internet hacking crisis, in order to show Absa’s commitment to 
internet safety, included: Absa’s internet banking complies with the 
highest standards of safety possible (Smith 2006). 
 
• Mortification strategies  
These strategies attempt to win forgiveness of publics.  Remediation 
willingly offers some form of compensation to help the victims in the form 
of money, goods and aid. Repentance involves asking for forgiveness. 
Rectification involves taking action to prevent a recurrence of the crisis 
in the future.  Absa (refer to chapter five) used the following statement 
indicative of a mortification strategy, to demonstrate that the organisation 
was making sure the problem did not reoccur: We have accelerated our 
planned roll-out of safety features (Smith 2006). 
 
• Suffering strategies  
These strategies are designed to win sympathy from publics.  They could 
portray the organisation as an unfair victim of a malicious, outside entity. 
An example could be the argument, by banks, in defence of charges 
levied on deposits and withdrawals of cash, that the spate of cash heists 
in this country makes such charges necessary.    
 
 114
In many cases a combination of strategies is used, for example, apology and 
justification or denial may be combined (Coombs 2004).  Literature further 
supports the effectiveness of the combined use of strategies in terms of 
favourable imagery coverage in the media (Huang 2005). It is possible for an 
organisation to use two or more strategies in one sentence (Englehardt et al 
2004:130) such as:  We are very sorry about the suffering this accident has 
caused, but this was not the result of any negligence on our part. In the 
beginning of the sentence a mortification strategy is applied, but the second half 
of the sentence reflects a dominant strategy of justification and/or denial. 
According to Englehardt et al (2004), Coombs’ five categories are not discrete 
or mutually exclusive in complex situations such as crises. 
 
The crisis response strategies can be ordered along a continuum ranging from 
defensive, putting organisational interests first, to accommodative, putting victim 
concerns first (Marcus & Goodman 1991; Shrivastava 1993).  The defensive-
accommodative continuum is adapted from the work of McLaughlin, Cody, and 
O’Hair (1983), which used the continuum to conceptualise accounts, or 
explanations/excuses people offer for their untoward or negative behaviour. 
Using this continuum the crisis manager then matches the crisis response to 
level of crisis responsibility.  The greater the crisis responsibility generated by 
the crisis the more accommodative the crisis response strategies must be 
according to SCCT (Coombs 2004).  Following this principle should, according 
to the theory, offer a defence for the organisation’s reputation.   
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3.4.3.4 Critical comment on SCCT 
 
The quest for simplicity, by summarising the crisis response types and crisis 
responses into categories, may affect the application of this theory to real life 
situations.  It is possible that some valuable, explanatory factors and variables 
have been excluded (Coombs 1995).  
 
Some of the variables excluded by SCCT include the following: 
 
• While SCCT acknowledges that the crisis response should be tempered 
with consideration of the organisation’s history, it does not mention other 
context variables that may impact on the choice of crisis response such 
as perceptions that the public might have of an industry as a whole. For 
example, in South Africa, the life insurance industry is receiving bad 
publicity following rulings by Pensions Funds Adjudicator Vuyani 
Ngalwana.  The negative perception of the industry as a whole would 
need to be considered should a particular insurance organisation have a 
crisis in the media during this time.  Refer also to section 2.3.5. 
 
• Other factors such as the cultural context in which the organisation 
operates, could possibly also have an impact on the choice of crisis 
response strategy.  The theory does not cater for the variance from one 
country to another, let alone one city to another.   
 
• Another aspect not addressed by the theory, is that there could be a real 
possibility that it may be in the interests of competitors or journalists to 
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exaggerate the consequences of an organisation’s crisis in the media. 
This would of course impact on public perceptions of the organisation in 
crisis and the attributions made. Even though these perceptions may be 
unjust, they could exist nevertheless and need to inform crisis response 
strategies. 
 
• In addition, the morality of crisis response strategies is not addressed by 
SCCT.   An inference could be drawn from the discussion on compassion 
and apologies that an organisation should not admit to anything that is 
going to cost them money.  According to Cohen (1999:1012) respect for 
others would seem to require that when an offender has hurt someone, 
she should apologise to the extent that she feels at fault.  However, the 
same author admits that lawyers may advise their client not to risk 
apology because of the implications of liability (Cohen 1999). According 
to Cohen (1999) the ideal is for crisis communicators and legal counsel 
to work together to develop a response that satisfies the public’s need to 
know, yet avoids self-implication of legal wrongdoing.   
 
• The human response is not mentioned in the theory.  Horsley and Barker 
(2002:409) state that: If a organisation is at fault, its spokespersons 
repair the organisation’s reputation much faster if they apologise, accept 
responsibility, and show remorse.  In the same vein, if a disaster has 
occurred that is not necessarily the fault of the organisation, the public 
and the media are still looking for some humanity; they want to see the 
organisation spokespersons express regret for what happened and show 
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compassion for the victims (Horsley & Barker 2002:410).  During the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the organisation did not even attempt to 
show concern over the animals that died in the oily mess and too often 
declined to comment. Englehardt et al (2004:150) found that Coombs’ 
crisis response strategies do not allow for corporate statements that 
express concern and sympathy without placing the blame on the 
organisation. Englehardt et al’s study (2004) demonstrates the need for 
an additional strategy to be added to SCCT, perhaps called compassion 
without blame (Englehardt et al 2004:151).  Compassion may affect 
stock prices, but it avoids the liabilities associated with apologies 
(Fitzpatrick 1995; Marcus & Goodman 1991; Tyler 1997). Like apologies, 
compassion addresses public concerns by acknowledging victims’ needs 
and in this way bolsters the organisational reputation (Barton 2001; 
Pearson & Mitroff 1993).  The most useful way to maximise both social 
and legal concerns during an accident crisis could be to incorporate 
compassion into the crisis response.    
 
• In addition, initial early responses when organisations are trying to find 
out what happened to cause the crisis, are not included in SCCT.  
Englehardt et al (2004:151) say that statements such as It’s too early to 
know if our airplane maintenance was a key factor in the crash do not fall 
into Coombs’ (1995) repertoire.  At this stage the organisation is not 
denying anything, it is not making an excuse, nor is it clarifying:  it merely 
does not have an answer (Englehardt et al 2004:151). Englehardt et al 
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(2004) call for a re-conceptualisation of SCCT to account for the findings 
of more recent research. 
 
• SCCT does not suggest that the client or victims of a crisis be put first, 
which has been a hard learnt lesson by Absa demonstrated in the case 
studies which follow in chapter five.  A number of recent studies predict a 
strong connection between an organisation’s values and culture and its 
behaviour during the response stage (Hale et al 2005:116). Refer also to 
discussion in section 2.3.5.  At the heart of the decision-making process 
conducted by the crisis team is an organisation’s values.  According to 
Foster and Snyder (1983), the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process is significantly enhanced if these organisational values are made 
explicit and communicated clearly to crisis decision makers. Foster and 
Snyder (1983) cite the Johnson and Johnson Tylenol crisis as a case in 
point. Seven people in Chicago died from taking Tylenol capsules laced 
with cyanide. News of this incident travelled quickly and was the cause of 
a massive, nationwide panic. These poisonings made it necessary for 
Johnson & Johnson to launch a public relations program immediately, in 
order to save the integrity of the product and the organisation as a whole.  
The decision makers stated unequivocally that, when they were forced to 
act in the dark during the Tylenol crisis, they looked to the credo for 
guidance and took actions that supported the first line of the credo which 
states:  We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses, and 
patients, to mothers and all others who use our products and services 
 119
(Foster & Snyder 1983:35).  The corporate president of Johnson and 
Johnson, David R Clare (Foster & Snyder 1983) noted that the events 
surrounding the Tylenol crisis were so atypical that they found 
themselves improvising every step of the way.  Crisis planning did not 
see us through this tragedy nearly as much as the sound business 
management philosophy that is embodied in our credo (Foster & Snyder 
1983: 35). Refer also to related discussion on ethics in section 2.3.3. 
 
• The crisis response strategies of SCCT have been derived from 
interpersonal communication research (Benoit 1995). This may limit their 
applicability to the organisational world. For example, the denial of 
volition (the intention to do harm), as a distance strategy suggested by 
SCCT, may be more effective in an interpersonal setting, than as an 
effective explanation for an organisation that has caused harm to its 
clients.  The public may not care whether the crisis was intentional or not, 
particularly in the case of large wealthy organisations. 
 
• The ingratiation strategy of bolstering discussed in section 3.4.3.3 which 
entails emphasising the positive aspects of the organisation may appear 
to be in bad taste during a crisis.  One could ask whether the 
organisation should be trying to garner support when it is dealing with a 
crisis where the public’s primary concern is the impact of the crisis. 
 
• In a similar vein, the justification strategy of seeking to minimise the 
damage associated with the crisis, would need to be skilfully managed so 
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as not to appear callous of the injury or damage done to the parties 
concerned.  According to Horsley and Barker (2002) attempts to blame 
the incident on some other entity or to take the pressure off the 
organisation, through suggested strategies such as justification or 
excuse, can backfire and hinder further public relations. Huang (2005:32) 
warns that the excuse response could be associated with manipulation 
and controlling and could ruin relationships between the organisation and 
the public. 
 
• Hearit (2001:509) criticises approaches to public relations messages 
during crises such as SCCT because they often treat the responses of 
organisations as static and linear when in reality they are dynamic and 
variable.  According to Ihlen (2002:185), while focusing on choosing 
crisis-response strategies, the study of combining, and especially 
changing, strategies is left unexplored. For example, media coverage 
could force an organisation to change its response strategy (Ihlen 2002), 
as in the case of Absa during its internet “hacking” crisis (refer to chapter 
five).  Benson (1988) and Ihlen (2002:191) suggest that tentative 
language and ambiguity in the first stages of a crisis can help an 
organisation to be flexible in its responses in the later stages. 
 
• Two issues are, according to Coombs and Holladay (2006:135) worth 
further consideration.  Does a favourable prior reputation create 
expectations about how an organisation should respond?  Will “good” 
organisations be expected to exceed the normal response?  It may be 
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that if a prior reputation is favourable an organisation will need to use the 
most expensive response regardless of the crisis situation.  No evidence 
as yet supports this conclusion. 
 
• In spite of the shift in communications and public relations towards a 
more symmetrical way of communicating and more socially responsible 
actions and interactions; it seems that at the heart of crisis 
communications dialogue and certainly at the core of a theory such as 
SCCT, is persuasion or influence (refer to 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).  The 
organisation wishes the public not to judge it too harshly and therefore 
designs messages using techniques such as bolstering, scapegoating, 
minimisation and so on to persuade the public or the media to view it in a 
better light. 
   
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter critically reviewed the existing literature on crisis management and 
crisis communication theories and models, ranging from the more traditional 
approaches to those based on open systems approaches. The traditional 
approaches generally view crises as signs of trouble, while the progressive 
systems approaches such as chaos theory view crises as opportunities for 
change and improvement to the organisation. While traditional organisations 
seek to predict and control their environments, progressive organisations 
choose to adapt to them.  
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A valuable recommendation from the models reviewed, particularly the more 
traditional models, is that an organisation should remain alert to signals and 
address issues before they become serious crises. Although prior planning in 
advance of a crisis is acknowledged as important, flexibility in approach during 
a crisis, rather than strict adherence to the plan is advised by progressive 
theories. 
 
While the discussed approaches acknowledge the importance of 
communication decisions made during a crisis, none of them (with the exception 
of the SCCT theory) actually examine these decisions or responses to 
investigate how messages can be communicated to the media to shape public 
perceptions of an organisation The shortcomings of SCCT were examined 
which will be addressed in the proposed model in chapter six. These include the 
lack of acknowledgement for flexibility in crisis response and issues such as the 
absence of a strategy to reflect compassion without incurring blame.  The 
applicability of some of the tactics suggested by SCCT, such as bolstering and 
justification were questioned in this chapter.  
  
The results of the research, which follow in chapter five will be combined with 
the relevant elements of SCCT and other supporting literature and applied to 
the conceptual model of crisis communication discussed in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have focused on a literature review of crisis 
management/crisis communication principles and theories which can be used as a 
foundation for this research. As Neuman (2000:445) states:  A literature review is 
based on the assumption that knowledge accumulates and that we learn from and 
build on what others have done. The knowledge gleaned from the literature review 
will be used to compare the findings of the case studies researched and as a basis 
for the conceptual model proposed in chapter six.    
 
This chapter begins with a summary of the research goal followed by a description 
of the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms.  The shift from modernism 
(from which the quantitative research paradigm is derived) – to postmodernism, the 
epistemology of the qualitative research paradigm, is described and the reason for 
choosing the qualitative research paradigm explained.  
 
The qualitative paradigm was considered more appropriate than the quantitative 
paradigm because of the interpretive nature of the research (Puth & Steyn 2000). 
The research methodology (sampling and selection, data collection, and data 
analysis processes followed) will be described in detail to make sure that the 
research adheres to scientific principles because, research methodology is what 
makes social science scientific (Neuman 2000:63). The aim is not however to 
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position the reader to replicate the study exactly (Babbie & Baxter 2004).  It is 
understood in qualitative research that a second researcher who studies the same 
group or setting might interpret it differently (Babbie & Baxter 2004).   
 
4.2 Research goal 
 
The research goal or objective provides a general idea of what the researcher 
wishes to achieve (Du Plooy 2001).  The research goal determines the research 
approach and techniques or methodologies followed (Du Plooy 2001; Wimmer & 
Dominick 1991). To summarise, the purpose of this study is to translate the 
existing literature on crisis communication and crisis management principles and 
theories, as well as the learning obtained from case studies of crises in the South 
African banking environment, into a currently relevant conceptual model for 
organisational strategies of crisis communications with the media.  
 
The research goal can be described as partly exploratory and partly descriptive 
(Babbie & Baxter 2004:30; Neuman 2000:21-23). It has a partly exploratory 
element because a large portion of the current literature on crisis communication 
has focused on the structural aspects of crisis response, rather than on the content 
(what communicators actually say).  The researcher’s stance is investigative and 
seeks to discover what kind of communication decisions are made during crises 
(Babbie & Baxter 2004:30; Neuman 2000:21; Puth & Steyn 2000).  Babbie and 
Baxter (2004:31) describe this kind of questioning as inductive reasoning because 
it begins with a relatively blank slate and the questions that guide the inductive 
process are: What is going on here?  What’s this all about? 
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It is also partly descriptive because it sets out to clarify a sequence of steps and 
presents a picture of the specific details of crisis communication – how 
communication decisions are made during crises (Babbie & Baxter 2004:31; 
Neuman 2000:21; Puth & Steyn 2000).  Social research such as this one can be 
conducted using quantitative research processes, qualitative research processes 
or a combination of both (Neuman 2000).  Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are discussed critically and the reasons for choosing a qualitative 
approach for this research are summarised. 
 
4.3 Quantitative research paradigm  
 
Adopted from traditional scientific research, the quantitative paradigm is congruent 
with objectivist, positivist or modernist epistemology. The key premise of this 
modernist epistemology is that there is a reality out there that can be discovered 
through the use of empirical, scientific methods that are quantitative in nature 
(Babbie & Baxter 2004; Durrheim & Terre Blanche 2002).  According to this view, 
knowledge should be an accurate representation of objective reality (Babbie & 
Baxter 2004; Du Plooy 2001; Stancombe & White 1998).From this perspective, 
research is only valid if it adheres to the rules of precise measurement, involves 
the manipulation of variables using an experimental design and the articulation of 
specific hypotheses (Puth & Steyn 2000).  In an objective world, the complex 
nature of lived human experience is devalued in the search for universal laws that 
can explain and predict (Du Plooy 2001). 
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Modernist epistemology endorses a mechanistic worldview, which depicts the 
world as a complex machine and events in nature as the product of the linear 
transmittal of forces (Gayeski & Majika 1996).  Scientists adhering to reductionist 
principles believe that phenomena can be studied in an atomistic way by breaking 
them down into discrete parts to discover their linear cause-effect relations 
(Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Gergen 1999).  The application of these modernist 
principles to the study of communication lends credence to a view of people as 
reactive and passive organisms, determined by their environment in an almost 
unidirectional way (Gergen 1999).  An example of this way of thinking by 
communicators is the traditional Hypodermic Needle Theory, which suggests that 
media audiences are passive and that the media inject information into users 
(Bloom 2001).  
 
The American Psychological Association specifies codified guidelines for producing 
research articles consistent with positivist ideology and methods of research 
(Rogers 2000:75).  Specifically these include: 
• The use of an objective, third person point of view. 
• Emphasis on precision, with mathematics as a model. 
• Avoidance of metaphors and other expressive uses of language. 
• Support of claims with experimental, empirical evidence.  
 
Positivist researchers favour rigorous, precise measures and test hypotheses by 
analysing numbers (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Neuman 2000:66). The use of 
quantitative methods leads to the acquisition of knowledge that is a-contextual but 
empirically precise (Becvar & Becvar 2000; Puth & Steyn 2000). The goal is to 
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produce findings that can reliably be taken as “objective” fact and offers absolute 
certainty (Du Plooy 2001; Puth & Steyn 2000). These findings are generally in the 
form of causal laws with predictable outcomes (Fourie 1998; Puth & Steyn 2000). 
In this sense, quantitative research can be described as linear or step-by-step or 
cause-effect. The aim of positivist research is to discover and confirm a set of 
probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human 
activity (Baxter & Babbie 2004; Neuman 2000:66).   
 
The quantitative research paradigm is questioned by interpretive thought, which 
postulates that observations are actively interpreted by the human observer and, 
therefore, cannot strictly be objective (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Rogers 2000). 
These observations are mediated by the observer’s experiences, perceptions, and 
social context (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Gergen 1999; Puth & Steyn 2000). The 
presumption that scientists can be value free in their approach to knowledge is 
challenged and the social implications and limitations of their studies questioned 
(Puth & Steyn 2000).   
 
According to the interpretative approach, the inductive method of observation, 
which is used in quantitative research as a means of establishing universal 
statements of truth, fails. It fails because it does not allow for the discovery of 
individual differences or variations from predictable patterns and because it 
presumes uniformity (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Du Plooy 2001; Gergen 1999). 
According to the interpretative perspective, because people have the ability to 
interpret a situation and ascribe meaning to it, human behaviour cannot be 
predicted (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Du Plooy 2001). 
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Another objection is that the standards of precise measurement and objectification 
required by positivism reduce the range of questions that can be effectively 
researched (Gordon 1999; Howard 1991).  Only those issues that reduce 
phenomena to behavioural and biological laws can be demonstrated in an 
experimental mode (Becvar & Becvar 2000). The meanings that people ascribe to 
their experiences, contexts, and relationships cannot be studied using quantitative 
methodology. Reductionist conceptions of causality do not take into account the 
primacy of human purpose and agency (Weinberg 2001). Du Plooy (2001: ix) 
succinctly asks whether an empirically demarcated view of reality can be 
superimposed on the complexity of human interaction.   
 
Critics also charge that positivism reduces people to numbers and that its concern 
with abstract laws or formulas is not relevant to the actual lives of real people (Du 
Plooy 2001; Neuman 2000:66).  For example, the positivist assumption that the 
laws of human nature should be universally valid, applicable to all historical eras 
and in all cultures is challenged (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Neuman 2000:68).  
Du Plooy (2001:ix) questions whether people should be or can be reduced to 
numerals. 
 
A different methodology to fit the researcher’s interpretive approach is therefore 
necessary, one that takes into account human cognition, and a reflective approach.  
The researcher is aiming to construct themes and propose an integrated model of 
crisis communication with the media. To do this, data will be gathered from a 
variety of sources, mainly from specialists involved in the field of crisis 
communication. The qualitative paradigm, the origins of which are described in the 
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next section, will allow for the flexibility required in achieving these descriptive and 
exploratory aims.   
 
4.4 Shift from modernism to the post modernism/constructivist paradigm 
 
The qualitative research paradigm is derived from post-modern, constructivist 
thought.  The shift from a purely modernist approach to research was fuelled by 
developments in such disciplines as physics, biology, mathematics and the 
cognitive sciences which acknowledged the general inadequacy of objectivism 
applied to the study of human beings and communication (Du Plooy 2001; Hoffman 
2000).  Building on Von Foerster and Zopf’s (1961) neurophysiological research, 
Maturana and Varela (1987) found that sensory data undergoes several 
transformations as it is received and processed by each individual.  This means 
that knowledge is not passively received, either through the senses or by way of 
communication, but is actively built up by the cognising subject.  Maturana and 
Varela (1987) therefore concluded that there is no such thing as direct perception.  
In other words, each person interprets and constructs a reality based on his or her 
experiences and interactions with his or her environment (Angelopulo & Barker 
2006).  Taking this premise to its logical conclusion, constructivist thought assumes 
that all mental images are creations of people, and thus speak of an invented 
reality (Gergen 1999; Watzlawick 1984). Realism, the modernist position that 
reality exists, was slowly replaced by post-modernism – the view that reality is only 
ever a view, an invention (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Du Plooy 2001; Hoffman 2000; 
Speed 1991). 
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What is important is that because constructivists believe that there is no outside, 
impartial viewpoint, all aspects of human experience and communication can only be 
seen from the point of view of the experiencing subject (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; 
Becvar & Becvar 2000).  The objectivist ideal of a detached observer requiring the 
separation of subject and object, an inside and outside world, as proposed by 
quantitative research, is not possible (Babbie & Baxter 2004). Watzlawick (1984) 
claims that the shift from objectivism to constructivism involves a growing awareness 
that any so-called reality is the construction of those who believe they have 
discovered and investigated it.  Or, as Effran, Lukens and Lukens (1998: 28) explain: 
Good constructivists acknowledge the active role they play in creating a view of the 
world. Rorty (1991:187) explains that epistemology in the latter half of the 20th 
century has been marked by a shift from notions of truth to notions of significance (or 
meaning): The essence of science lies in the progression of ever-improving theories 
that explain a particular domain of action.  But in the constructionist worldview, since 
we can’t objectively know reality, all we can do is interpret experience.  There are 
many possibilities for how any given experience may be interpreted, but no 
interpretation is ‘really’ true.  The same ‘facts’ can be retold from different points of 
view and they can have very different meanings.  Because reality is constructed 
through a person’s active experience of it, the constructivist assumption is that we 
can never have access to an objective world, independent of human mental activity 
(Gergen 1999; Du Plooy 2001).  A person behaves in accordance with his or her 
‘reality’ and looks for consensus for this reality in terms of internal consistence (his 
or her previous experiences) and social consensus (Hoffman 2000).  If there is 
agreement, it can be said that a domain of consensus in language exists between 
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observers and not because the area of agreement has an objective existence 
independent of context (Hoffman 2000). 
 
While objectivists (modernists) believe that there is a real world ‘out there’ and we 
can know it through language, constructivists contend that [l]anguage does not 
mirror nature; language creates the natures we know (Anderson & Goolishian 
1988:378).  According to Effran et al (1998), reality is co-constructed in language 
by the observer internally to him or herself, and externally, through the observer’s 
communication with others.  One could argue that we create realities or truths in 
conversation with others.  This suggests that when newspapers or broadcasters 
use phrases such as “the war on terror” or “internet hacking”, they are legitimised 
as tangible, real concepts.  From a constructivist perspective they become value-
laden social constructions.  In the context of this research, this means that words 
need to be selected with care in communication with the media because phrases 
can be considered to be ”facts” if enough journalists refer to them as such.  
 
While positivists would try to disqualify alternatives to work methodically to identify 
universally applicable laws, constructivists and interpretive researchers celebrate 
diversity (Angelopulo & Barker 2006; Du Plooy 2001).  Within the multiple stories 
and multiple possibilities of the constructivist multiverse, there are no essential or 
absolute truths, only perspectives or interpretations.  This is what scholars refer to 
as the interpretive turn – a turning away from authoritative meaning (Bruner 1990; 
Donovan 1999; Du Plooy 2001).  It can therefore be said that truth is relative 
depending on who is making the claim, to whom and in what context (Babbie & 
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Baxter 2004). The next section describes qualitative research which derives from 
the post-modern, constructivist or interpretative paradigm discussed in this section. 
 
4.5 Qualitative research paradigm 
 
The qualitative research paradigm will be discussed in terms of the following:  its 
purpose, advantages and disadvantages.  The justification for choosing a 
qualitative research approach for this study and the methodology followed will be 
described in detail. 
 
4.5.1 Purpose of qualitative research 
 
Having described the foundations of the qualitative research paradigm, the 
purpose of qualitative research can be summarised as the understanding or the 
illumination of meanings (Du Plooy 2001; Durrheim & Terre Blanche 2002; 
Hoshmand 1989).  For this reason, qualitative research is described as an 
interpretative or constructionist method (Du Plooy 2001; Hoshmand 1999). In 
comparison with the quantitative tradition of experimentation, theory testing and 
verification (Gergen 1999), qualitative researchers place more emphasis on 
description, understanding and discovery (Gordon 1999).  The attitudes associated 
with this mode of inquiry have been described as open, reflexive, and sometimes 
a-theoretical (Flick 2002; Hoshmand 1989).  More importance is placed on the 
researcher as an active participant (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Becvar & Becvar 2000; 
Puth & Steyn 2000) while the subject, more aptly termed the participant, is viewed 
as a collaborator, or co-constructor, of meanings (Weinberg 2001). The researcher 
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who engages in qualitative research is involved with those being studied (Neuman 
2000; Puth & Steyn 2000), to the extent that the researcher is the instrument 
(Patton 2002:14).  Participants are consulted as to what would constitute 
meaningful and relevant research questions, and whether the interpretations and 
conclusions truly reflect their experience, or are valid for the setting studied 
(Hoshmand 1989; Rapmund 1996). The qualitative researcher is very practical and 
wants to get to know a particular phenomenon from the perspective of those 
involved with it (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Neuman 2000). It is acknowledged that the 
researcher cannot completely know or understand the participants’ experiences.  
This would imply an objectivist ability to stand apart from the interview and make 
value-free observations (Babbie & Baxter 2004).   A distinctive feature of qualitative 
research is that it is openly constructivist, acknowledging that the meaning of any 
event or experience is socially constructed, and that each observer will interpret 
things differently.  McLeod (1996:73) underscores the constructivist nature of 
qualitative research by stating that: The aim of qualitative research is to construct a 
representation of an area of human experience, a local knowledge that promotes 
understanding within readers at a particular historical and cultural place and time. 
 
Thematic and content analyses are aimed at the recognition of meaning patterns, 
rather than at the yielding of statistical data (Du Plooy 2001; Rogers 2000). The 
interpretive base may be theoretical or evolving (Rogers 2000). Rather than 
upholding traditional standards of reliability and validity, where increased 
quantification and standardisation is the norm, criteria such as authenticity, or 
domain-referenced validity, is more appropriate, as is the usefulness of the 
interpretations gleaned from the research (Durrheim & Terre Blanche 2002). 
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4.5.2   Advantages of qualitative research 
 
The literature review shows that qualitative research has the following advantages: 
  
• It allows the researcher to observe behaviour in a natural setting without the 
artificiality that is often associated with experimental or survey research.  
Qualitative research involves letting the phenomenon speak for itself by 
observing it (Babbie & Baxter 2004).  Many qualitative researchers have long 
criticised laboratory based research as artificial and noted that people react 
differently in alternative situations (Neuman 2000).   
 
• Because qualitative methods are designed to allow researchers to pay attention 
to individual cases and to the meanings that people ascribe to their 
experiences, contexts and relationships, deep insights can be derived (Du 
Plooy 2001). This understanding can then be used to empower people (Du 
Plooy 2001). 
 
• Qualitative methods are flexible and because there are no restrictions or limits 
to the kinds of data that are collected, researchers are encouraged to pursue 
new areas of interest (Du Plooy 2001). 
 
• The inductive nature of qualitative research is an ideal mechanism for 
exploratory studies because pre-existing expectations are not imposed as in 
quantitative research (Neuman 2000). 
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• Qualitative research allows for the discovery of individual differences or 
variations from predictable patterns (Babbie & Baxter 2004).  
 
• Sound qualitative research follows rigorous procedures and uses measurement 
and analysis techniques which can be classified as scientific (Babbie & Baxter 
2004). 
 
• Qualitative reports are generally easy to read and understand (Babbie & Baxter 
2004). 
 
• The information that emerges from the data is contextual (Puth & Steyn 
2000:157).  In other words, the knowledge gleaned from the research is closely 
related to the specific situation that was studied. 
 
4.5.3 Disadvantages of qualitative research 
 
The disadvantages of qualitative research are as follows:  
 
• The samples are generally too small to allow the researcher to generalise 
their findings (Babbie & Baxter 2004). 
 
• Reliability of data can be an issue as single observers are describing unique 
events (Du Plooy 2001; Wimmer & Dominick 1991). 
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• If qualitative research is not planned properly it may produce nothing of value 
(Wimmer & Dominick 1991). 
 
• The results or the research may not be able to be replicated due to the 
individual and subjective nature of the research (Du Plooy 2001).  
 
• The conclusions drawn are often regarded as suggestive rather than definitive 
(Du Plooy 2001). 
 
• Positivists argue that because of these factors, qualitative research is 
unscientific (Du Plooy 2001). 
 
Researcher integrity is a critical issue in qualitative research (Neuman 2000:126).  
Quantitative research addresses the integrity issue by relying on so-called 
objective technology such as precise statements, standard techniques, numerical 
measures, statistics and replication (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Neuman 2000:126).  
Qualitative research places greater trust in the personal integrity of individual 
researchers, but specifies a variety of safeguards on how evidence is gathered 
which are described in section 4.5.6 and 4.5.7.   
 
The reason for choosing the qualitative research approach for this study is 
summarised in the section that follows. 
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4.5.4 Justification for choosing a qualitative research approach 
 
In summary, the phenomenon under investigation is not statistically or numerically 
rich and was therefore not suited to a quantitative research methodology (Bloom 
2000; Du Plooy 2001). Rather than testing a hypothesis or theory (the aim of a 
quantitative approach) the researcher was concerned with gaining an 
understanding of the field in order to empower other crisis communicators with an 
empirical, illustrative decision-making tool. These exploratory and descriptive aims 
are characteristically the domain of qualitative research (Babbie & Baxter 2004).  
For the purposes of this study, the advantages of an interpretive, qualitative 
approach discussed in section 4.5.2 outweigh the disadvantages discussed in 
section 4.5.3. Reliability and validity in qualitative research are conceptualised 
differently from quantitative research designs and will be described in the next 
section.   
 
4.5.5 Reliability and validity in qualitative research 
 
In quantitative research designs, reliability refers to the consistency with which the 
measurement device yields the same approximate results when utilised repeatedly 
under similar situations (Breakwell, Hammond & Fife-Schaw 2000). In short, this 
refers to the degree with which the research can be replicated. Any researcher 
should be able to replicate or reproduce the results of others (Du Plooy 2001). 
Validity refers to the extent to which the instrument measures what it intends to 
measure (Breakwell et al 2000). This refers to the accuracy of the research. 
According to Stiles (1993:594), in qualitative research, [r]eliability refers to the 
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trustworthiness of observations or data, while validity refers to the trustworthiness 
of interpretations or conclusions.  Instead of judging observations by their 
consistency, qualitative researchers evaluate whether the observations are 
dependable (Babbie & Baxter 2004:298). The methods used to insure reliability in 
this study are described in the section which follows. 
 
4.5.6 Reliability with reference to this study 
 
Strategies to ensure reliability or the trustworthiness of observations or data have 
been adapted largely from the work of Stiles (1993:594). They are: 
  
• Data collection and analysis procedures have been described in detail in 
order to provide a clear and accurate picture of the methods used in the 
study (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Durrheim & Terre Blanche 2002). 
 
• The context in which the research takes place has been described (Du 
Plooy 2001). These factors influenced the collection and analysis of the data 
and were therefore made overt.  
 
• The researcher tried to establish a comfortable relationship with participants 
to encourage the telling of their stories (Rapmund 1996). 
 
• The researcher tried to be sensitive to the dialogue and encourage 
revelations (Rapmund 1996).  
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• Questions were chosen about which the participants had direct knowledge 
in order to elicit reliable material (Rapmund 1996).  
 
• The researcher engaged closely with the material and considered how the 
themes that emerged could enrich understanding of the experience of crisis 
communications (Mason 2002).   
 
• Recording of the interviews through the use of audiotape and transcriptions 
were open for scrutiny and verification by a supervisor (Rapmund 1996). 
 
• As recommended by Stiles (1993), the researcher repeatedly listened to and 
read the material. Observations undoubtedly changed in the process.  
 
• Interpretations and themes were grounded by linking them to excerpts from 
the interview text (Durrheim & Terre Blanche 2002). 
 
• Triangulation or the collection of information from multiple sources such as 
crisis communication specialists and a host of media articles contributed to 
the reliability of the investigation (Du Plooy 2001).     
 
4.5.7 Validity with reference to this study 
 
In this research, the following actions were taken to ensure validity or the 
trustworthiness of interpretations or conclusions (Stiles 1993:594): 
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• The researcher undertook a procedure known as member-checking or 
testimonial validity (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Rapmund 1996).  This means 
that the researcher checked validity by consulting with the participants 
throughout the analysis process (Weinberg 2001).  
 
• An ongoing dialogue regarding the researcher’s interpretations of the 
participants’ realities and meanings took place. However, it is acknowledged 
that the participants may still view things differently (Durrheim & Terre 
Blanche 2002). 
 
• Coherent conclusions made by the interpretation of data were defended by 
informal reasoning (Babbie & Baxter 2004).  The argument was one of 
likelihood, not certainty or statistical probability (Babbie & Baxter 2004). 
 
• Reflexive validity was ensured because the researcher’s interpretations kept 
changing and were continuously evaluated (Stiles 1993). Alternative 
explanations were offered during the analytic process (Babbie & Baxter 
2001; MacLiam 2003).  
 
• The coherence or quality of the fit of the interpretation was ensured in 
consultation with a supervisor (Rapmund 1996; MacLiam 2003). 
 
• The researcher tried not to generalise the findings of the research to wider 
groups (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Du Plooy 2001; Durrheim & Terre Blanche 
2002).   
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• The circularity of this approach, which contrasts from the fixed sequence of 
steps followed by quantitative researchers, can be seen as a strength, 
because it forces the researcher to permanently reflect on the whole 
research process and on particular steps in the  light of other steps (Babbie 
& Baxter 2004; Flick 1998:43). 
 
4.5.8 Selection of participants and collection of data 
 
In qualitative research, sampling is often purposive in that the informants that are 
chosen are those who can provide rich descriptions of the experiences under study 
(Du Plooy 2001; Durrheim &Terre Blanche 1999; Weinberg 2001).  Informants 
must be able to articulate their experiences and be willing to give complete and 
sensitive accounts (Mason 2002; Weinberg 2001). A small sample is appropriate 
for qualitative research, where the purpose is to elicit as much detail as possible 
from individual cases (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Breakwell et al 2000). 
 
The researcher approached the heads of organisational communication of three 
different banking groups in South Africa and requested their participation. The 
banking groups are the largest in this country in terms of clients and assets. They 
are Absa, Standard Bank and First Rand. The respective heads of organisational 
communications were encouraged to share in as much detail as possible their 
memories of dealing with crises that made the newspaper headlines within the 
period 1999 - 2003. The participants chosen were the key communication decision-
makers during the crises and were thus able to provide rich descriptions about the 
strategies employed. In the case of Standard Bank, two participants were 
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interviewed: the head of organisational communication and an external advisor 
from a specialist crisis communication consultancy. The aforementioned was 
employed to assist the Standard Bank team during the crisis.  The sample was 
thus a convenience sample because they were conveniently available (Du Plooy 
2001). According to Wimmer and Dominick (1991:72) this kind of sampling does 
not follow the guidelines of mathematical probability.  The sample was considered 
appropriate for the researcher’s goal which was to collect information for an in-
depth investigation (Du Plooy 2001).The supplementing news coverage of the 
crises over the period 1999 – 2003 discussed during the interviews, was drawn 
from three major South African business publications:  The Business Times, 
Business Report and Business Day. This formed the basis for the case studies.  
 
The following benefits of applying a case study methodology are relevant: 
(Du Plooy 2001; Neuman 2000; Wimmer & Dominick 1991:156): 
 
• Case studies provide researchers with a wide range of evidence about the 
research topic.  Documents, artefacts, interviews and direct observations 
can be incorporated into the study. A wealth of information and range of 
evidence can therefore be obtained. 
• The case study method can be used as a retrospective learning tool of real-
life situations. 
• Case studies can also provide information about why something has 
occurred.  It can help to understand why communication decisions were 
taken by the crisis communicators during the crisis. 
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These advantages outweigh the possible disadvantages of the case study 
methodology, such as a lack of scientific rigor or its time-consuming nature (Du 
Plooy 2001; Wimmer & Dominick 1991).   
 
The qualitative in-depth interview was chosen as the data collection tool because 
of the researcher’s intention to understand informants’ perspectives regarding their 
situations, as expressed in their own words.  In contrast to structured interviewing, 
qualitative interviewing has been referred to as non-directive, unstructured, open-
ended and non-standardised (Breakwell et al 2000; Du Plooy 2001).  The in-depth 
interview can be described as a conversation between equals, rather than a formal 
question-and-answer exchange.  Far from being a robotlike data collector, the 
interviewer, not an interview schedule or protocol is the research tool (Bogdan & 
Taylor 1998:77). Questions were open-ended and discovery oriented and 
participants were encouraged to tell their stories or case studies with as much 
detail as they were willing or able to provide.  One very important factor is that 
open-ended questions allow for answers that the researcher may not have 
foreseen in the construction of a questionnaire (Du Plooy 2001; Wimmer & 
Dominick 1991:105). Unlike pre-planned questionnaires, open-ended interviews do 
not limit the kinds of data that can be collected, which allows the researcher 
flexibility (Du Plooy 2001). In comparison with traditional survey methods, in-depth 
interviews provide more accurate responses on sensitive issues (Du Plooy 2001). 
Another benefit is that respondents can answer in detail and qualify and clarify 
responses which encourages a richness of material and can reveal a respondent’s 
logic and frame of reference (Du Plooy 2001; Neuman 2000). However, there are 
some disadvantages to open-ended questions which have been identified:   
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• Different respondents give different degrees of detail in answers (Puth & 
Steyn 2000). 
• Responses may be irrelevant or buried in useless detail (Neuman 2000: 
241).  
• Comparisons and statistical analysis become very difficult (Neuman 2000: 
241). 
• Coding responses is difficult (Neuman 2000:241). 
• Questions may be too general for respondents who lose direction (Neuman 
2000:241). 
• Articulate and highly literate respondents have an advantage (Du Plooy 
2001). 
• Participants may not be willing to share all information or may not tell the 
truth (Du Plooy 2001). They may censor their stories or simply may not be 
fully aware of, or able (because of organisation confidentiality restrictions), 
to articulate certain aspects of their experiences (Breakwell et al 2000).                       
• The ability to generalise is curtailed (Du Plooy 2001). 
• Respondents may ascribe different meanings to the words used by the 
researcher because their conceptualisations of reality may differ (Du Plooy 
2001). 
 
To alleviate these problems, the researcher checked the shared meanings of 
concepts and skilfully guided the participants in the interviews so that appropriate 
and relevant material could be obtained for analysis (Du Plooy 2001). The 
researcher was careful not to lead the participants in a particular direction – or to 
put words into their mouths (Du Plooy 2001).   
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The aim was to elicit the most detail possible about participants’ experiences of 
being responsible for crisis communication to the media during selected crises that 
made newspaper headlines. This information needed to be analysed and the 
following section describes the process that was followed by the researcher. 
 
4.5.9 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis is the process whereby order, structure and meaning are imposed on 
the mass of data that is collected in a qualitative research study (Rapmund 
1996:118). The relevance of the research findings lies in proper interpretation (Du 
Plooy 2001). Both qualitative and quantitative researchers examine empirical 
information to reach a conclusion based on evidence.  The conclusion is reached 
by reasoning and simplifies the complexity of the data (Neuman 2000:418). 
Interpretation brings logical and observational aspects together in the search for 
patterns in what is observed (Babbie & Baxter 2004:9).  
 
An interpretive approach called hermeneutics was selected in order to understand 
the worldview of the participants.  According to Neuman (2000:70), hermeneutics 
refers to: [a] detailed reading or examination of a text, which could refer to 
conversation, written words, or pictures.  A researcher conducts “a reading” to 
discover meaning embedded within text. Each reader brings his or her subjective 
experience to a text.  The term hermeneutics is a Greek word which means to 
interpret and is derived from the story of Hermes, a mythological messenger who 
was tasked with changing the unknowable to a form that humans could 
understand, via language and writing (Babbie & Baxter 2004; Van Manen 2002).   
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As a contemporary research approach, hermeneutics involves understanding and 
interpretation.  The aim is to understand how people experience the world pre-
reflectively, without taxonomising, classifying or abstracting it (Van Manen 2002:9). 
Hermeneutics endeavours to discover meaning and achieve understanding, not to 
extract theoretical terms or concepts at a higher level of abstraction (Van Manen 
2002).  It attempts to interpret a person’s experiences through a text which could 
refer to a conversation or written words (Neuman 2000:70).  The assumption is 
however that the lived experience is hidden.  Thus the researcher’s task, in 
collaboration with the participant, is to uncover the shared common practices of the 
experience (Van Manen 2002). The aims and principals of hermeneutics are in 
keeping with the qualitative paradigm on which this study rests. 
 
At the beginning of the data analysis process, the qualitative researcher becomes 
aware of meanings, patterns, regularities, explanations and possible 
configurations.  The competent researcher should, however, be aware of early 
conclusions and approach these conclusions with a sceptical, open mind (Van 
Manen 2002).  Final conclusions should not be made until data collection has been 
completed. In both qualitative and quantitative forms of data analysis, researchers 
strive to avoid errors, false conclusions and illusions.  They sort through the 
various explanations, discussions and descriptions seeking those that are more 
authentic and valid (Neuman 2000:418).  Dialoguing between the researcher and 
the text; between the researcher and supervisor; between the researcher and the 
account itself, took place (Rapmund 1996).  The process of developing categories 
and themes is an iterative cycle that you engage in over and over (Babbie & Baxter 
2004: 367). This method shows that the qualitative, hermeneutic approach to 
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analysis is non-linear and cyclical (Neuman 2000).  With each cycle or repetition, 
the researcher gained new insights. During this process the researcher looked for 
any possible misconceptions, deeper meanings, alternative connotations, and 
changes over time as she examined elements of the text and the whole text 
(Rapmund 1996).   
 
The researcher’s goal was to organise the large quantity of specific details 
gathered into a coherent picture or model.  A qualitative researcher rarely tries to 
document universal laws (Neuman 2000:419).  The researcher is satisfied by 
building a case or supplying supportive evidence (Neuman 2000:419). Although 
proponents of hermeneutics do not generally advocate the use of specified 
techniques, the following approach was adapted from Rapmund (1996) and 
applied to this study: 
 
Table 4.5: Hermeneutic technique used to analyse date from interviews 
Step 1 Permission was obtained from 
participants before being interviewed.  
The interviews were tape-recorded 
Step 2 
 
The taped interviews were 
transcribed. 
 
Step 3 
 
The researcher carefully listened to 
the tape recordings while 
simultaneously reading the 
transcribed interviews. 
 
 
Step 4 
 
The researcher read the text 
repeatedly and became immersed  in 
each of the participant’s interviews in 
order to make sense of their 
communication decisions and 
strategies during the crises they 
described 
Step 5  The researcher identified themes or 
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 patterns from each of the original 
texts and used excerpts from the 
original texts to support these 
proposed themes. 
Step 6 
 
Themes common to all three 
participants and case studies were 
identified.  A comparative analysis 
was then undertaken in order to 
integrate the findings from previous 
research and literature with the 
themes articulated in this study, not to 
prove that these themes were right, 
but as a way of uniting multiple  
voices. 
 
The steps described above summarise the process followed by the researcher in 
analysing the data collected. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the qualitative research approach and methodology of this 
study. The study was described as partly exploratory and partly descriptive (Babbie 
& Baxter 2004:30; Neuman 2000:21-23). It has a partly exploratory element 
because a large portion of the current literature on crisis communication has 
focused on the structural aspects of crisis response, rather than on the content 
(what communicators actually say).  The researcher’s stance is investigative and 
seeks to discover what kind of communication decisions are made during crises 
(Babbie & Baxter 2004:30; Neuman 2000:21; Puth & Steyn 2000).  It is also partly 
descriptive because it sets out to clarify a sequence of steps and presents a picture 
of crisis communication to the media – how communication decisions are made 
during crises (Babbie & Baxter 2004:31; Neuman 2000:21; Puth & Steyn 2000). 
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Because qualitative methods are designed to allow researchers to pay attention to 
individual cases (Neuman 2000) and to the meanings that people ascribe to their 
experiences, contexts and relationships - deep insights can be obtained which can 
be used to empower people (Du Plooy 2001). The samples are however generally 
too small to allow the researcher to generalise their findings (Babbie & Baxter 
2004).  Nevertheless it was argued that the value of this research approach will be 
in its description and careful insights.  The use of this kind of qualitative approach 
requires a suspension of belief in the singular authority of the traditional scientific 
method (Gergen 1999) and a tolerance for studies that are not concerned with the 
testing of hypotheses designed to identify general laws, independently of the 
individual’s experience or of the context (Babbie & Baxter 2001; Rapmund 1996). 
 
Chapter five which follows discusses the results of the research undertaken on the 
case studies using the approach described in this chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the research approach and methodology of this study was 
outlined. A qualitative, constructivist paradigm was considered more appropriate 
than a quantitative, positive paradigm because of the interpretive nature of the 
research. In this chapter, the results of the research undertaken on the case 
studies are discussed, which together with elements drawn from the literature, 
forms the basis for the model proposed in chapter six. The data collection process 
involved interviews with the heads of communication/media at three of the largest 
banking groups in South Africa in terms of assets and customer volumes – Absa, 
First Rand and Standard Bank. The participants were selected because of their 
hands-on involvement in specific crises in their roles as professionals in the area of 
media communications.  They were in direct contact with the most senior 
executives of the respective organisations as well as the plethora of journalists 
seeking information during the crises. The crises themselves were selected by the 
participants because of the considerable publicity they garnered, and also 
because, after this period of time, it is unlikely that the analysis undertaken in this 
study will generate further, possibly damaging publicity. The participants were 
encouraged to share in as much detail as possible their recollections of the 
respective crises that made newspaper headlines, as well as the manner in which 
they were managed.  
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Material obtained from the interviews with specialists was supplemented with the 
relevant coverage in selected media which was obtained electronically from the 
web pages of three business publications with national readership in South Africa, 
namely the weekly Sunday Times Business Times (Johnnic Publishing), daily 
Business Day (Johnnic Publishing) and daily Business Report (Independent News 
Media).  The Business Report supplement appears in the following national 
newspapers: The Mercury, The Star, The Saturday Cape Argus, The Pretoria 
News, Cape Times, Sunday Tribute, The Sunday Argus, The Sunday Independent, 
The Saturday Star and The Weekend Argus.  The researcher entered the 
respective websites of the publications listed and searched for articles relating to 
the crises using key words. In this way case studies were compiled. The content of 
the interviews with participants was evaluated against the media coverage.  The 
three publications were targeted because of their business focus, the 
recommendations of the three interviewees and the publications’ wide readerships. 
They are the predominant, pre-eminent daily and weekly business publications in 
this country (Levine 2006).  Each of them is circulated nationally and online.  
Average circulation figures for the publications at the time of the selected crises are 
as follows: Sunday Times Business Times 505 066, Independent Newspapers 
Business Report 172 899, Business Day 41 954 (The Media List 2003:2-4).   
Although extensive coverage, some of it potentially scathing, was received in many 
other consumer oriented publications, online and in the broadcast media, with 
respect to the financial sector, the selection of publications chosen is considered a 
balanced representation of overall coverage.   The respective organisational crises 
examined are:   
• Absa (July – October 2003): an internet hacking/online banking crisis 
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• Standard Bank (October 1999 – March 2001): a hostile take-over attempt of 
Standard Bank by competitor bank Nedcor  
• First Rand Bank (February – November 2003): a non-executive director 
accused of corruption.  
 
5.2 Summaries of case studies 
 
A summary is presented of the three case studies based on an analysis of the well-
publicised cases in the specified media and time frame. The headings of the 
clippings are listed in date order. Comprehensive analyses of the case studies, 
with quotes from the crisis communicators and transcripts of the media articles 
appear in Annexure A (Absa), B (Standard Bank) and C (First Rand).   
 
5.2.1. Absa: An Internet “hacking” crisis  
 
In 2003, three of Absa’s Internet bank clients were defrauded through an illegal 
procedure known as identity theft.  This is the invasion of a client’s personal 
computer through the planting of key-logging software which records the 
customer’s confidential PIN and username.  The criminal then uses this information 
to impersonate the customer and steal money from the victims. The media hype 
was sensational in the reporting of these losses.  Absa’s initial response was to 
distance itself from all responsibility for the crime by putting the onus onto its 
clients to protect themselves from this form of fraud. The Bank was highly criticised 
in the media for this response. Under pressure, Absa later offered free software to 
clients and promised to refund money stolen in this way. The media coverage for 
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the time period analysed in this research is summarised in Table 5.1. The 
newspaper articles reflect the content of discussions with the participant.  They 
especially highlight the change in strategy adopted from a distant, clinical approach 
to one of customer reassurance. 
 
Table 5.1:  Media coverage of the Absa internet “hacking” crisis during the period 
July 2003 – October 2003 
Date 2003 Publication Heading and first line of article 
20 July  Sunday Times Hacker cleans out bank accounts 
Hundreds of thousands of rands stolen via Internet from Absa 
clients. 
22 July  Business Day Online banking faces security crisis 
Clients who use internet facilities must be vigilant about 
releasing their details. 
22 July  Business Report ID theft at Absa is first in SA crime logs 
The theft of the identities of three Absa customers to access 
their internet banking accounts appeared to be the first crimes 
of this kind in this country, but a recent survey in the US has 
claimed that 7 million American adults have been victims of 
identity theft over the past year. 
23 July  Business Day Internet fraud 
The theft of hundreds of thousands of rands from Absa bank 
accounts via the internet raises numerous concerns both for 
consumers and for banks. 
25 July  Business Report Absa sticks to its guns despite scepticism 
Banking group Absa yesterday stuck to its original version of 
how a fraudster gained unauthorised access to, and 
transferred funds from, the internet bank accounts of three of 
its clients. 
26 July Business Report Your PC, your responsibility, say banks 
Inadequate security on your personal computer, or PC, that 
you use for internet banking is the equivalent of putting your 
money on the pavement outside your house and hoping that 
nobody takes it. 
27 July  Sunday Times Two men linked to Absa hacker case 
Two men worked together in an elaborate plot in the 
sensational Absa bank account hacking case, the Sunday 
Times can reveal. 
27 July  Sunday Times Banks counter fears of online banking fraud          
Banks have moved to boost customer confidence in their 
Internet banking platforms following last week’s discovery that 
someone had accessed funds in three Absa Internet banking 
accounts. 
28 July Business Report It’s safety first Standard tells its online clients 
Bank spends millions on software. 
30 July  Business Report The customer should come first in a crisis, at any cost 
South African companies should be sitting up and taking 
notes.  If ever there was a time to learn about how not to deal 
with an external threat, it was now. 
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3 August  Sunday Times Absa hacker’s sidekick says no bank is safe 
A computer programmer admitted this week that he had 
helped the alleged Absa hacker. 
25 August Business Report How can we fob you off? 
Cartoon depicting Absa call centre operator telling a client 
Absa is not responsible for Internet security. 
21 September  Sunday Times Alleged Absa hacker’s secrets revealed in court 
The first details of how the man accused of being the Absa 
hacker allegedly stole money from bank accounts over the 
Internet emerged in court this week. 
5 October  Sunday Times New security fears for web banking 
Expert proves that latest measures don’t protect online 
customers 
6 October Business Day Banks put brave face on hacking 
SA banks moved yesterday to reassure customers alarmed by 
reports at the weekend that their savings may be at risk from 
dishonesty in online banking operations. 
10 October  Business Day Absa internet scandal ‘only tip of iceberg’ 
Absa’s recent internet banking fraud scandal was the tip of the 
iceberg and revealed only a small percentage of the risk 
facing South African companies, Scorpions head of forensics 
Praveck Geeanpersadh said yesterday. 
12 October  Sunday Times Banks ‘must pay up if hacked’ 
Customers who lose money to Internet bank hackers have a 
legal right to be refunded by the bank, a leading lawyer said 
this week. 
 
 
5.2.2 Standard Bank:  A hostile take-over attempt of Standard Bank by 
competitor Nedbank  
 
In 1999, competitor group Nedcor (Nedbank) proposed a hostile take-over bid of 
Stanbic (Standard Bank).  While the media were initially in favour of the bid and 
openly supported Nedbank’s stance, largely because of respect for, and good 
relations with its then CEO, Richard Laubscher, Standard Bank’s communication 
team and new CEO Jacko Maree, put forward compelling arguments against the 
proposed merger and eventually won public sympathy for their cause. The team 
successfully used the media as a platform to stage its offensive against the 
merger. The media coverage on this event for the time period is summarised in 
Table 5.2.  It is interesting to note how the media continuously found new angles to 
keep the story alive in the minds of their readers.  For example, when there were 
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no direct confrontations or information flowing between the two newsmakers, 
Nedcor and Stanbic, the journalists started to create interesting perspectives to 
write about.  These included the legal wrangles and implications of the proposed 
take-over and the personalities and remarks of the regulatory authorities involved 
in the debate, such as the minister of the Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni and the 
then finance director general, Maria Ramos. 
 
Table 5.2:  Media coverage of Standard Bank’s crisis during the period  
October 1999 - March 2001 
Date  
1999 - 2001 
Publication Heading and first paragraph of article 
4 October 1999 Business Report FirstRand and Absa expect bigger slice 
FirstRand and Absa, two of SA’s “big four” banking 
groups, would be short-term winners and boost their 
business if Nedcor’s proposed bid for Stanbic was 
successful, senior management at FirstRand and 
Absa said last week. 
27 October 1999 Business Day Stanbic turns down Nedcors initial bid 
Stage set for battle royal as Nedcor is likely to go 
directly to shareholders. 
27 October 1999 Business Report Stanbic rejects Nedcor’s merger overtures 
Stanbic yesterday declared that the proposed tie-up 
with its smaller rival was “not in the best interests of 
Stanbic shareholders” but it did not reject the deal. 
30 October 1999 Business Report Stanbic board warns shareholders of a possible 
hostile bid by Nedcor 
Stanbic again rebuffed a merger proposal from its 
smaller rival Nedcor yesterday and warned its 
shareholders Nedcor could launch a hostile bid. 
1 November 1999 Business Day Stanbic faces new Nedcor pressure 
New CE says implementing such a merger is very 
complex, with huge risks. 
1 November 1999 Business Day As Nedcor prepares to make a quick decision on 
whether to launch a hostile offer for Stanbic, newly 
appointed Stanbic CEO Jacko Maree said his first 
priority was to get staff back to work after the 
disruption caused by Nedcor’s bid. 
7 November 1999 Business Times Nedcor poised to move as Stanbic row brews 
Hostility worsens as Stanbic goes to Securities 
Regulation Panel 
12 November 1999 Business Day There is no longer any chance of a friendly merger 
If and it is a big if the merger happens, it may yet be 
amiable but it will not be at market prices. 
16 November 1999 Business Times Nedcor’s bid for Stanbic backed by shareholders 
Nedcor had gained virtually enough shareholder 
backing to make the outcome of its long awaited bid, 
announced early yesterday, for larger rival Stanbic a 
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foregone conclusion.  The investor support came in 
the form of irrevocable undertakings and written 
indications of support.  Richard Laubscher, Nedcor’s 
chief executive, said:  “The institutions have 
overwhelmingly evidenced their strong support for the 
deal.” 
16 November 1999 Business Day Burying the hatchet is key to friendly merger 
Nedcor needs to allay Stanbic’s fears over proposed 
deal if a hostile bid is to be avoided. 
16 November 1999 Business Day Merger could result in 10 000 job losses 
Nedcor, SAs fourth-largest bank, says 10 000 jobs will 
be lost if the proposed merger between it and Stanbic 
goes through, with the number of staff at the 
combined operation dropping from the current 50 000 
to 40 000 in three year’s time. 
16 November 1999 Business Day Tough days ahead for ambitious deal 
Nedcor will have its work cut out as it sews up merger. 
16 November 1999 Business Day Banking shares end mixed in wake of bid 
Banking shares ended the day on a mixed note 
yesterday following news of a hostile takeover bid by 
Nedcor of its rival Stanbic. 
16 November 1999 Business Day Suitor says shareholders representing more than 
half of targeted group support merger bid. 
Nedcor has turned up the heat on Stanbic, launching 
a R29bn, all-paper merger bid, which analysts say 
Stanbic would be hard pressed to reject. 
17 November 1999 Business Report Besotted Nedcor should pay some heed to Old 
Mutual 
Which part of “no” don’t you understand, was the third, 
remarkably consistent, response by Stanbic to 
Nedcor’s persistent amorous advances yesterday. 
19 November 1999 Business Report Stanbic calls securities regulator into bid war 
Stanbic yesterday confirmed it had written to the 
Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) expressing its 
concern that Stanbic shareholders might have been 
misled by Nedcor’s claimed institutional backing for its 
bid. The letter comes as Stanbic steps up its defence 
and the two banks dig in for a protracted battle in the 
run-up to year-end. 
19 November 1999 Business Day Stanbic questions Nedcor’s claims 
Stanbic has expressed concern to the Securities 
Regulation Panel that the shareholder support 
claimed by Nedcor in its hostile bid may not be as 
solid as it has led the market to believe. 
20 November 1999 Business Report Banking battle may end up too costly 
As the battle rages on between banking groups 
Nedcor and Stanbic, fuelled by the former’s hostile 
takeover bid of its bigger rival, the price may be too 
heavy for the merged entity if the deal is successful.  
But at what price?  Market share. 
21 November 1999 Business Times Stanbic shores up merger defences 
The besieged bank is to beef up its top team. 
22 November 1999 Business Day (Letters) Nedcor-Stanbic merger driven by vested 
interests 
It is amazing that one shareholder, Old Mutual, can 
bully others into compliance, despite basic flaws in the 
transaction. 
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22 November 1999 Business Day (Letters) Goodwill cannot be bought, it has to be 
earned 
As a Standard Bank client for 49 years, I must 
express my disgust at the hostile bid engineered by 
Chris Liebenberg to gain control of the bank. 
22 November 1999 Business Day Bigger is not always better, says Maree 
SA does not necessarily need to follow the global 
trend in bank mergers, and size is not necessarily an 
advantage in this market, Stanbic CE Jacko Maree 
said. 
24 November 1999 Business Report Staff association backs Nedcor bid 
The Insurance and Banking Staff Association 
yesterday threw its weight behind Nedcor’s hostile 
takeover offer for Stanbic. 
24 November 1999 Business Day Nedcor, Stanbic in regulatory dispute 
Will deal be judged by registrar and minister, or by 
competition tribunal? 
26 November 1999 Business Day Stanbic takes off the gloves, landing a blow to 
Nedcor bid 
SA has not seen the likes of the presentation given 
yesterday by Stanbic to defend itself against Nedcor’s 
hostile takeover bid. 
26 November 1999 Business Day Battle for Stanbic – Bank wants top spot back 
Slashing costs through merger likely to produce only 
short-term results. Stanbic is determined to prove it 
can return to being Sas best-rated bank, Stanbic CE 
Jacko Maree said yesterday as he presented the 
groups case for its defence against Nedcor’s hostile 
takeover bid. 
26 November 1999 Business Day Battle for Stanbic – Unions threaten legal action to 
prevent merger 
The Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu) yesterday 
threatened to take legal action to prevent a merger 
between Nedbank and Stanbic.  Meanwhile Stanbic 
announced that 3000 jobs would be cut over the next 
three years. 
26 November 1999 Business Day Stanbic drops a bombshell 
CE Jacko Maree says far more generous terms were 
offered when Nedcor attempted to buy Liberty’s stake 
a year ago. 
28 November 1999 Business Times Gordon triggered Nedcor bid 
Battle of the banks.  The breakdown in relations 
between Liberty Life founder Donald Gordon and 
Standard Bank management over the past four years 
was the catalyst for Nedcor’s attempts to take control 
of Stanbic. 
30 November 1999 Business Day Nedcor wants Sasbo to clarify its stance 
Challenge follows confusion over which position has 
been endorsed by members. 
30 November 1999 Business Day Libam pension trustees to vote on Nedcor bid 
Liberty Asset Management is to take unusual step of 
bringing pension fund trustees in on the crucial 
decision of how to vote their shares in Nedcor’s 
hostile bid for Stanbic. 
1 December 1999 Business Day Old Mutual is firm on Stanbic, Nedcor shares 
voting stance 
Old Mutual yesterday strongly defended its stance in 
the controversy surrounding the voting of its shares in 
Nedcor and Stanbic. 
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2 December 1999 Business Report Union takes umbrage at Nedcor 
The strained relations between Sasbo and Nedcor 
over the latter’s hostile bid for Stanbic took a knock 
yesterday, with Sasbo accusing the bank of trying to 
forge a “clumsy alliance” with union dissidents. 
3 December 1999 Business Report Sasbo wins support for its anti-merger stance 
Sasbo, the Cosatu-affiliated finance union that 
opposes Nedcor’s hostil bid for Stanbic received a 
pledge of support yesterday from the International 
Federation of Commercial Clerical Professional and 
Technical Employees. 
3 December 1999 Business Report Nedcor-Stanbic decision postponed 
The Reserve Bank would decide early next year 
whether Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic could go 
ahead 
5 December 1999 Business Times Stanbic goes to court 
The bank wants a legal ruling on which authorities 
should rule on Nedcor’s takeover plan. 
7 December 1999 Business Report Cool it, Tito tells banks 
Mboweni has forcefully stepped into the two-month-
old battle in which Nedcor has proposed a merger 
with rival Stanbic, which has insisted on retaining its 
independence. 
7 December 1999 Business Day Mboweni intervenes in banks battle 
Governor asks Stanbic and Nedcor to show maturity 
in their handling of proposed merger. 
8 December 1999 Business Report Mboweni baffles bank boss 
Stanbic said yesterday it wanted clarity on remarks 
made by Tito Mboweni, the Reserve Bank governor, 
regarding its merger battle with smaller rival Nedcor. 
8 December 1999 Business Day Stanbic court action to proceed 
Stanbic is to proceed with its court action over who 
will adjudicate Nedcor’s hostile bid, despite 
negotiations about the correct procedure between the 
Reserve Bank and the Competition Commission. 
8 December 1999 Business Day Cool it, Governor 
One wonders whether former labour minister, now 
Reserve Bank governor, Tito Mboweni thought he was 
intervening in a shop floor dispute when he told 
Nedcor and Stanbic to behave themselves. 
9 December 1999 Business Day Competition body will judge merger 
Nedbank’s hostile takeover bid for Stanbic will be 
judged by the Competition Tribunal and if there is any 
doubt about its jurisdiction over competition matters, 
the competition authority will seek to change the law, 
competition commissioner Alistair Reuters says. 
10 December 1999 Business Day Get up, stand up for your right to regulate banking 
merger 
The battle of the banks was beginning to be more 
than a little predictable. Fortunately, the battle of the 
regulators has provided the most recent titillation. 
12 December 1999 Business Report Stanbic goes to the bench to fend off Nedcor bid 
Standard Bank has carried out its threat to go to court 
over which regulatory authority should rule on the 
threatened hostile takeover bid by Nedcor. 
13 December 1999 Business Day Manuel is dragged into Stanbic fray 
It is up to the minister to give his consent in hostile 
bid, says Nedcor’s takeover target. 
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13 December 1999 Business Day Letters. Planned bid by Nedcor for Stanbic may be 
too pricey and too risky.  In Germany, a provision in 
company articles still exists that no single 
shareholder, however big, can exercise more than 5% 
of the votes. 
22 December 1999 Business Report Laubscher named Business Report’s top business 
newsmaker of 1999 
Business Report has chosen Richard Laubscher, the 
chief executive of Nedcor as its top newsmaker of the 
year.  Laubscher has set the banking sector on fire 
with Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic.  But he has also 
modernised the already low-cost Nedecor with forays 
into information technology with a Didata partnership 
and advisory services with the acquisition of law firm 
Edward Nathan & Friedland. 
22 December 1999 Business Report Banking opened the door to much-needed change 
The noise surrounding Nedcor’s hostile takeover bid 
for larger rival Stanbic was just the wake-up call 
needed to stir SA’s somnolent banking sector as the 
century drew to a close. 
12 January 2000 Business Day Hostile bid investigation put on hold pending 
court ruling 
The Competition Commission investigation of 
Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic is on hold, while the 
Commission waits for high court ruling on who should 
regulate the deal. 
17 January 2000 Business Day All parties will be heard, says Ramos 
Nedcor, Stanbic and interested parties will have 
chance to be heard when regulator of banks weighs 
Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic, says finance director-
general, Maria Ramos. 
23 January Business Report Nedcor bosses fall victim to Stanbic ribaldry 
Nedcor’s top brass are shrugging off reports that they 
were the object of pointed corporate voodoo and 
tomfoolery at an end-of-year party in December 
attended by senior managers and directors of their 
intended takeover victim, Stanbic. 
23 January 2000 Business Times Stanbic blows whistle on Registrar Wiese’s 
‘favouritism’ 
Standard Bank has raised concerns that the Registrar 
of Banks, Christo Wiese, “favours” Nedcor’s merger 
bid without having given Stanbic the chance to 
present its argument about the competitive 
implications. 
26 January 2000 Business Report Stanbic argues need for Competition Commission 
Stanbic yesterday gave its opening arguments to the 
high court in Pretoria in its attempt to have Judge Nico 
Coetzee rule that Nedcor’s hostile bid for it must be 
cleared by the Competition Commission and not left to 
the registrar of banks and the finance minister as 
planned. 
2 February 2000 Business Report Bank brawl antics can get shareholders hostile 
Last week’s courtroom shenanigans between the 
parties to Nedcor’s proposed takeover of Stanbic 
illustrate that our regulatory and legal framework and 
even our corporate culture is still far from ready for the 
sort of hostile – or even agreed – takeovers that are 
routine in the UK and US. 
7 February 2000 Business Report The end of the road for banks may turn out to be 
the beginning 
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Nedcor is so much at the end of its hi-tech, top niche 
road that it needs a merger with Stanbic or 
acquisitions of law firms to grow. 
8 February 2000 Business Report Court ruling strengthens Nedcor’s hand 
Shares in Nedcor, the smallest of the country’s big 
four banks, rallied yesterday after  a high court ruling 
that its hostile takeover bid for Stanbic should be 
reviewed by the registrar of banks and the finance 
minister. 
8 February 2000 Business Day Nedcor’s bid for Stanbic off the hook 
Court decision makes it clear that the finance minister 
has the last say. 
10 February 2000 Business Day Competition Act to change 
Erwin says judge’s interpretation of law in Nedcor’s 
decision was extreme. 
10 February 2000 Business Report Whiners and spin doctors are drowning out the 
cool voice of rational debate 
Banking brawl 
10 February 2000 Business Report Nedcor to fight Stanbic’s appeal by saying delays 
will hurt shareholders 
Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic returns to the courtroom 
today when Stanbic seeks to appeal Monday’s high court 
ruling that the Banks Act was the principal law governing 
Nedcor’s bid. 
10 February 2000 Business Report Nedcor’s takeover bid may have a degree of 
desperation 
If it is not one takeoer, it is another: pushing the Randfontein 
and Harmony saga off the front business pages is the return 
of the Nedcor and Stanbic merger – or hostile takeover, as 
Stanbic spokesmen describe it. 
11 February 2000 Business Report Post-merger banks often lose their edge 
In the simmering saga surrounding Standard Bank 
and Nedbank, there has not been much input in the 
debate from those who are at the coalface of events – 
the customers. 
11 February 2000 Business Report Nedcor and Stanbic shares dip after leave to 
appeal is granted 
Shares in Nedcor and Stanbic fell yesterday as 
interest in their takeover tussle dwindled, after Stanbic 
won leave to appeal against Monday’s court ruling 
that the Banks Act was the principal law governing 
Nedcor’s hostile bid. 
16 February 2000 Business Report Nedcor blows its IT trumpet 
Nedcor, the banking group engaged in a hostile 
takeover bid for its larger rival Stanbic, yesterday 
made its clearest statement yet that it considered itself 
at the forefront of convergence between IT and 
banking. 
16 February 2000 Business Day Nedcor tries to revive interest in bid 
Nedcor launched a new charm offensive yesterday 
aimed at reviving lagging interest in its bid for Stanbic. 
17 February 2000 Business Day Hostile bid welcomes South Africa to real world 
Nedcor-Stanbic battle shows the era of gentility is 
over and the day of the corporate raider has arrived. 
20 February 2000 Business Report Absa and FNB cash in on Nedcor-Stanbic merger 
brawl 
Absa and FNB are cashing in on the Nedcor-Stanbic 
merger brawl and gearing up to recruit customers who 
have been left disenchanted and uncertain by 
corporate crossfire. 
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22 February 2000 Business Day Stanbic takes Transnet boss and Stals on board 
Stanbic, currently involved in a hostile takeover bid by 
smaller rival Nedcor, said yesterday it had appointed 
Transnet boss Saki Macozoma as its joint deputy 
chairman from March 1. 
 
1 March 2000 Business Day Bid for Stanbic not smart thing 
Nedcor’s hostile takeover bid for Stanbic will place 
Namibia’s banking industry in difficult situation 
incoming MD of Standard Bank Namibia Owen 
Tidbury says. 
16 March 2000 Business Day Group’s board still convinced 
Nedcor’s hostile takeover bid will destroy value. 
17 March 2000 Business Day Stanbic results as expected even before Nedcor 
offer emerged, says analysts polled after the release 
of Stanbic’s year-end results yesterday agreed that 
the results left Stanbic neither more nor less 
vulnerable to Nedcor’s hostile bid. 
17 March 2000 Business Day The bottom-line growth of 27% was no surprise 
but Stanbic provided some information gems with 
its results this week. First it revealed that its defence 
against Nedcor’s hostile bid had cost it R54m so far. 
20 March 2000 Business Day 
 
Semantics to take centre stage in takeover tussle 
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather 
scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to mean 
neither more nor less (editorial piece). 
1 April 2000 Business Report Court dismisses Stanbic’s application 
The court of appeal in Bloemfontein yesterday turfed 
out Stanbic’s appeal against an earlier high court 
ruling that the Banks Act was the main applicable law 
in rival Nedcor’s proposed hostile bid for it. 
3 April 2000 Business Day Nedcor bid needs only ministers ok 
Pricing is becoming an issue as Stanbic’s offering 
improves. 
7 April 2000 Business Day Bank regulators might ask:  How big is too big for 
SA? 
Now that the appeal court has clarified who really is 
going to judge Nedcor’s hostile bid for Stanbic, we are 
about to discover what SAs policy on big bank 
mergers is. 
9 April 2000 Business Times Hostilities hotting up 
The hostile bid by Nedcor for Stanbic is likely to 
proceed at a faster pace. Both sides have embarked 
on an energetic campaign to convince regulators, 
shareholders and the public of the merits of their 
positions. 
16 April 2000 Business Report Nedcor calms top Stanbic staff’s worries 
Stanbic was forcing its senior management to walk 
the plank by asserting that employees would jump 
ship in the event of a merger between Standard Bank 
and Nedcor, Richard Laubscher, the chief executive at 
Nedcor, said on Friday. 
17 April 2000 Business Day Nedcor CE is critical of Stanbic’s tactics 
Nedcor management was fully cognisant that it would 
put the banking sector into play following Nedcor’s 
hostile bid for rival Stanbic, Nedcor CE Richard 
Laubscher said on Friday. 
10 May 2000 Business Day Banks merger debate heating up again 
Market seems to be turning away from optimism over 
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chance of bid’s success. 
10 May 2000 Business Times Stanbic reopens war of words 
Stanbic, the country’s second largest retail bank and 
the target of a proposed bid from rival Nedcor, used 
its latest annual report to slam the bid and rekindle its 
war of words against Nedcor. 
24 May 2000 Business Times Nedcor-Stanbic union may first strain shares 
A merger of banking rivals Nedcor and Stanbic could 
at first put pressure on their shares as a union of two 
of SA’s biggest banks looks a long and painful haul, 
analysts said yesterday. 
25 May 2000 Business Day Watchdog is opposed to take-over  
Competition in the industry could drop if Nedcor 
succeeds in its bid for Stanbic, says report 
The Competition Commission has expressed strong 
reservations about Nedcor’s bid for Stanbic in its 
report to the registrar of banks. 
25 May 2000 Business Report Stanbic attacks the terms of Nedcor bid 
Stanbic remained extremely dissatisfied with the 
mechanism of the proposed bid presented by its 
smaller rival Nedcor. 
30 May 2000 Business Report ‘Too early’ for Nedcor decision on Stanbic UK 
Nedcor said yesterday it had not decided whether it 
would sell the London operations of Stanbic if its 
hostile bid for rival lender was successful, although 
the step is seen as likely. 
13 June 2000 Business Day Nedcor talks of 7000 new jobs 
Nedcor says it will hire 7000 people in the first three 
years if its bid for Stanbic is successful. 
22 June 2000 Business Report Sasbo hails end to takeover that would have cost 
thousands of jobs 
It was gigantic party time last night for Sasbo, the 
finance union, after Trevor Manuel, the finance 
minister, blocked Nedcor’s hostile takeover bid for 
Stanbic. 
22 June 2000 Business Day Nedcor’s bid blocked 
The decision puts end to the 10-month hostile bid for 
Stanbic, and is likely to affect other bids. 
22 June 2000 Business Report Manuel sinks bank merger 
One of South Africa’s most bitterly contested takeover 
attempts drew to a close yesterday when Trevor 
Manuel, the finance minister, ruled against Nedcor’s 
application to buy more than 49 percent of Stanbic. 
23 June 2000 Business Report Cosatu welcomes Manuel’s decision 
Shares in Nedcor and Stanbic continued to plummet 
yesterday following the refusal this week by Trevor 
Manuel, the minister of finance, to allow Nedcor to 
merge with Stannic. 
10 August 2000 Business Report Back to core business for Maree 
After a fiery bapitsm, the leader of South Africa’s 
largest banking group is convinced he is on the right 
path to achieve growth at home, elsewhere in Africa 
and internationally. 
15 August 2000 Business Day Stanbic will post an earnings leap of up to 26% in 
its interim results this week, despite the money it 
spent repelling a takeover bid by rival bank Nedcor, 
analysts said yesterday. 
15 March 2001 Business Report Stanbic rise in line with expectations 
Stanbic lived up to promises made during its defence 
against a hostile takeover bid by rival Nedcor last 
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year, notching up a 26 percent rise in headline 
earnings a share to 285c for the year to December. 
 
5.2.3   FirstRand: a non-executive director accused of corruption 
 
In 2003, the accusations of corruption levelled against FirstRand’s non-executive 
director, Mac Maharaj, caused FirstRand’s governance principles to be openly 
questioned.  FirstRand ordered an independent inquiry into the matter when the 
story broke in the Sunday Times on 16 February 2003.  FirstRand was initially 
defensive in their attitude toward the media, but, with the guidance of a new crisis 
communication consultant, became a lot more lot proactive in their approach to the 
media and managed to turn the situation around in its favour. Table 5.3 presents a 
summary of the media coverage for the time period on this event. 
 
Table 5.3:  Media coverage of FirstRand’s crisis during the period February – 
November 2003 
Date 2003 Publication Heading and first line of article 
16 February Sunday Times Shaik paid money to Maharaj 
Former transport minister did not declare cash and gifts. 
21 February Business Day Maharaj takes time out from FirstRand 
Although FirstRand director Mac Maharaj has still not broken 
his silence on allegations that he received irregular payments 
from a Durban businessman while he was transport minister, 
the former politician was granted a three-month leave of 
absence from the banking group yesterday, while he deals 
with the claims. 
21 February Business Report Mac Maharaj takes leave of absence 
FirstRand had agreed to give director Mac Maharaj leave of 
absence for three months with immediate effect from various 
group boards to enable him to focus on recent allegations, 
chief executive Laurie Dippenaar said yesterday. 
18 March Business Report FirstRand commissions Maharaj inquiry 
FirstRand bank has appointed law firm Hofmeyr, Herbstein & 
Gihwala to conduct an independent inquiry into allegations 
recently made against FirstRand director and former minister 
of transport Mac Maharaj. 
29 May Business Report FirstRand extends Maharaj’s leave 
FirstRand has agreed to extend Mac Maharaj’s leave of 
absence for a further two months while Deloitte & Touche 
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reviewed the independent inquiry conducted by attorneys 
Hofmeyr Herbstein & Gihwala, Laurie Dippenaar, FirstRand’s 
chief executive, said yesterday. 
31 July Business Report FirstRand will report on Maharaj dealings today 
FirstRand was expected to make an announcement today concerning 
the allegations and possible effects to the group of its dealings with 
Mac Maharaj, the former transport minister and a director of 
FirstRand and Discovery Group, a spokesperson for the bank said 
yesterday. 
1 August Business Report FirstRand won’t duck Maharaj report 
A four-month independent inquiry into allegations of corruption 
against Mac Maharaj, a FirstRand non-executive director and 
former transport minister, has been concluded. However a 
decision on the report, such as whether Maharaj should stay 
on the group’s board, will have to wait a little longer. 
7 August Business Report Shaik, Maharaj answer corruption allegations 
Shaik claimed the payments were for Zarina Maharaj, the 
former minister’s wife, for services rendered as a consultant 
on gender equality to Shaik’s company for four years. 
8 August Business Day Why FirstRand must release its report on Maharaj 
With Promotion of Access to Information Act as much 
information as possible must be available on request. 
11 August Business Report No resignation from Maharaj, says FirstRand 
FirstRand had received no formal notification from suspended 
director Mac Maharaj, regarding his intention to resign or 
retain his position at FirstRand, it said yesterday. 
14 August Business Report Maharaj resigns from FirstRand 
The board of FirstRand on Thursday announced it had 
accepted the resignation of former transport minister Mac 
Maharaj as a director. Maharaj said that given the current 
emotional debate being publicly waged around his personal 
affairs, his continued association with FirstRand might lead to 
further negative publicity for the Group. 
15 August Business Report Danger of spillover reignites cooling-off debate 
The appointment of former transport minister Mac Maharaj to 
FirstRand’s board of directors soon after leaving government 
has rekindled the debate on the merits of a cooling-off period 
before ministers, MPs or senior public servants take up 
employment in the industry they were dealing with in their 
portfolios. 
15 August  Business Day No plans to leave business sector 
Although former transport minister Mac Maharaj has quit the 
FirstRand board amid controversy over alleged payments 
made to him by Durban business Schabir Shaik, he has no 
plans to quit the business sector. 
15 August Business Report Shaik coy on R100 000 payment to trust 
Mac Maharaj’s close friend, Schabir Shaik, yesterday could 
not supply details of a mysterious R100 000 payment into the 
Maharja family trust in 1996. 
15 August Business Report Maharaj lashes out at Scorpion’s sting 
A defiant Mac Maharaj yesterday lashed out at the Scorpions 
claiming that “someone” in the law enforcement agency was 
illegally “leaking” information about his financial affairs, 
causing great suffering to him and his family. 
15 August Business Report FirstRand won’t alter its practices 
The events leading up to the resignation of FirstRand non-
executive director Mac Maharaj would not result in the firm 
reviewing its corporate governance practices.  The group 
would, however, be more careful in checking directors’ 
interests if those directors came from the government. 
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17 August Sunday Times More questions than answers 
FirstRand’s guarded report on its investigation into Mac 
Maharaj’s business dealings fails to exonerate the former 
transport minister. 
17 August Sunday Times Maharaj’s statement after the bank’s inquiry 
From the outset I have motivated for and fully co-operated 
with the FirstRand inquiry. 
17 August Business Report Cool off before cashing in 
Now that Mac Maharaj has packed his bags at FirstRand and 
left with his million-rand payoff to protect the bank’s good 
name, we are getting hot under the collar about cooling-off 
periods for politicians and senior civil servants who cash in on 
their public service by taking lucrative jobs in related fields in 
the private sector. 
17 August Business Report Mac’s hit the road, his integrity still intact, despite the 
media’s penchant for hype 
Sometimes I feel I am living in another world, not in South Africa.  
18 August Business Day FirstRand has done itself and Mac Maharaj no favours 
with its limp-wristed inquiry into allegations that Maharaj, who 
resigned as a FirstRand director last week, took money illicitly 
from Schabir Shaik. 
15 September Business Report FirstRand will show solid growth despite year of 
controversy 
After a controversial year, FirstRand should please 
shareholders when it reports its results tomorrow for the year 
to June 2003. 
17 September Business Day Retail segment drives FirstRand’s profit 
Controversies have no effect on operations, with corporate 
and newer businesses also showing growth. 
2 November Sunday Times News mag beats bank over Mac ad 
FirstRand complained to the Advertising Standards Authority 
after noseweek magazine ran a radio ad saying the group had 
landed itself in a “billion-rand crisis” because of one of its 
directors, Maharaj. “To keep him on is as risky as it is to fire 
him,” said the ad, on Classic FM in June.  “Why? Well, for a 
start, some of the bank’s top executives could just find 
themselves facing corruption charges if they are not very 
careful.” 
 
Themes common to the three case studies consulted for this research project were 
identified and are discussed in the following section. A comparative analysis 
between these themes and the literature was undertaken in order to identify 
similarities and differences.  Interpretations and themes were grounded by linking 
them to excerpts from the interview text and to existing literature. 
 
 
 
 166
5.3 Themes common to all three case studies 
 
The conceptualisation of these themes arose from a hermeneutic process of 
analysis. This involved a process of dialogue between the researcher and the text, 
empirical experience, interpretations and impressions (Rapmund 1996).  
 
• The first set of themes describes the form of crisis communication - the 
foundation necessary to ensure effective communication with the media 
during the crisis-response phase when the crisis has attracted the media’s 
attention and when the quality of communications issued could seriously 
affect the organisation’s image. 
 
• The second set of themes explores the actual communication decisions 
made by the crisis communicators consulted or the content of their media 
communications, using the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT or 
SCC theory) discussed in chapter three.  This is the theory most relevant to 
this research because it provides a framework for examining the decisions 
and responses made by communicators during the crisis-response stage.   
 
• The third and final theme shows that all of the crises examined ultimately 
resulted in positive outcomes, which provides evidence for the premise that 
a crisis, if properly managed, can be beneficial for the organisation 
concerned.   
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5.3.1 The building blocks for effective crisis communications with the 
media: The form of crisis communication   
 
In all of the case studies consulted, certain factors dominated as being necessary 
components for creating successful crisis communication strategies with the media.  
They are:  
 
5.3.1.1 Multi-disciplinary crisis communication team with access to 
management decisions and all crisis-related information 
 
It became evident from the case studies consulted, that it is imperative to select a 
crisis communication team that represents to a practicable degree the diverse and 
sometimes conflicting concerns and interests of all stakeholders and departments 
in the organisation – such as customers; institutional shareholders; government 
relations; the departments responsible for media communications; legal issues; 
human resources; operations and finance. This is important because decisions 
made by the organisation can have implications in the media.  Senior executives 
need to be aware that anything they do or say and any decisions made, especially 
during crisis, will need to be carefully considered by the crisis team because of the 
possible ramifications of such decisions.  The crisis team must have access to the 
senior executives responsible for running the organisation and to all crisis-related 
information – positive or negative, that may impact on the strategy adopted.  
 
Having a multi-disciplinary team may create tension between members, but was 
demonstrated to be a necessary factor in guiding Standard Bank’s strategy in the 
 168
media against the hostile bid by rival Nedcor.  Having the input of an outside 
consultancy known for its strategies against hostile bids was vital in developing 
messages to counter-act Nedcor’s justifications for the merger. This team, for 
example, advised Standard Bank to focus its messaging on possible staff 
retrenchments and lowered morale as an argument against the merger.  This 
strategy won the Standard Bank executive team sympathy and support of the 
public, union and staff. By meeting on a daily basis throughout the Nedcor threat, 
the team was able to adjust its strategy as new information was acquired and was 
able to make decisions as to how to respond to journalists and media reports. The 
advisor to Standard Bank explained:  I believe that in a crisis, have a team.  Don’t 
have one or two people in a corner managing a crisis.  Open it up.  Get lots of 
people thinking about it and lots of people working on it so that you can bounce 
ideas and control mavericks.   
 
A multi-disciplinary team was also an important component in shaping Absa’s 
communication strategy with regards to internet fraud. The customer care and 
media communications departments were eventually able to convince the rest of 
the crisis team that it was important for customers to be reassured even though, 
the advice from a legal standpoint was that Absa was not responsible for the fraud. 
The initial conclusion arrived at was obviously purely a business decision, based 
on the cost factor. Jonathan Zapiro, cartoonist, succinctly captured the public’s 
response to Absa’s preliminary hands-off, aloof stance, with an illustration titled: 
Absa – how can we fob you off? (The Star 2003:5). It was subsequently decided by 
the crisis team that the loss of goodwill would be more expensive than the 
estimated costs of the fraud. In every crisis situation this factor should be taken into 
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consideration. Had Absa continued with its seemingly non-compassionate stance 
in the media, as advised by lawyers and fraud experts, it would possibly have 
taken longer than transpired for the negative public reaction to subside.  During his 
interview with the researcher, the head of media communication at Absa explained: 
It took us longer than it should have to correct internet fraud and we spent R8 
million on ads alone.  After a shaky start, day after day, week after week, we had 
meeting after meeting to make sure we communicated the right message. The 
head of media communication at Absa explained that because the crisis team had 
not been given all the relevant information pertaining to the crisis, in a communiqué 
sent out to journalists explaining the nature of identity theft it was stated that 
identity theft was a new global trend, whereas in reality, it has been around for the 
past 15-20 years. 
 
FirstRand also made use of a multi-disciplinary team of lawyers and accountants to 
investigate the allegations made by the media.  This was to ensure that the CEO 
had all the correct information at his disposal before making a public 
announcement and decision on the matter of the organisation’s non-executive 
director. The head of media communication at FirstRand explains this in her 
interview with the researcher: It’s very important that you have your 
communications people as part of your inner circle and everybody agrees during 
that meeting in the morning of a particular day what we are going to say to the 
press, what we are going to say to the analysts, what we are going to say to the 
shareholders and let’s make sure that we say the same thing to everybody rather 
than the merchant bank and the company then sitting and agreeing and then telling 
the PR people what to say.  It doesn’t work like that.  The PR/Media team have to 
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be part of that decision making process so that you can see if the merchant bank 
have a defence strategy and how can working the media or working the analysts 
support that on a tactical basis on a day-to-day basis and that’s basically how it 
was managed. 
 
The principal of having a multi-disciplinary team with a mandate to make strategic 
decisions has also been recommended in the literature (refer to 2.3.7).  Angelopulo 
and Barker (2006) and Kaufmann et al (1994), for example, propose that the crisis 
management team should be comprised of people who are creative, 
knowledgeable of the business and are able to offer unique perspectives on 
resolving the issues. The healthy tension, particularly between legal advisors and 
public relations advisors is raised by Kaufmann et al (1994).  In addition 
Angelopulo and Barker (2006) specify that the crisis team should also have the 
authority to make decisions and allocate resources.  This finding is also reflected in 
chaos theory (refer to 3.4.2.2) which recommends that senior management  form 
part of the crisis team as important decisions may need to be taken that may 
impact on various operational areas of the organisation (Bloom 2001).  The 
necessity of a crisis team having access to all crisis information that could impact 
on decisions taken has also been raised by authors such as Mersham and Skinner 
(2002) and Augustine (1995) (refer to section 2.2.4).  Mersham and Skinner (2002) 
contend that making decisions when only minimal, ambiguous or conflicting facts 
are available is dangerous.  Augustine (1995) notes that organisations can 
misclassify problems in these circumstances, and that often the focus is on 
technical issues, at the expense of information on public perceptions (refer to 
2.3.5). Chaos theory (discussed in section 3.4.2) recommends particular diligence 
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to public opinion in order to remain relevant to environmental dynamics (Edgar & 
Nisbet 1996).  
 
5.3.1.2 Executive stress management 
 
In all of the case studies reported on, managing the stress levels of executive 
management is clearly critical to the work of the crisis communicator. It is 
sometimes very difficult for executive management to realise that simply because 
they are in positions of power within an organisation, that they cannot always use 
this power externally to control journalists. The presumption of organisational 
executives that the media can and should be controlled and manipulated (Bloom 
2001; Smith 2006) is illusionary as the only time an organisation has complete 
editorial control of its messages in the media is if it pays for an advert or advertorial 
(Levine 2006). 
 
The head of First Rand’s media communication explains: A major problem with 
crises – the really big challenge is to manage your own management.  I mean, 
every time they see something really negative in the press, they go berserk and get 
into a frenzy and want to phone and shout at everybody.  Now you’ve got to 
manage that.  You’ve got to calm them down.  You’ve got to get them to see 
sense.  You’ve got to get them to stick to the rules and the plan and the script 
because often they don’t want to.  Often they go mad if they read something and 
that is another part of crises:  do not get sidetracked and do not let your 
management get sidetracked and do not let them lose the plot. You know, a lot of 
these very senior guys are control freaks.  That’s why they are what they are and 
 172
the thing they find so unbelievably difficult is the press.  It’s because they’re not in 
control of what’s going to appear the next day in the press and that’s the thing they 
hate. They hate that feeling of powerlessness because they’re powerful people and 
they don’t like to feel powerless or at the mercy of somebody and that’s a serious 
problem.  Just make sure they focus on the important stuff and never be knee-jerk.  
The moment you’re knee-jerk, you’re dead in a crisis.  The moment you have a 
thought and act on it, you’re in serious trouble. 
 
The stress executives experience during the crisis-response stage, and of being 
unable to control the reportage of the media can result in them taking matters into 
their own hands.  They may ignore the advice of the multi-disciplinary team and 
upset the strategy, as was, in the opinion of Standard Bank’s crisis advisor, what 
happened at Nedcor with negative consequences.  The CEO of First Rand also, on 
one occasion, went against the recommendation of his advisor and chose to tackle 
a journalist known for his acerbic, sometimes aggressive stance against big 
corporations. The head of Absa’s media communication explained how he had to 
convince executives not to react to every negative newspaper article with threats to 
editors should they not withdraw certain statements.  We do not control the media.  
This is a democratic society.  If you pay for advertising you can control every word, 
but not with editorial.  It is only if the journalists get facts wrong that one can take 
them on.  Otherwise management have to remain calm and ride the media wave of 
negative publicity. 
 
Based on the comments made by crisis communicators in the case studies, it is 
advised that senior executives attempt not to take every media comment 
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personally and that they should make every effort to try to understand how the 
media works. In crisis management, it is necessary that an organisation’s principals 
are fully aware of the power of the press and also that that power frequently 
devolves to an individual journalist, as was evident in the First Rand case study 
(refer to annexure C for more details). In many instances, the journalist may not be 
of a very senior level. It is for this reason that crisis communicators should actively 
assess the character and style of the journalists with whom they are in contact and 
adapt their communication style accordingly.  
 
The head of media communication at First Rand gives the following pertinent 
advice: Accept that you are not going to win every single battle in the press, 
especially in a bid.  They (the other side) will have their day in the press.  You then 
have to accept that it’s their day in the press.  You then have to work very hard to 
make sure you have your day in the press.  So, even though you’re not going to 
win every single skirmish, you’ve got to stick to your battle plan, win the key ones 
and hope that you come out at the end clean.  Don’t pick up the paper every single 
day and stress about what’s been written and then have a knee jerk response. 
There might have been some really stupid articles in that week that you might have 
really wanted to respond to in a knee-jerk fashion but your thinking gets muddled 
as soon as you do that.  This aspect was not specified in the literature reviewed on 
crisis communication, which suggests that it has not received prior consideration. It 
was however, clearly critical to the crisis communicators interviewed for this 
research.  It has therefore been included as a fundamental factor in the proposed 
conceptual model described in chapter six. 
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5.3.1.3 Key messages and consistent messaging critical 
 
What is evident in the Absa case study is that in the early stages, each of the 
spokespeople appeared to communicate different messages to the public, causing 
confusion and leading to negative perceptions about Absa’s handling of the crisis. 
For example, one spokesperson stated that identity theft was a new trend in 
international fraud, while another explained that it had been around for some years. 
In stark contrast, Standard Bank’s spokespeople kept to the prepared messages 
from the outset, as did First Rand’s, for the most part, which stood them both, 
respectively, in good stead.  The head of media communication at First Rand 
explains: You’ve got to stay really focussed on what you’ve agreed in the war 
cabinet that morning, what your tactics are, and keep it very simple. We kept falling 
back on the expression that we’re following due process and the one thing I’ll say 
about the Mac crisis, is that we had a script and we stuck to it.  Everybody stuck to 
it.  But it should be remembered that if the situation changes or the goalposts are 
removed, reassessment of the tactics may become necessary.  But the messages 
should make sense, be accurate and have some consistency. 
 
This principal has been referred to in the literature (refer to section 2.3.5 and 
2.3.7.2) and was verified by this research.  Mersham et al (2001), for example, 
advise against the use of jargon to ensure clear understanding of key messages by 
the public and Calloway and Keen (1996) stress that communication should be 
based on facts, not speculation, in order to ensure credibility and consistency of 
messages to the public. Coombs (1999b) and Kaufmann et al (1994) also stress 
the importance of uniformity and reliability of messages to avoid public confusion.  
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5.3.1.4 Active response 
 
A proactive strategy to engage the media during the crisis proved effective, 
particularly in the cases of First Rand and Standard Bank, because the CEOs were 
not, prior to the crises, known to the media on a personal basis.  By opening their 
doors to the media, inviting journalists for one-on-one meetings and proactive 
media conferences, the respective CEOs were able to build the trust of the 
journalists. At the time, the take-over bid was considered to be one of the most 
exciting stories in financial circles. The head of the specialist consultancy, who had 
been brought in by Standard Bank to take advantage of the atmosphere of public 
interest, explains Stanbic’s defence: The second tactic was to get very aggressive 
in the press from a proactive perspective so we set up press conferences and 
press briefings to try and tell the story in a way that would be more exciting for the 
press. We got very proactive, we didn’t just sit and wait to be smacked around by 
Nedbank – we went back at them quite quickly.  Try and set the agenda from your 
perspective rather than constantly be responding to somebody else’s agenda.  The 
in-house head of media communication at Standard Bank explained that to be 
proactive with journalists, it is necessary to understand how the media works and 
what it is they want. In this way, Standard Bank was able to use the media to its 
advantage to influence public opinion to its side. He explained: You’ve got to 
understand what the journalists are looking for.  You’ve got to understand their time 
constraints, their deadlines and what kind of facts they need for their stories.  You 
can even use the media to your advantage – to get facts out to your public.  The 
media helped us with the Nedcor bid.  They helped us to tell our side of the story 
and swing the public attention in our favour.  
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This principal of being proactive with the media and using the media as a tool to 
reach the public has been highlighted as an important strategy in many texts 
dealing with crisis communications (refer to section 2.3.5) and was confirmed 
during the interviews. Birch (1994), Darling (1994) and Fearn-Banks (2002), for 
example, advise that the organisation in crisis should quickly establish itself as the 
single authoritative source of information, to avoid speculation by journalists. 
 
5.3.1.5 Flexibility of strategy and alertness to changes in the 
environment 
 
The research results show how the crisis team must remain alert to changes both 
within and outside the organisational system. In this way the team can be 
responsive and seize opportunities to enhance its strategy and the effectiveness of 
its communication to the media.  
 
For example, as soon as Standard Bank’s management made the strategic 
decision to replace its management team quite early on in the crisis, the crisis 
communicators used this as an opportunity to tell a new story about Standard Bank 
to the media.  The new team was not burdened by the legacy of past mistakes and 
a picture was painted of a vibrant executive going forth to conquer the foe, which in 
this case was the hostile bidder, Nedbank. The crisis team at Standard Bank also 
used the uncertainties and fears expressed by staff as a tool to support 
management in their fight to regain control of Standard Bank.  In contast, Nedbank 
seemed to depend on its irrevocable stock reserves of goodwill that it had from 
shareholders. According to the crisis advisor to Standard Bank, Nedbank over 
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relied on their currency and did not apply themselves to re-energising their 
messages to the media. Nedbank was thus inflexible in its approach. Being flexible 
in strategy means that crisis communicators should not stick rigidly to a crisis 
communications plan at all costs.  The teams consulted daily as to the best tactics 
to follow, given the changing circumstances.  As the crisis advisor to Standard 
Bank explained: We didn’t have a huge big communication strategy.  We used to 
have early morning meetings where the advisors and us and the company – the 
little war cabinet – would agree on a daily and weekly basis how we were going to 
manage the events of the day.  So we didn’t have a highfaluting written strategy.  It 
was very practical.  It generally is in that kind of situation.  I mean we didn’t write 
lots and lots of big documents that said we’re going to do this.  It was day-to-day 
tactical. 
   
In the case of the identity theft crisis, Absa kept its feedback loops open and thus 
quickly became aware of the negative publicity and reaction of clients about the 
Bank’s initial stance that implied that it was not concerned about the victims. By 
nimbly changing its strategy and promising restitution in proven cases of identity 
theft, the Bank regained some lost ground in the publicity stakes.  Absa also took 
advantage of the arrest of the “hacker” through the excellent investigative skills of 
the South African Police Services and Absa’s specialist forensic team, by giving 
the journalists all the details for a new angle to the story.   
 
In its handling of the Mac Maharaj debacle, First Rand kept the channels of 
communication open with the media and constantly reported back on the progress 
made with the investigations.  In this way it was able to monitor opinions, and keep 
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a check on them, by responding accordingly. The head of communication at First 
Rand explains: It should be remembered that if the situation changes or the 
goalposts are removed, reassessment of the tactics may become necessary.  But 
the messages should make sense, be accurate and have some consistency. 
 
This principal of remaining alert to changes in the environment, in order to be 
flexible in approach, is fundamental to chaos theory (Comfort 1994) (refer to 
section 3.4.2) and was confirmed through the research participants. Chaos theory 
warns that over-reliance on a plan or an analysis of past events could be 
detrimental and that the focus should be on building an innovative, creative and 
spontaneous approach to strategy (Bloom et al 2002).  This does of course rely on 
the organisation remaining connected to information and intelligence from its 
members and the environment (Bloom et al 2002; Edgar & Nisbet 1996). 
 
5.3.1.6 Overall attitude of organisation important during the crisis  
 
According to the Standard Bank’s advisor, during the crisis, Nedcor appeared to be 
arrogant, while Standard Bank was humble, admitting its faults. Standard Bank and 
First Rand each had open door policies with the media, were not defensive and 
were proactive in dealing with the journalists.  This seemed to earn them the 
respect of the journalists.  A modest attitude was crucial in winning the media over 
to Standard Bank’s side.  Journalists react adversely to arrogance as the advisor to 
Standard Bank explained: We were honest in the sense that in every engagement 
with the press we were very careful to always talk about the things that we had 
done wrong in the past, so we were honest and humble which they found 
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appealing. It wasn’t like we were aggressive or defensive. Nedbank made some 
terrible mistakes. I mean, they were hugely arrogant. 
 
Absa’s initial conceited attitude appeared to irritate journalists, and disappoint and 
anger clients, in that the organisation was perceived as showing no responsibility 
for its clients.  In the case studies examined, the banks with the least arrogant and 
least defensive attitudes appeared to be reported on in the most favourable way. 
The head of media communication at Absa warns: It’s important to remember that 
it is the journalist’s opinions that will be printed in the newspaper the following 
morning.  
 
What is notable, is that even though Standard Bank and First Rand’s respective 
CEOs had not built up good relationships with the media prior to the crisis, as 
suggested by the crisis planning literature, they managed to use the opportunity of 
their respective crises to do so.  This is because the attitudes of the spokespeople 
during the crises were open, humble and approachable. Spokesperson likeability is 
critical and Standard Bank and First Rand CEOs fell into that category.  As the 
head of media communication at Absa said:  If you do not have prior relationships 
with the media, the only thing you can do is to be honest, try and come across as 
nice as possible.  In this way try and build the relationship. He also believes that 
even if an organisation has a good relationship with the media prior to a crisis it is 
the actions and attitudes of the organisation during the crisis that dictates the 
nature of publicity received.  This certainly seemed to be the case at Absa, as 
explained by the head of media communication: We did have a good relationship 
with the media, but remember, once you face a crisis and you’ve been negligent or 
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if you’ve been perceived as negligent, that relationship with the media goes out the 
back door.  When it comes to the crunch, the relationship between the media and 
the bank is basically adversarial.  The journalist’s job is to find news stories and 
you can be pretty sure that it won’t be good news that he or she is looking for.  It’s 
bad news that sells newspapers.  
 
The principal of attitude has been alluded to in the literature (refer to 2.3.5).  
Augustine (1995) for example, stresses that an organisation’s response should 
reflect concern for victims.  Much of the research is focused on diligent image 
building in good times, an important component of Horsley and Barker’s (2002) 
stage model of crisis (refer to 3.3.2.3).  Puth and Steyn (2000) also advise the 
merits of engaging with stakeholders such as the media, prior to a crisis (refer to 
section 2.37).  However, no specific reference has been made to the negative 
effects of arrogance, which was clearly highlighted in the case studies examined 
for this research.  These findings also suggest that the conduct of the organisation 
during a crisis supersedes any prior relationships with journalists, the latter being 
the primary focus of the mentioned authors (Puth & Steyn 2000); Horsley and 
Barker (2002). The case studies proved that an organisation’s attitude is linked to 
an organisation’s values (Hale et al 2005; Foster & Snyder 1983).  For example, 
Absa’s legal values were initially the guiding force during its crisis.  On the other 
hand, companies such as Johnson and Johnson, placed its users top of the value 
chain (Foster & Snyder 1983 – refer to 3.4.3.4).  This brings a fresh perspective to 
the field of crisis communication. 
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Included in this discussion on attitude are the following two subsections:  
Honesty/trust and a customer first approach. 
 
5.3.1.6.1 Honesty/Trust 
  
An additional part of having a good attitude is, as all the communicators 
interviewed for this study agree, the importance of being honest with the media.  
This helps to build trust.  With regards to First Rand’s CEO, Laurie Dippenaar, the 
head of media communication explains: They trusted Laurie because Laurie wears 
his heart on his sleeve and he’s a very open and transparent person. He’s got a 
reputation of being straightforward and honest and it’s given him a good standing 
with the press. That was why, even though FirstRand could not give the full report 
of the findings of the independent investigation into the alleged misconduct of its 
board member to the media, (because of legal issues), the media, on the whole, 
accepted it.  They knew that Laurie would have given it to them if he could have, 
and appreciated the fact that he gave copies to other independent parties such as 
the South African Reserve Bank. The head of media communication at FirstRand 
explains the predicament: But then we had to come up with all credible reasons of 
why we couldn’t and you know companies often duck and dive behind sub judice 
and client confidentiality and all that sort of thing, they do, it’s one of their 
favourites.  So that didn’t really wash with them but you know what, to a certain 
extent, you have to rely on whether they trust you or not.  Yes, they were irritated, 
because they wanted the story, but fundamentally, in the end they stopped 
hounding us because they trusted Laurie because Laurie is a very open and 
transparent person.  In the end they just had to stop and give in and accept that 
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what they got was what they got and we took the high ground by saying, well, 
we’ve given it to the Scorpions, the SRP, FSB, the Reserve Bank, they’ve got the 
full thing.  
 
In response to the researcher’s question as to how the head of media 
communication at FirstRand deals with an issue when she cannot give the media 
any details or cannot be honest about for various reasons she said: You tell them 
something.  At the end of the day they just want to write about something.  You 
might not be able to tell them something that you know but you can tell them 
something that’s not a lie, but that gives them something to say because 
fundamentally that’s all they need to do.  They need to say something.  You don’t 
lie to them, but you find a way of saying something to them that is – it’s not telling 
them what’s really going on, but it’s telling them something that they will never look 
stupid if they write or print it and it solves their problem, the fact they they’ve got to 
fill column inches.  They’ve got to look as though they know what’s going on so you 
find something to tell them.  But never lie to them.  The day that you lie to them, is 
your downfall.  Better to say that I don’t know or I actually know but can’t tell you.  
But don’t lie.  Often to say, I don’t know, is a lie, so best not to say that either, 
because that can also come back and hurt you.  So stay honest.  Honesty is the 
best policy, like in life. 
 
Honesty and trust have been raised in the literature (refer to section 2.3.5) which is 
confirmed by this research.  Authors such as Fink (2005) stress the importance of 
honesty in communication with the media and warn that without it, an 
organisation’s media and public credibility is at risk, a situation that will serve to 
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escalate the proportions of the crisis.   However, there appears to be debate about 
the levels of disclosure required without unnecessarily damaging the image of the 
organisation or creating financial liability for the organisation (refer to section 
2.3.5).  
 
5.3.1.6.2   Customer first approach 
 
Allied to the principle of attitude is the recommendation that the financial 
organisation structure messages with the audience in mind. As was evident in the 
case study on Absa, it was necessary that the organisation showed its care and 
concern for the victims of the internet crisis, more than anything.  The fact that it 
practically ignored the interests of its clients at first and even tried to shift the blame 
to the clients, created a crisis within a crisis for the organisation.  In Absa’s case, 
the public were concerned and fearful about the possible theft of their hard earned 
money, and required reassurances from Absa. Absa’s head of media 
communication explained: We first made the mistake of blaming the customers and 
then we had a crisis on a crisis.  You must be very careful. Lesson number one for 
Absa was you never blame your customers. Never build a wedge between your 
stakeholders and yourselves when you have a crisis – rule number one.  Rule 
number two – refer to rule number one. The media can be extremely unforgiving if 
you blame your customers.  Legal issues are legal issues, but in an emotive case 
such as this, you don’t base your crisis communications on legalities.  People don’t 
want to know about legalities because they don’t understand it.  
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Spokesperson likeability was found to be a critical factor in all of the case studies 
examined.  Absa’s head of media communications explained that during a crisis, 
customers want reassurance from a top management person, preferably the CEO.  
He said:  As a general rule of thumb, the policy should be to put a face to the crisis.  
Not simply the issuing of a press statement. Have a person talking to the people – 
on television, radio, in the press.  Call a press conference.  A face, a human 
person at the end of the day is worth much more and I think in hindsight, for Absa’s 
internet fraud, if the CEO was unavailable we should have had a face, a friendly, 
good, trustworthy person talking to the public at large.  Not your security expert 
because they are militarists, not your technical expert – you need a communicator, 
a facilitator, you need to give the people a warm and fuzzy – a message with 
integrity.  He explained that when people have a problem, they want to speak to 
the boss, not the secretary.  In retrospect, he thought that Absa’s CEO should have 
gone on record as saying something like:  Guys, I’m in charge of Absa bank and 
I’ve heard about this whole thing and let me tell you I’m deeply concerned for your 
safety if this is the truth.  I give you my promise that I am doing everything possible 
to protect you.  I’m the CEO and I will make sure it will be done. 
 
Spokesperson likeability has been alluded to in the literature (refer to section 
2.3.7.2) and was certainly confirmed by this research.  The spokesperson as the 
representative of the organisation needs to convey a favourable attitude of trust, 
honesty, customer concern and integrity (Mersham & Skinner 2002).  In all of the 
case studies examined, except for Absa, the spokesperson was the most senior 
person in the organisation, that is, the CEO. The decision by Absa not to use its 
CEO was clearly held by Absa’s head of media communication to be ill considered. 
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Although Fearn-Banks (2002) and Mersham and Skinner (2002) also recommend 
that the CEO become the spokesperson for the organisation in a serious crisis, 
Irvine and Millar (1998:88) argue against this.  Irvine and Millar (1998:88) suggest 
that if the CEO fails to project a compassionate and convincing image, it would be 
difficult for the organisation to recover its reputation. A point made by Engelhardt et 
al (2004) and Drukenmiller (1993), that was also confirmed by this research, is that 
whoever the spokesperson is for the organisation, of vital importance is that they 
remain accessible to journalists throughout the crisis.  Refer to section 2.3.7.2 for a 
full discussion in this regard.   
  
Another example of a customer-first approach was that Standard Bank designed its 
messages to speak to the hearts of the public.  It painted a picture with words of an 
organisation on its way to success; that if it was taken over by Nedbank, job losses 
would occur and that many years would pass before the organisation could provide 
its clients with good service, as most of the attention would be on merging the two 
entities.  It spoke in language that its clients could understand and addressed 
issues that would affect them personally. Simplicity and applicability of message 
was mentioned by all of the spokespeople interviewed as important. Absa’s head 
of media communication stresses: The information should be clear and simple.  
Not fact overdose.  One, two or perhaps three facts is all most people can 
remember. Simple and easy-to-understand phrasing of messages without jargon, 
recommended by Absa’s head of communication, has also been advised in the 
literature (Mersham et al 2002) (refer to section 2.3.5). 
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Scholars such as Mersham et al (2001) and Augustine (1995) also stress the 
importance of putting people first and of demonstrating concern, but very often 
lawyers tend to be more concerned about avoiding liability for the organisation in 
crisis (Kaufmann et al 1994).  Once liability is admitted an organisation is legally 
liable to compensate victims for damages and may not be in a position to withstand 
the costs of such actions (Kaufmann et al 1994).  In these circumstances 
Englehardt et al (2004) suggest that the organisation express compassion, without 
blame.  Like apologies, compassion address public concerns by acknowledging the 
victims, but it avoids the liabilities associated with apologies (Fitzpatrick 1995, 
Marcus & Goodman 1991, Tyler 1997) (refer to section 2.3.5 for full discussion on 
this).   
 
5.3.2 The content of communication: an examination of communication 
decisions using SCCT terminology 
 
This section examines the communication decisions made by the crisis 
communicators who participated in this research in the light of strategies and 
tactics suggested by the SCC theory discussed in section 3.5.1.  Some of the 
tactics/strategies employed by the crisis communicators in this research verify 
those presented in the SCC theory and others highlight instances where SCCT 
strategies should be amended or used with caution.  Additional successful 
strategies employed by the participants are not included in the SCC theory and can 
thus be presented as new discoveries made by this research. As pointed out in 
section 3.5.1.4, an organisation’s values (such as whether it adopts a customer-
first or legal stance) are at the heart of the decision-making process, and these 
determine the communication decisions made. 
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5.3.2.1   Distance strategies/tactics (discussed in section 3.4.3.3) 
 
Distance strategies are aimed at weakening the link of the organisation to the crisis 
to reduce negative public perceptions (Coombs 2004). By applying a distance 
strategy, termed a justification tactic (Coombs 1995:453), Absa sought to 
minimise injury as a result of identity theft and clarified what it considered to be a 
misrepresentation of the crisis event. Absa issued a media release that stated that 
identity theft was limited to three cases and that a total of about R530 000 had 
been stolen. Absa also tried to communicate that the term “hacker” used by the 
media was incorrect as the Bank’s systems had not been infiltrated (Smith 2006).  
These tactics did not appear to work and continued to feed public perception that 
Absa was trying to shift the blame for identity theft onto its clients.  Perhaps this 
was because it appeared as if Absa was not taking the crisis seriously enough and 
was not putting the interests of the clients first.  For the three clients involved, R530 
000 was considered to be a great deal of money.  It may have appeared as if Absa 
was downplaying the severity of the crisis, rather than putting it into context.  The 
result of employing a justification tactic in Absa’s case, suggests that an 
organisation wishing to use this tactic should be very measured in its wording so as 
not to appear callous about the victims and also not to appear defensive.  Crisis 
managers may need to take into account that statements of minimisation may be 
treated with scepticism. 
 
A distancing tactic, not specified in SCCT, but used effectively by Absa was the 
conceptualisation of identity theft as an industry issue – a problem faced by all 
the banks, not just Absa.  This strategy served to diffuse the negative publicity 
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being experienced by the Bank. The other banks were then forced to react to 
identity theft and admitted to having experienced a few such cases themselves, so 
that it was not just Absa alone that was dealing with this problem. This distancing 
tactic is not part of the SCC theory and will be included in the proposed model in 
chapter six because of its successful application by Absa’s crisis communicators. 
 
First Rand’s response to allegations concerning its non-executive director can also 
be analysed using the SCCT.  First Rand’s crisis response, which proved 
justifiable, was to distance itself from the alleged misdeeds of its non-executive 
director by ordering an independent investigation into the allegations made. It 
showed that First Rand was prepared to take responsibility for investigating the 
issue and was not prepared to make a judgement call until all facts were collated. 
The independence of the investigation lent a certain public credibility to its findings 
that could not have been possible had the investigation been conducted in-house.  
The in-house findings would no doubt have been criticised for bias, regardless of 
the facts. This strategy is not mentioned in the SCCT, but because of its successful 
application by the crisis communicators interviewed for this research, will be 
included in the proposed conceptual model in chapter six. 
 
First Rand communicators were also reasonably successful in their distancing 
strategy of ensuring that the spotlight was focussed on only one member of their 
board:  Mac Maharaj.  As soon as journalists began to make allegations about 
possible mismanagement about other members of the First Rand board, the 
communication was quick to ring-fence the problem and localise the attention to Mr 
Maharaj. This tactic is described as scape-goating by SCCT (Coombs 1995:453).    
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The intended message is that the organisation cannot control the crisis if some 
third party is responsible for the crisis or has acted without organisational sanction 
(Ihlen 2002). Because scape-goating has a negative connotation, this tactic will be 
referred to as localising attention in the proposed model.  This is because the 
tactic can be used effectively without necessarily putting the blame on a selected 
person or institution.  For example, at no point did First Rand accuse or denigrate 
Maharaj in the media.  They just made sure that the attention was on him and not 
the entire board or governance structure of FirstRand, the reputation of which 
some journalists appeared to be trying to tarnish along with Maharaj. 
 
5.3.2.2   Ingratiation strategies/tactics (discussed in section 3.4.3.3) 
 
Ingratiation strategies are designed to associate the organisation with positive 
events to win public approval (Coombs 1995:453). Using the terminology of SCC 
theory several new ingratiation tactics not mentioned by SCCT came to the fore in 
the cases consulted.   
 
One of the tactics mentioned by the crisis communicators interviewed was third 
party endorsements.  These are statements made by people or companies 
outside the organisation – seemingly independent parties. These statements can 
add legitimacy to an organisation’s messages.  Sometimes it happens naturally 
that the media will ask a third party for a comment on a crisis, but this process can 
also be encouraged by crisis communicators. Third party endorsements are not 
included in the SCC theory. For example, Absa encouraged some of the 
independent research houses to evaluate Absa’s internet banking security systems 
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and make public statements about its credibility during the internet fraud scare of 
2003.  Online security experts were also contacted to get their opinion on how 
customers should protect their computers from Identity theft software.  These 
statements, which were eventually published in the media, served to dilute 
negative publicity for Absa.  The third parties involved also welcomed receiving 
free, unpaid for publicity, which helped to boost their images as Internet/research 
specialists.   
 
In a similar vein, Standard Bank enlisted scholars and researchers (respected third 
parties) who had investigated hostile take-overs worldwide, to prepare a credible 
defence. Following the scandal involving former Transport Minister and non-
executive director, Mac Maharaj, First Rand deemed it necessary to demonstrate 
unequivocally that a full investigation, by a reliable source, into the alleged 
misconduct of its non-executive member had been carried out. This was hampered 
by the fact that legal considerations prevented full disclosure of the findings to the 
media. The evident need for transparency was satisfied by presenting the 
findings to regulatory bodies (respected and independent third parties) such 
as the South African Reserve Bank and the Financial Services Board.  The fact 
that the investigations were undertaken by a respected legal firm, and not by 
Standard Bank itself, lent the findings a credibility and respectability that an in-
house report, (which would undoubtedly have been criticised for  bias – regardless 
of the facts), could not. 
 
First Rand also employed the ingratiation strategy (Allen & Caillouet 1994) in its 
messaging, by reminding the public of its commitment to corporate governance, 
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and by asking the public to evaluate its actions during the crisis. Ingratiating 
statements employed by spokespeople after the internet hacking crisis to 
demonstrate Absa’s commitment to internet safety included: Absa’s internet 
banking complies with the highest standards of safety possible (Smith 2006). 
Standard Bank also applied SCCT’s ingratiation strategy by referring to the good 
progress Standard Bank had made, and was planning to make, without Nedbank’s 
ownership.   
 
Another unique ingratiation tactic employed by Standard Bank was to offer the 
media a new angle to the crisis story to write about. The angle should be 
favourable for the organisation’s image. This ingratiation strategy is not mentioned 
in the SCCT, but was found to be useful to the crisis communicators interviewed, 
and will form part of the proposed model in chapter six. To summarise (refer also to 
5.3.1.5), Standard Bank successfully gave the media a different slant on the crisis 
to investigate.The appointment of a new CEO and management team, much 
younger than the previous team and without the legacy of past mistakes, interested 
the media who were looking for new permutations to the story to keep it alive in the 
headlines.  Knowing that journalists need new angles from which to write, when a 
large crisis hits the public space, should encourage crisis communicators to think 
creatively and use the opportunity to promote the organisation, as did Standard 
Bank.  Absa too found a new story to take to the media, when the alleged 
perpetrators of internet fraud were arrested through the skills of the South African 
Police Services and Absa’s forensic team.  This was a good news story for Absa 
as it gave the impression that the problem had been resolved and that Absa was a 
proactive part of this resolution.  This tactic is often dependent on the operational 
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strategies adopted by an organisation such as Standard Bank’s decision to appoint 
a new, younger management team (refer to Annexure B for additional details). 
 
Standard Bank also employed a transcendence tactic (part of ingratiation 
strategy) in its attempt to win positive media support for its defence against the 
hostile bid from Nedcor. It worked on the assumption that the public shared its 
values in the larger context of competition in the banking industry. Its argument 
was that job losses would occur as a result of the merger and that the merger 
would reduce competition in the sector. The South African government has a 
strong agenda to create jobs and improve skills, and Standard Bank’s 
communicators took full advantage of this political context to further its arguments.  
 
5.3.2.4   Mortification strategies/tactics (discussed in section 3.4.3.3) 
 
Mortification strategies are designed to publicly associate the organisation with 
characteristics or actions positively regarded by stakeholders (Coombs 1995:453). 
SCCT highlights the importance of perceptions that the public have of the 
organisation and advises that these perceptions be taken as fact. The SCC theory 
can help communicators decide how to shape their responses in the media 
according to the amount of blame/responsibility the public perceives the 
organisation to be responsible for.  
 
In Absa’s case, the public generally attributed blame for identity theft to Absa.  
Their perception was that Absa was responsible.  Even though Absa had a sound, 
trusted brand, it was recovering from bad publicity concerning an online offer made 
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to the public (for free internet access), which was withdrawn two years prior to the 
identity theft crisis.  Given this context, Absa’s response, according to SCCT, 
should have been immediately to reassure customers and to accept responsibility 
for not having educated consumers about identity theft. In other words, Absa 
should have immediately chosen a mortification tactic described by SCCT 
(Coombs 1995). As soon as Absa changed its messaging to reflect this strategy, 
the tone of its media coverage improved.  While the advice the Bank received from 
its lawyers was that it was not legally liable for refunding money to its clients who 
were victims of identity theft (because it is the clients’ systems that are infiltrated, 
not the Bank’s), the organisation realised that given the situation, extreme anger on 
the part of clients and reassurances from other banks, warranted adapting its 
messaging and appearing more compassionate. It even promised to refund the 
money in proven cases of identity theft. This mortification strategy is termed 
remediation by SCCT (Marcus & Goodman 1991; Sharkey & Stafford 1990). 
Another mortification tactic termed rectification involves taking action to prevent a 
recurrence of the crisis in the future. Absa used statements indicative of 
mortification strategies designed to show that the organisation was making sure 
the problem did not reoccur. We have accelerated our planned roll-out of safety 
features (Smith 2006). The Bank was also quick to convey that its security systems 
were top class and it offered free anti-virus CDs to customers to protect their 
computers.  It also provided educational information to customers about how to 
safeguard their systems from unsolicited access. These rectification tactics 
gained favour for Absa in terms of publicity and helped rectify the damage its 
earlier stance engendered. 
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5.3.2.5   Suffering strategies (discussed in section 3.4.3.3) 
 
Suffering strategies are designed to elicit sympathy from the public for the 
organisation by portraying the organisation as an unfair victim (Coombs 1995:453). 
A suffering strategy employed by Standard Bank, not included in the literature on 
SCCT, which will be referred to as an emotive tactic, was to get staff to articulate 
their views on the impending take-over and fears of possible job losses, should the 
merger be approved by the Competition Commission. The crisis communicators 
organised a journalist press shoot of staff wearing T-shirts and hanging banners at 
the head office with wording deriding the merger, such as “Don’t let the big green 
(ie Nedbank) take over the big blue”(Standard Bank). This also gave the media a 
new story to the crisis – one that worked in Standard Bank’s favour.  This tactic, 
because of its success in Standard Bank’s case, will be included in the proposed 
model. Standard Bank was able to elicit sympathy from the public and provided 
relevant information as to why it should not be taken over by Nedbank. This 
emotive technique proved successful under the circumstances. 
 
5.3.3   Positive outcomes/organisational changes 
 
The crisis forced Absa to roll out a programme of security enhancements to help 
clients to protect their identities on the internet. Before the crisis, Absa was not 
really perceived as innovative or technologically advanced, but the Group’s 
response to the crisis has put its security systems in line with world class 
standards. This is clearly an example of how a crisis can be positive for an 
organisation’s image.  According to independent research house, Lafferty (2003), 
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Absa’s security measures have been ranked by experts as being amongst the best 
in the world. Although the crisis presented a public relations challenge for Absa, it 
spurred a renewed focus on internet security and the rules governing the industry. 
The banks became more proactive in advising clients of the latest trends in 
security.  The average online banking consumer had been ill informed on security 
matters until then. Following Absa’s lead, other banks were also forced to make 
security a priority. In addition, Absa was forced to re-learn the valuable lesson that 
the customer must come first, no matter what the crisis event entails.   
 
Standard Bank also experienced positive organisational effects from the crisis 
unlike its rival, Nedcor. It appears that Standard Bank has gone from strength to 
strength since the crisis.  Although Stanbic seemed to make all the right strategic 
internal business decisions during the crisis, according to its advisor, it had not 
been working on its relationships with the media, shareholders or analysts prior to 
the crisis.  The crisis seemed to spur the organisation to re-think its communication 
strategy.  It recognised the value of having good media relations through the crisis 
and has since worked consistently to engage the local banking journalists on a 
regular basis.  Nedcor, in contrast, had been doing all the necessary things with 
regards to relationship building with the key stakeholders – media and analysts, but 
making the wrong strategic business decisions and, since the crisis, these 
decisions have been exposed and the organisation, once the darlings of the media 
and the industry, appears to have lost favour. In a retrospective review of the crisis, 
Candy (2005) explains:  When Nedcor announced its bid for Standard Bank in late 
1999, many people believed it was the end of Standard Bank, which at the time 
was trading at around R19.  Six years later the bank has survived a hostile 
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takeover attempted, seen its share price jump almost four fold and, pipping another 
banking giant FirstRand to the post, is the sixth largest stock on the JSE with a 
market capitalisation of R93bn. By contrast, Nedcor has, since losing the merger 
bid, fallen into disrepute.  Once the darlings of the sector, the Group seems to have 
made one strategic mistake after the other.  Its CEO at the time of the merger bid, 
Richard Laubscher, has since left the Group and a new team at Nedcor headed by 
Tom Boardman, is currently trying to turn the company around.  Although now the 
poor cousin of the South African banking community, Nedbank once ruled 
 the roost trading as high as R163 before falling ignominiously from grace.  This fall 
was precipitated by an ill-advised hostile bid for Standard Bank and a disastrous 
involvement in Dimension Data shares.  At the end of 2004, the group announced 
a three-year plan designed to clean up its balance sheet and streamline the 
business. 
 
Judging from the media coverage received, and from the position in which First 
Rand is in today, the Maharaj crisis of First Rand was managed constructively.  In 
fact, so successful was it, that Laurie Dippenaar, chief executive of FirstRand, was 
a contender for the 2005 Deloitte Good Governance Awards. This success can be 
ascribed to a policy of transparency, availability and honesty on the part of the 
spokespersons concerned.  This strategy worked favourably even though 
Dippenaar did not have a significant relationship with the journalists prior to the 
crisis.  It seems that no matter how bad the various crises may have appeared at 
that time, the banks in question have largely recovered from any negative publicity 
that ensued.   
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The literature emanating particularly from the progressive systems approaches to 
communication such as the chaos theory suggests that a crisis can be beneficial to 
an organisation (refer to sections 3.2 and 3.4.2) and the case studies provide 
evidence of this.  Advocates suggest that instead of resisting influences that can, in 
traditional terms, be viewed negatively as a crisis, an organisation can use 
information sourced from the environment and its members to enhance its 
operations and improve (Murphy 1996; Bloom et al 2002).   
 
5.4   Conclusion 
 
The findings of the case studies were organised into themes and compared to 
current literature on the topic.  Several new crisis communication tactics were 
discovered that are not included in the SCCT literature. These include:  the 
ingratiation strategies of third party endorsements, providing the media with a new 
angle to the crisis story, and the use of emotive arguments to persuade the media 
to perceive the organisation in a favourable light. The distancing tactic of making 
the crisis an industry issue and ordering independent investigations into the matter 
also emerged as a new tactic not included in the literature.   
 
Other findings from the case studies, not specified in the literature included the 
need to control executive stress, which emerged as a necessary factor in ensuring 
effective crisis management. The importance of an organisation’s attitude during a 
crisis was found to be more important than good relationships with journalists prior 
to a crisis. Arrogant and self-serving statements without consideration for victims 
were shown particularly to have negative consequences in terms of media 
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coverage. These strategies and principles should form part of a comprehensive 
crisis communications strategy to the media. 
 
Other observations from the case studies confirm the existing literature.  These 
include the need to have a multidisciplinary crisis communications team with 
access to management decisions; the creation of key, consistent messages; 
proactive responses and a flexible strategy which is responsive to changes in the 
environment. In all the case studies, the crises led to positive organisational 
changes which suggest that crises can indeed be viewed as opportunities for 
beneficial restructuring and change as proposed by progressive approaches such 
as chaos theory. The research shows therefore that crises do not necessarily have 
to be regarded as negative events.  By managing the crisis and its media 
communication competently, positive outcomes are possible. 
 
Chapter six combines the findings of the case studies discussed, together with 
elements drawn from the literature review into a proposed conceptual model for 
communication to the media during a crisis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGIES OF CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION WITH THE MEDIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter represents a culmination of the literature study and the research 
undertaken (as discussed in the previous chapters), by proposing a conceptual 
model which can be used by communicators to make strategic decisions during the 
crisis-response stage. The model can assist an organisation to protect its image 
during a crisis in the following ways: 
• Convince the media that there is no crisis (in the case of unfounded 
rumours); 
• Encourage them to view the crisis in a less negative light by acknowledging 
the organisation’s interpretation of events. 
• Influence the media to see the organisation more positively through the 
effective management of the crisis. 
 
The model recognises that no two crises are identical and that no single crisis 
communication strategy is going to resolve every problem. However, given the 
short time frame for making communication decisions, which is generally endemic 
to crisis situations, this model is intended to assist crisis communicators in their 
task of communicating to the media. 
 
This model is of course based on the assumption that communication to the media 
is just one element of a crisis communication plan that takes into account 
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communication to shareholders, government, analysts, staff, interest groups and 
customers.  Communication to the media is given significance because of its value 
in dispersing information, its critical role in shaping public opinion and because the 
media intrude themselves upon a crisis situation.  
 
A significant part of crisis management is devoted to detecting and preventing a 
crisis proactively because the best crisis is the one that is avoided (Coombs 
1999:125). However, according to Coombs (1999) an organisation cannot avoid, 
prevent or prepare in advance for all possible crises. The success of a crisis 
management effort is heavily dependent on what an organisation says and does 
after a crisis commences – termed the crisis response (Benoit 1997). It is 
acknowledged that the crisis response phase puts any organisation’s normal 
communication systems and processes under enormous additional pressure.  Hale 
et al. (2005:131) therefore suggest that communication models can prove most 
beneficial under such circumstances. An awareness of the steps normally followed 
and challenges faced in such a process can help crisis managers respond quickly 
and rationally once a triggering event occurs. The ultimate end may prove to be not 
just improved communication within the response stage of the crisis but also a 
reduction of the damage from the crisis. 
 
Bloom (2001:85) states: Inventing a response to a crisis as it breaks cannot be 
done to the best of a public relations consultant’s advantage under the pressure of 
events.  Given this state of affairs, a set of guidelines could help crisis 
communicators to formulate responses to the media during a crisis.  The next 
section describes a proposed conceptual model for this purpose. 
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6.2 Conceptual model for effective crisis communication with the media 
 
The conceptual model proposed is designed specifically for the crisis response 
stage to help crisis communicators communicate effectively with the media.  
• Section 1: 
The foundation 
• Section 2: 
An analysis of a crisis situation  
• Section 3: 
Content of communications 
For the purposes of clarity, each of the consecutive sections of the model are 
illustrated and described.  
 
6.2.1 Section 1 of conceptual model: The foundation  
Multi-disciplinary team with access to information and input into executive 
decisions 
Management of executive stress/ perceptions 
Pro-active response/accessibility 
Consistent messaging  
Customer-friendly attitude of organisation throughout crisis 
 
Figure 6.1:  Fundamental building blocks for effective crisis communication with the 
media (the foundation) 
 
This section of the model highlighted in green represents the fundamental factors 
or foundation necessary to ensure effective communication with the media during 
the crisis response stage.  These building blocks or structure should be in place 
during the period when the crisis has reached the media and public’s attention and 
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when the quality of communications issued could have a critical impact on the 
company’s image. 
 
Please note that in the explanations which follow, key arguments are summarised 
and references are given to the full discussions contained in the appropriate 
sections in Chapters 2 – 5. In summary, the foundation or structure necessary for 
effective crisis communication with the media, highlighted by this model, comprises 
the following:  
 
• Multidisciplinary crisis communication team with access to executive 
decisions and all crisis-related information  
(Refer to section 5.3.1.1 for further details from the case studies)  
The model reminds us that it is important to select a crisis communication 
team that represents to a practicable degree the diverse, and sometimes 
conflicting concerns and interests of all stakeholders and departments in the 
organisation – such as customers; institutional shareholders; government 
relations; the departments responsible for media communications; public 
relations; legal issues; human resources; operations, finance and risk 
management. The team has to balance the best interests of all of these 
stakeholders in making communication decisions and according to Kempner 
(1995) a senior executive should have the final word on key decisions to be 
implemented (refer to section 2.3.7).  The consequences of each decision or 
action should be discussed, debated and addressed before implementation.  
The spiral crisis response communication model (Hale et al 2005) (refer to 
section 3.4.1) offers a good illustration of this iterative process. This team 
may need to meet daily in cases of severe crises in order to determine 
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media/public responses or changes in strategic direction. Any board 
activities or strategic management decisions which may impact on the work 
of the crisis communication team will need to be addressed. Nothing should 
be hidden from the team so that it does not have to deal with any surprise 
elements.  It is therefore essential that this team have access to all 
information pertaining to the organisation during a crisis. To alleviate these 
problems, scholars such as Angelopulo and Barker (2006) advocate the 
crisis communication head should form part of the top management of an 
organisation, have open access to information and the authority to make 
decisions.  
 
• Executive stress management / management of executive perceptions 
(Refer to section 5.3.1.2 for further details from the case studies) 
The team needs to ensure that the spokespeople keep to the strategic 
communication messages and do not deviate or have knee-jerk reactions in 
their efforts to control media coverage. Company executives need to 
understand that the organisation cannot win every battle in the media 
space, especially if it is at fault, and that by following a strategic plan and 
meeting on a regular basis, the team can shape, but not control precisely, 
the tone of media coverage.  Executives need to be made aware of the fact 
that the media can be hostile (and often is, because of the nature and 
requirements of the industry), and that it is necessary to manage stress 
levels in order to make level-headed communication decisions. This aspect 
has not been mentioned in the literature. 
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• Customer-friendly attitude of organisation throughout crisis 
(Refer to section 5.3.1.6 for further details from case studies) 
During the crisis the organisation must constantly be aware of its attitude 
toward journalists and the public.  Public perceptions play a key role in the 
successful resolution of a crisis and an organisation that comes across as 
arrogant and unsympathetic will incur criticism for its handling of a crisis.  In 
contrast, an organisation that clearly puts people first and is honest, 
forthright, humble and non-defensive in approach, will stand a better chance 
of having its reputation unscathed, or even enhanced at the conclusion of 
the crisis. The spokesperson who is appointed to face the media on behalf 
of the company will need to be likeable and media friendly.  Training a 
spokesperson prior to a crisis, to control factors such as body language and 
expressions which could impart negative messages to an audience (refer to 
section 2.3.7.1), is essential because this person represents the 
organisation. Mersham and Skinner (2002) warn that without training a 
spokesperson can appear to lack credibility and honesty. A compassionate 
attitude conveyed by an organisational spokesperson during a crisis can 
help to build positive perceptions, even in cases where the organisation has 
no previous relationships with journalists or the public (refer to section 
5.3.1.5 and 5.3.1.6).  The organisation cannot rely on its irrevocable stocks 
of goodwill from shareholders prior to the crisis and must focus on creating 
goodwill during a crisis. 
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• Proactive response and accessibility  
(Refer to section 5.3.1.4 for further details from the case studies) 
By pro-actively engaging the media and having an open-door policy, an 
organisation is positioned to build trust and credibility with journalists and 
therefore has a better chance of managing public perceptions. An 
organisation that refuses to speak to the media and is merely reactive or 
slow to respond may appear to be hiding something or even guilty as 
charged. Pro-active media briefings or one-on-one meetings with trained 
media spokespeople and the release of media statements and/or editorial 
ensures that the organisation is not merely reactive to the media’s agenda. 
Accessibility of key spokespeople to engage with journalists should be a top 
priority during a crisis. Even if the crisis is protracted, the organisation 
should keep the media informed, otherwise they will find alternative sources 
of information which may be completely inaccurate (Fink 2005) (refer to 
section 2.3.7). Bloom (2001) warns that without facts, a journalist is likely to 
publish an article based on speculation.  Fink (2005:109) suggests that not 
engaging with the media can sometimes make the organisation look 
arrogant, or not in control of the situation.  
 
• Consistent messages  
(Refer to section 5.3.1.3 for further details from the case studies) 
It is important for the organisation to speak with one voice, without 
contradiction and to design clear key messages so that there is no 
information overload or confusion in the public space. Coherence is 
achieved by analysing the output from the organisation and ensuring that 
spokespeople are briefed. Mersham and Skinner (2002) suggest that 
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centralising all media contacts with a single spokesperson minimises the 
possibility of conflicting statements.  
 
• Flexible in strategy and monitor changes in the environment  
(See arrows on either side of figure 6.1)   
(Refer to section 5.3.1.5 for further details from the case studies) 
By being alert and monitoring public perceptions the team can be 
responsive and seize opportunities to enhance strategic communication to 
media/public. Media pressure may force an organisation to change its 
response strategy. It is therefore necessary that the crisis communications 
team analyse media coverage continuously.  If the crisis response is proved 
unconstructive or not accepted by major publics such as the media, the 
crisis-response strategy has to be changed.   The crisis team must bear in 
mind that because it is human nature to fail occasionally, the organisation 
might have to admit a wrongdoing and apologise, and in these cases should 
not cling to initial strategies. The strategy throughout the crisis should 
therefore be flexible and fluid in nature, not rigid and uncompromising.  The 
organisation should however attempt, as far as possible, to keep its 
arguments coherent and consistent even when a change of strategy is 
adopted, except of course, when the organisation has to admit wrongdoing 
and repent (refer to mortification strategy). By analysing the incidents, 
arguments and positions presented in the media coverage and adhering to 
the initial characterisations of the situation or problem, the crisis team can 
leave the impression of communicating consistently even when adjusting a 
strategy that has failed. Inherent in this precept of flexibility and monitoring 
is the principle of two-way communication.  Symmetrical communication 
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ensures that communication is not just one-way – from the organisation to 
the media.  The monitoring of feedback from the media and the environment 
is important to developing a robust crisis communication strategy.  
Symmetrical communication is stressed by authors such as Grunig (2000), 
Woodward (2000) and is fundamental to chaos theory (refer section 3.4.2). 
 
6.2.2    Section 2 of model: Analysis of the crisis situation 
 
Multi-disciplinary team with access to information and input into executive decisions 
Management of executive stress/perceptions 
Pro-active response 
Consistent messages 
Customer-friendly attitude of organisation throughout crisis 
Conduct situational analysis taking into account the following: 
• The context (e.g. perceptions of the industry; political/social climate) 
• The history/ethos of the organisation: its culture, public image 
• Severity of damage 
Perception: organisation not at fault 
innocent 
 
Perception: organisation at fault  
guilty  
 
Figure 6.2: Analysis of the crisis situation  
 
This section of the model highlighted in lilac suggests that an analysis of the crisis 
situation is imperative to the formulation of a response.    
 
Keeping the fundamental building blocks or structure for successful crisis 
communication with the media in mind, the crisis communications team is advised 
to undertake a situational analysis. This section of the model has been based on 
amendments and additions to the SCC theory as discussed in chapter three. 
According to the theory, the situation in which the crisis is occurring should 
influence the organisational response to the media. The crisis situation is both a 
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constraint and an asset when articulating a crisis response (Coombs & Holladay 
2001).  It follows that the more comprehensive an understanding crisis managers 
have of the crisis situation, the better prepared they are to deliver an effective crisis 
response (Coombs & Holladay 2001). Critically important is whether the 
organisation in a particular context is perceived to be responsible or not for the 
crisis, because the greater the crisis responsibility, the more accommodative the 
crisis response strategy should be according to SCCT (Coombs 2004). 
 
Although this section of the model has been influenced by SCC theory, the 
researcher has made amendments and additions to the theory based on the 
findings of the case studies examined and on the literature review conducted. 
These amendments and additions are noted. The main points of SCCT will merely 
be highlighted in this chapter for the purpose of clarity and the reader is referred to 
the relevant sections in the previous chapters for further details. 
 
Factors to consider as part of the situational analysis are: 
 
• The context  (Refer to 3.4.3.2)  
SCCT takes into consideration only one element of context - the 
organisation’s history - specifically whether it has endured similar crises in 
the past. This conceptual model expands the definition of context to 
include factors such as public perceptions of the industry as a whole in 
the country in which it operates - for example the reputation of the banking 
or insurance sector, the ethos of the organisation itself (is the organisation 
customer focussed or dynamic?), as well as the political and social climate 
(additions to SCCT). The crisis communication team would need, for 
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example, to consider whether there is a huge public outcry regarding the 
crisis and overt demands by government for compensation to victims in 
order to design a response sensitive to context and expectations. An 
organisation that is perceived as having a good ethos may have an easier 
time convincing the public to accept its interpretation of events. On the 
other hand, however, it could be argued that additional compensation or 
more remedial actions may be expected from an organisation that is 
viewed in a favourable light by the public, than one which has a poor public 
image. Context is also noted as a critical factor in the decision-making 
process by the spiral crisis response model (section 3.4.1) and chaos 
theory (section 3.4.2).  The spiral crisis response model illustrates how 
additional information and data from the environment affects the decision-
making process during a crisis (Hale et al 2005). Advocates of chaos 
theory, such as Bloom et al (2002), stress that crisis communicators should 
determine acceptable courses of actions from environmental trends. 
 
• The severity of damage (Refer to 3.4.3.2)  
This refers to the impact of the crisis on victims. Severe damage to victims 
may dictate greater rectification strategies and statements (Coombs 2004).  
A finding from the Absa case study suggests that any consequence to  
victim/s as a result of a crisis, should be acknowledged as serious by the 
organisation in its response (refer to section 5.3.2.1).  
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• Whether the organisation is perceived to be responsible for causing 
the crisis or not  (Refer to 3.4.3.1)  
According to Coombs (2004) if the organisation could have prevented the 
crisis, the media is more likely to be critical of the organisation. 
 
The three perceptions listed above will dictate the type of response chosen, 
according to this section of the proposed model. For the purpose of simplicity and 
clarity, it was decided to divide the overall analysis of the crisis situation into two 
categories as perceived by the media and the public – one entitled organisation at 
fault or guilty and the other, organisation not at fault or innocent.   This reflects a 
deviation from the SCC theory which divides the overall analysis of the crisis 
situation into the accidental, preventable and victim clusters (amendment to SCCT; 
refer to section 3.4.3.3). While it is acknowledged that the aforementioned 
categories proposed by SCCT can be useful in distinguishing between crises 
which the organisation did not purposely intend to happen, it is proposed that 
perceptions of a crisis by the media or public are generally either one or the other 
(that the organisation is responsible or not – albeit to differing degrees) and that 
crisis responses can be adjusted accordingly. It is suggested that the excuse tactic 
or explanation of “we did not mean for the crisis to happen” might be applicable as 
an ingratiating strategy in an interpersonal context but not in an organisational 
context.  It is thought that the public would generally not accept this as an excuse 
from an organisation, given an organisation’s perceived responsibilities and its 
legitimacy, or sanction to operate (Boyd 2000) (refer to section 2.2.6).  A financial 
institution that states that it did not intend to lose a client’s investment would 
probably not be forgiven or viewed in a gentler light. This kind of excuse tactic 
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recommended by SCCT is not included as an option in the proposed model for this 
reason (amendment to SCCT).   
 
Nevertheless, even if perceptions are negative, the organisation can choose a 
response that can lessen media criticism and which may even earn it positive 
exposure. Brief illustrations drawn from the research conducted are included as 
examples.  For full explanations refer to chapter five. 
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6.2.2 Section 3 of model:  Content of communication to the media 
Multi-disciplinary team with access to information and input into executive decisions 
Management of executive stress/perceptions 
Pro-active response and accessibility 
Consistent messages 
Customer-friendly attitude of organisation throughout crisis 
Conduct situational analysis taking into account the following: 
• Context which includes factors such as perceptions of the industry; political and social climate in the 
country, history/ethos of the organisation - its culture and public image   
• severity of damage 
 
Overall public perception of organisation: 
INNOCENT (organisation not at fault).  
Differing degrees of this perception may 
influence the chosen strategy.    
Overall public perception of organisation: 
GUILTY  
(Organisation at fault) 
Differing degrees of this perception mayinfluence 
the strategy chosen.    
 Aims of innocent strategies: 
• Convince media/public that there 
      is no crisis 
• Use opportunity to get positive 
publicity for organisation 
   Aims of guilty strategies:  
• Have media/public view crisis in less 
negative light by acknowledging the 
organisation’s interpretation of events. 
• Influence media/public to see the 
organisation more positively through its 
management of the crisis 
 
 
Non-existent strategies: 
 
• Denial  
• Denial plus proof that rumour does not 
exist 
• Attack rumour monger –  
       threaten lawsuit 
 
 
      Distance strategies: 
 
• Localise attention   
• Make crisis an industry issue 
• Support independent investigation  
 
Suffering/victim strategies: 
 
• Emotive arguments 
 
       Justification strategies: 
 
• clarify misrepresentations  
• minimise injury 
 
Ingratiation strategies: 
 
• Bolstering  
• Transcendance   
• Praising others (e.g. 
media/investigators/regulators) 
• Find a new story to take to the  
      media  
• Third party endorsements 
 
 
Ingratiation strategies: 
 
• Third party endorsement.  
• Praise others (e.g. media/investigators, 
police) 
 
 Mortification strategies: 
• Remedial, repentance, rectification. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Content of communication to the media 
 
Ex
pr
es
s 
co
m
pa
ss
io
n 
fo
r v
ic
tim
s.
 P
ro
vi
de
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n/
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
. 
M
O
N
IT
O
R
: c
on
st
an
tly
 m
on
ito
r t
he
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t  
FL
E
X
IB
LE
:  
A
da
pt
 s
tra
te
gy
/ i
f r
el
ev
an
t t
o 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
 213
This section of the model describes some alternatives for the actual content of 
communication to the media. 
 
At this point, the crisis communicator is confronted with a range of possible 
responses (or a combination of them) from which to choose.  These have been 
separated into two columns: the right hand column is entitled guilty (organisation 
at fault) and the left hand column is entitled innocent (organisation not at fault). 
The aforementioned headings describe the dominant perception of the public and 
media towards an organisation in crisis.   
 
If an organisation is perceived by the public/media to be guilty, but is in fact 
innocent, the crisis communicator could apply the appropriate non-existent tactics 
in the innocent/left hand column.  On the other hand, if the organisation is 
perceived to be innocent, but is in fact guilty, no response is necessarily required, 
as the organisation’s reputation or organisational legitimacy would not be under 
threat and the situation would not be classified as a crisis from a communication 
perspective.  In the majority of cases, it is only when an organisation is negatively 
portrayed in the media that a response is required, in terms of crisis management 
principals. There are of course exceptions to this.  Another organisation or person 
could be wrongly accused for the crisis or the organisation could be concerned that 
investigations may reveal the truth at a later stage. In such cases, the response 
adopted would be guided by senior management who are responsible for the 
ethics and governance of the organisation.  Decisions about how much or how little 
information to reveal to the media are discussed in section 2.3.5, with the proviso 
that an organisation should never lie to a journalist. 
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Non-interchangeable strategies/tactics: 
 
It should be noted that some of the strategies in each column are not 
interchangeable (addition to SCCT). That is, if an organisation is guilty, it should 
not employ the denial tactic, or if the organisation is not at fault, it is not necessary 
or appropriate to use the justification strategies (addition to SCCT). Ingratiation 
tactics such as taking a new story to the media or bolstering are only advised when 
the organisation is not to blame (amendment to SCCT). This is because these 
tactics might be construed as an avoidance mechanism by the organisation to 
draw attention away from its responsibilities in terms of a crisis. When the 
organisation is not at fault, such as in Standard Bank’s case study, it is apt for it to 
try and seek public approval as it did by bolstering its own business case at the 
expense of Nedcor’s strategy.  However, when the company is at fault, the 
ingratiation techniques would need to be more subtle, such as through the 
employment of third party endorsements, for as Reinhardt (1987:44) declares:  The 
organisation in crisis should not be promotional when dealing with the media 
because a crisis is not the time for a company to pitch its products or services.  
 
Interchangeable strategies/tactics: 
 
The findings of the case studies revealed a number of new strategies that are not 
included in the SCCT and which can classified as interchangeable strategies.  
The first two tactics mentioned should be incorporated into the crisis response for 
good effect, regardless of whether the organisation is perceived to be innocent or 
guilty (amendment to SCCT).   These are illustrated in the yellow panel between 
the left and right hand columns and include the following ingratiating tactics: 
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• Compassion for any possible victims or casualties of the crisis should be 
incorporated into the wording of the response (amendment to SCCT).  This 
stance illustrates the integrity of the organisation and does not necessarily 
mean that the organisation has to pay compensation (refer to section 
3.5.1.4).  If the organisation does not acknowledge the plight of any possible 
victims and does not express its concern in human terms, it might be 
severely criticised in the media, which could create another crisis for the 
organisation. Any bolstering or ingratiation tactics that an innocent 
organisation applies which are not preceded by a compassionate statement 
could be misinterpreted as boasting, arrogance or insensitivity.   
 
• Information about the crisis and/or advice or instructional information to 
prevent further casualties, when relevant. The rationale for including the 
aforementioned tactic for both situations is that even though the 
organisation is not to blame, it is still concerned about its clients and wants 
to make sure they know what to do during the crisis to protect their finances 
or their lives.  In any circumstances, it is the correct thing to do in a crisis, 
regardless of whether the organisation is innocent or guilty. Examples of 
this pertaining to the financial services sector could be the issuing of tips on 
how clients can protect themselves when banking online or at an ATM, or 
from being deceived by pyramid schemes (amendment to SCCT). It is 
interesting to note that Absa, since its hacking crisis, regularly disseminates 
such advice and information to the media (Smith 2006).  This advice is very 
popular and generally always gets published free of charge which gives the 
organisation vast exposure in the media (Smith 2006).  The intent is for the 
organisation to portray itself as a friend of the consumer and as a specialist 
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in security and financial advice (Smith 2006).  A word of caution here 
however, is that this strategy may be misinterpreted by the public as an 
obfuscation of duty by the organisation or an attempt to put the blame on 
the customers.  This is what initially happened in Absa’s case when the 
bank did not include in its strategy, its concern for victims, so that it 
appeared as if Absa was avoiding any responsibility for internet fraud and 
passing the responsibility directly to the consumers. The tips/information 
must be phrased in such a way as to be helpful, rather than critical or 
accusatory, and should be preceded by compassion, as mentioned in the 
previous point.   
 
Other interchangeable strategies that can be used effectively in both innocent and 
guilty contexts include: 
• The ingratiation tactic of third party endorsements (addition to SCCT). 
• The ingratiation tactic of praising others, such as the media or investigators, 
for their work in exposing or dealing with a crisis. 
 
An important factor to remember is that any strategy chosen may need to be 
adapted according to the principles of constant monitoring and flexibility as part of 
the fundamental building blocks/foundations of crisis communications (section 1 of 
model).   
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6.2.2.1 Innocent category:   
Strategies to be employed if the organisation is perceived to be 
not at fault 
 
If the organisation is not at fault, the crisis communication team can employ any of 
the listed options (refer to left-hand column of figure 6.3), the aims of which are to 
convince the media/public that there is no crisis and at the same time to garner 
positive publicity for the organisation, particularly through the use of ingratiation 
strategies.  The innocent strategies are classified as: non-existent, suffering/victim 
and ingratiation.  
 
• Non-existent strategies (refer to 3.4.3.3) 
These strategies seek to eliminate the crisis. They could include a 
categorical denial statement without explanation; a denial statement 
together with evidence that the rumour is unfounded; or, in certain cases, 
the organisation might threaten lawsuits against those spreading the rumour 
(attack tactic).  The denial strategy should only be used if there is no basis 
for the rumours (Coombs 2001).  The organisation in crisis may also need to 
take into account that protestations of innocence could be treated with 
scepticism by a wary media (Smith 2006).  Another factor to consider is that 
an attack strategy can be highly risky because it portrays the organisation in 
an aggressive light (Hearit 2001). It is therefore suggested that this strategy 
only be used in extreme situations (amendment to SCCT). 
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•       Suffering/victim strategies (refer to 3.4.3.3) 
These strategies use messages to elicit public sympathy.  Emotive 
arguments and third party endorsements (additions to SCCT) were used to 
good effect by Standard Bank (refer to chapter five for more detail).  
 
• Ingratiation strategies (refer to 3.4.3.3) 
Public approval is sought for the organisation through the following tactics: 
bolstering (associating the organisation with positive traits), transcendence 
(seeing the context or bigger picture of the crisis), praising others (for 
example by complimenting the media for their role in the investigations), 
third party endorsements (addition to SCCT) or finding a new story to take 
to the media (addition to SCCT). 
 
6.2.2.2 Guilty category:  
Strategies to be employed if the organisation is perceived to be 
at fault  
 
If the organisation is at fault, the crisis communication team can choose from the 
listed tactical options (refer to right-hand column of figure 6.3) the aims of which 
are to get the public/media to view the crisis in a less negative light by 
acknowledging the organisation’s interpretation of events or to be viewed more 
positively by the sensitive handling of the crisis.  An organisation can gain positive 
publicity for its laudable behaviour during a crisis, even in instances where it 
caused the crisis. These strategies are classified as:  distance, justification, 
ingratiation and justification. (Please note: A few brief explanations drawn from the 
case studies are given as examples.  Full details appear in chapter five) 
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Distance strategies (refer to section 3.4.3.3)  
These strategies acknowledge the crisis but try to weaken the link between the 
crisis and the organisation. 
 
• Localise attention or put the attention or spotlight on one area/person.  
For example, in FirstRand’s case, the strategy employed by the crisis 
communications team ensured that the focus was placed on the accused 
member (Mac Maharaj) and not on the full board of FirstRand. SCCT uses 
the term scapegoating.  Because of the negative connotation of this word, 
localising attention is preferred by this model (amendment to SCCT).  For a 
full explanation of the preferred term, kindly refer to section 5.3.2.1. Unlike 
SCCT, the proposed model does not recommend making an excuse for the 
crisis or shifting blame, rather this tactic of localising attention is used only if 
it is legitimate and is not done in a defensive manner.  FirstRand provides a 
good example of this tactic applied in the appropriate context (refer to 
section 5.3.2.1) 
 
• Make the crisis an industry issue and not one experienced only by a 
particular organisation (addition to SCCT). For example, Absa was 
perceived favourably because it brought together all the banks to discuss 
and tackle the problem of internet fraud as one that affected the entire 
banking industry. This tactic helped dilute the negative attention given solely 
to Absa in the media space and protected the organisation’s credibility. 
 
• Support an independent investigation into the crisis (addition to SCCT).  
This tactic is aimed at creating credibility with the public by showing a 
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transparency and willingness to have external parties investigate the matter 
and share the findings with the media. 
 
Justification strategies (refer to section 3.4.3.3)  
 
• These strategies seek to minimise damage associated with the crisis, often 
through clarification. Absa, for example, tried to communicate to the public 
that there was minimal damage as a result of identity theft and that the 
extent and nature of the crisis had been misrepresented by the media. Absa 
attempted to convey the message that the media had used the term 
“hacking” which is incorrect as the bank’s systems had not been infiltrated. 
From the study conducted, it seems that justification strategies should be 
used with caution and are not always successful because they may come 
across as insensitive and defensive, as in Absa’s case (amendment to 
SCCT). The proposed model suggests a cautionary approach when using 
tactics such as minimising injury proposed by SCCT (amendment to SCCT). 
This finding concurs with that of Huang (2005:32) who argues that this 
response could be associated with manipulation and could ruin 
organisation-public relationships. If the organisation is perceived to be to 
blame, even if technically it is not, as in Absa’s identity theft crisis, the 
proposed model suggests that, at the very least, compassion be 
demonstrated for the victims of the crisis. 
 
Ingratiation strategies (refer to section 3.4.3.3)  
These strategies are designed to improve public perceptions about the 
organisation by associating it with positive attributes. 
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• Independent third party endorsements and praising others 
These tactics involve soliciting comment in support of the organisation’s 
arguments or defence from respected, independent third parties (addition to 
SCCT). All of the banks investigated engaged in this practice which has not 
been mentioned in the literature. Again this tactic lends credibility to the 
organisation in crisis and helps to dilute negative sentiment.  In cases where 
the organisation is at fault, this tactic serves as a defence and because it 
comes from a source outside the organisation, it is perceived as being more 
reliable than if the organisation themselves put forward the argument. 
Praising other parties, such as the Competition Board for pointing out unfair 
practices, or the police for their investigations into the matter, or even the 
journalists for exposing the situation, can earn the organisation favourable 
publicity. 
 
Mortification strategies (refer to section 3.4.3.3) 
These strategies are designed to encourage the public to forgive the organisation.  
Mortification strategies/tactics suggested by this research when an organisation is 
perceived to be at fault include the following: remedial action, repentance and 
rectification. 
 
• Remedial action could include an explanation of what the organisation is 
doing to prevent the crisis from re-occurring. Absa, for example, accelerated 
its programme of security enhancements to help protect customers from the 
threat of further fraud. An organisation could combine praise with remedial 
tactics.  For example: Thank you for drawing our attention to the issue. To 
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ensure that this does not happen again we are taking the following actions. 
To prevent further negative publicity, even though it was not obliged to do 
so, Absa also offered full financial compensation to the victims of identity 
theft – an example of a rectification strategy. The value of compensation 
would be dependent on a full situational analysis (refer to section 2 of the 
model described in section 6.2.2) which would determine how much 
responsibility an organisation should bear.  Repentance is when the 
organisation publicly accepts full responsibility for the crisis and requests 
forgiveness from stakeholders.  
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6.3 Critical evaluation of proposed crisis response model (CR-model) 
 
Multi-disciplinary team with access to relevant information and input into executive decisions 
Management of executive stress/perceptions 
Proactive response and accessibility 
Consistent messaging  
Customer-friendly attitude of organisation throughout crisis 
Conduct situational analysis taking into account the following: 
• Context which includes factors such as perceptions of the industry; political and social climate in the 
country, history/ethos of the organisation - its culture and public image   
• severity of damage 
  
Overall perception: INNOCENT  
(Organisation not at fault)  
Differing degrees of this perception may 
influence the chosen strategy.     
Overall perception: GUILTY  
(Organisation at fault) 
Differing degrees of this perception may 
influence the chosen strategy.    
 Aims of innocent strategies: 
• Convince media/public that 
       there is no crisis 
• Use opportunity to get positive 
publicity for organisation 
 Aims of guilty strategies:  
• Have media/public view crisis in less 
negative light by acknowledging the 
organisation’s interpretation of events. 
• Influence media/public to see the 
organisation more positively through its 
management of the crisis 
 
 
Non-existent strategies: 
 
• Denial  
• Denial plus proof that rumour does 
not exist 
• Attack rumour monger –  
       threaten lawsuit 
 
 
      Distance strategies: 
 
• Localise attention   
• Make crisis an industry issue 
• Support independent investigation  
 
Suffering/victim strategies: 
 
• Emotive arguments 
 
       Justification strategies: 
 
• clarify misrepresentations  
• minimise injury 
 
Ingratiation strategies: 
 
• Bolstering  
• Transcendance   
• Praising others (e.g. 
Media/investigators) 
• Find a new story to take to the  
Media 
• Third party endorsements 
 
Ingratiation strategies: 
 
• Third party endorsements  
• Praise others (e.g. media/investigators, 
police) 
 
 Mortification strategies: 
• Remedial, repentance, rectification. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: conceptual model for organisational strategies of crisis    
communication with the media (CR-model):  
 
Lexicon:   section 1: Green - Foundation 
section 2: Orange - Analysis of the crisis situation 
section 3: Content of communications 
Lilac - innocent tactics; Pink – guilty tactics 
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This section evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed crisis  
response model (or CR-model).   
 
 
6.3.1 Weaknesses of CR-model 
 
• As with most models, the quest for simplicity may affect the application of 
this model to live situations of crisis.  It is possible that some explanatory 
factors and variables have been excluded.  Because this is an interpretive 
model there are obvious shortcomings regarding the potential for 
generalisation.  However the aim is not to provide a model of standard 
response or dictate all organisational behaviours in a crisis. Rather the aim 
is to provide guidelines for the process of decision-making. It must be 
remembered that crises are complex and demand complex, situation-driven 
responses (Englehardt et al 2004). 
 
6.3.2 Strengths of CR-model 
 
•    What could be considered valuable is that the CR-model illustrates and puts 
in place the basic building blocks necessary for crisis response and 
suggests some strategies and tactics to adopt when communicating with the 
media, which are dependent on the context in which the crisis occurs. It thus 
combines and synthesises all the critical factors and decision-making 
processes for considered communication during the crisis-response phase. 
It gives the crisis communicator a process to follow and suggestions about 
the actual content of crisis response communications and strategy. It also 
suggests areas where caution should be followed in applying a particular 
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strategy. The literature review shows that no other model illustrates or 
combines these factors with the integrity of the CR model which makes it 
unique.  
 
• The model can also be applied during the pre-planning stage of crisis 
preparation as it can help formulate possible standard responses to some 
predictable crises. It provides a comprehensive summary of all the factors 
needed to be considered before compiling a media response. 
 
• The model also facilitates the categorisation of the crisis – as one in which 
the media will consider the organisation at fault, or not, and then, based on 
research, suggests ideas for different strategies and tactics that have been 
known to be successful. Because it is based on tried and tested strategies 
gleaned either through the literature review or from the research material, 
the model has empirical significance. 
 
• It addresses the limitations of other theories such as SCCT by 
acknowledging that context plays an important role in deciding what strategy 
to follow.  Although, the context of the research was limited to the banking 
environment in South Africa, the lilac section of the model highlights the 
imperative that context should be considered before making a decision 
about content. This gives the model a certain degree of adaptability to 
different organisational sectors and different cultures or countries.  This is a 
key advantage of the model.   
 
 226
• It also accommodates crisis response strategies that allow for organisational 
statements that express concern and sympathy without placing blame on 
the organisation which may carry legal and financial responsibilities 
(Englehardt et al 2004).  This factor remains absent in other models. 
 
• The bulk of related research offers task-level support of specific foreseen 
crises (Hale et al 2005) and thus provides excellent planning strategies. 
What the CR-model does is provide crisis communication support and 
content decision-making tools during the actual crisis. Not every crisis 
communication strategy can be planned in exact detail before a crisis 
commences because the crisis communication team needs to monitor and 
adjust its communications to meet public perceptions and exploit possible 
opportunities that may arise.  
 
• The model highlights the precepts of progressive systems approaches by 
focusing on two-way symmetrical communication, through a constant 
monitoring of the environment and flexible responses thereto. In this it 
presents a more dynamic and responsive approach to that of the traditional 
linear models discussed in chapter three. 
 
In summary, the study has built a qualitatively based model of crisis response 
communication that could prove to be useful when an organisation is under time 
pressure to provide a response to the media. The more we know about the crisis 
response process, the more effective a crisis manager can be (Coombs 1999a). 
The model has been based, in a large part, on data collected from crisis managers 
in a real business context, based upon their actual experiences in handling crises, 
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as well as from an extensive literature review of material gleaned from similar 
studies. The study thus provides empirical evidence to demonstrate the value of 
categories of responses and is not purely theoretical. 
 
6.4 Evaluation of entire research 
 
The aim of the research was to translate the existing literature on crisis 
communication and crisis management principles and theories, as well as the 
knowledge gained from case studies of crises in the South African banking 
environment, into a currently relevant conceptual model for corporate strategies of 
crisis communications with the media.  It is believed that this task has been 
adequately executed and the proposed model represents a synthesis of the 
material and case studies researched and discussed.  The research provided 
insights, often absent from more traditional quantitative approaches, which could 
assist those crisis communicators desiring to enter the field, as well as to practicing 
communicators seeking to conceptualise their experiences/strategies to facilitate 
decision-making with ease during the crisis-response phase. 
 
6.4.1 Weaknesses of the research 
 
It is acknowledged that the study as a whole has some weaknesses which include 
the following:  
 
• The researcher selected, interpreted and articulated various meanings from 
the raw interview material, but they are not the only meanings that could 
exist (Bryne-Armstrong, Higgs & Horsfall 2001).  Different meanings and 
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completely different observations could be identified and interpreted by 
other readers.  This is the subjectivity of the research.  The interpretations 
could have been different had there been different participants, a different 
interviewer or even a different context.  The researcher was thus cognitively 
limited in the sense that the mind tends to select data that confirm the 
meanings that have already been identified (Gordon 1999).  They will not be 
the only interpretations possible.  They represent a view, rather than the 
view.  It could be argued however, that by combining the interviews with an 
intensive literature review and data obtained from newspaper material, that 
the subjectivity of the researcher is counteracted to some degree by an 
analysis of the aforementioned material. 
 
• Qualitative research which is the approach adopted by this study is time and 
labour intensive.  Therefore it is not feasible to use a large sample and it is 
normal practice that only a few cases are studied intensively (Darlington & 
Scott 2002). This affects the ability to generalise the findings.  In this 
research, only three cases were studied and all of them pertained to the 
financial services sector.  All of the participants were South African.  
However, by combining these results, with information from an intensive 
literature review of material gleaned from research into crises from other 
industries and countries, the proposed conceptual model is possibly 
afforded a wider application. 
 
• According to Becvar and Becvar (2000), qualitative research is still often 
regarded in research circles as inferior to the highly scientific empirical 
traditions of quantitative research.  Becvar and Becvar (2000:337) state: It is 
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the model with which consumers of our services are familiar and in which 
they have faith, regardless of whether or not this faith is justified.  
Nevertheless, in qualitative research, the recognition of meaning patterns 
and the usefulness of the interpretations gleaned from the research are 
considered of greater importance than the yielding of statistical data 
(Neuman 2000). 
 
6.4.2 Strengths of the research 
 
• This study can be seen to represent a progression on the research that has 
been done on the use of crisis management and communication with the 
media to protect organisational reputations. The section on analysing a 
situation to determine a response is an extension of Coombs’ research on 
matching crisis response strategies with the public to the crisis situation, 
while also building on the work of other crisis management scholars.  It has 
helped further the argument that it is important to understand a crisis 
situation in order to select the most appropriate or effective crisis response 
strategy (Coombs 1998, 1999a). 
 
6.4.3   Recommendations for future research 
 
• Future research could further investigate and evaluate the different 
categories of responses in order to determine their effectiveness and to 
create further response options to add to the model. 
• The link between the responses chosen and the context of the crisis could 
be examined in order to advance the arguments made. 
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• Additional research could assess how people perceive the various crisis 
responses. 
• A larger sample, including other industries and contexts, would increase the 
ability to generalise the findings, which is not possible with a sample of this 
size.  In these ways, the model could be further refined. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The proposed conceptual model for crisis communication with the media discussed 
in this chapter is based on the results of the case studies researched on crises in 
the financial services sector, and on the literature focusing on the crisis-response 
stage.  While acknowledging its limitations, the model is useful in illustrating factors 
that require consideration when making strategic decisions during this critical 
phase of crisis communications: the building blocks, the need to consider context 
before choosing responses. The literature reveals that no other model illustrates all 
of these factors and in this way the proposed CR model is unique. The model also 
has value in that it illustrates various response options available to the crisis 
communicator during the crisis-response period with the media, when there is 
often limited time for making strategic decisions.  It highlights that certain 
responses should be applied with caution because of the possible perceptions that 
they might create and it places integrity high on the agenda when making these 
decisions.  This factor also accords the CR model unique status. It thus provides 
the crisis communicator with a simple and thoughtful decision-making tool. 
Because it is based on tried and tested strategies, the model has empirical 
significance.  Opportunities for further research and testing of the proposed model 
have been suggested in order to enhance its contribution to the crisis 
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communications field as a credible, worthwhile and perhaps even scientific 
instrument.   
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ANNEXURE A:  A CASE STUDY OF A “HACKING” CRISIS AT SOUTH 
AFRICA’S LARGEST INTERNET BANK - ABSA 
 
A.1   Purpose of this annexure 
 
The purpose of annexure is to examine the crisis communication strategies 
employed by Absa and to analyse the media coverage surrounding the well-
publicised Absa cases of identity theft using key-stroke logging software in the 
period July 2003 – October 2003. This was considered to be a protracted or 
continuing crisis (refer to section 2.2.2) for the bank, in that a great deal of intensive 
negative publicity was incurred over a four month period, and since then, the “Absa 
hacker” continues to incur mentions in the media in sensationalist articles pertaining 
to internet security issues. The fear at the start of the crisis in July 2003 was that the 
public would cancel their internet banking accounts with Absa – that there would be 
a run on internet banking.  Information gleaned for this chapter was obtained from 
archived internet media reports and from interviews with the head of the Absa’s 
media communications, who was responsible for managing the messages to the 
media during the crisis.  The analysis was conducted by the researcher and the 
authenticity and validity of the interpretations checked with the participant. 
 
In order to provide full context, the background of the crisis will be explained in the 
section which follows. 
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A.2   Background to the crisis 
 
This section includes a definition of the term identity theft as well as the details of 
the complete story which made headlines in the media space. 
 
A.2.1   Definition of identity theft 
 
Identity theft is the invasion of a customer’s personal computer through the 
planting of key-logging (spyware) software which records the customer’s PIN and 
username. The thief then uses this information to impersonate the customer and 
steal money from his or her accounts. 
 
Identity theft is not the hacking of a bank’s security systems. Clients using their 
home computers to access the web are the vulnerable targets of this form of cyber-
crime, unless precautionary measures are taken by clients.  These measures 
include installing the latest virus control software on home computers and deleting 
suspicious looking emails. 
 
A.2.2   How the story unfolded in the South African media 
 
The South African media reported extensively on the subject during the initial 
intensive four month period of the crisis.  At times this coverage was misleading in 
that the facts were not always reported accurately.  Journalists confused the term 
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hacking (infiltration of a bank’s security systems) with identity theft (infiltration of 
clients’ computers).  The media repeatedly referred to the fraudster/s as the “Absa 
Hacker/s”. The phrase stuck even though journalists were told that Absa’s systems 
had not been penetrated.  Emotive headlines encouraged a media sensation 
around what could be described as a relatively minor case of fraud – a total of 
R530 000 was stolen. 
 
The story broke with a dramatic, but technically incorrect Sunday Times headline:  
Hacker cleans out bank accounts – hundreds of thousands of rand stolen via 
internet from Absa clients (Sunday Times 2003:1).   
It is suspected that one of the victims, a Belville-based lawyer, leaked the story to 
Edwin Lombard, journalist at the Sunday Times.  This was the start of a public 
furore on which the media avidly fed. It is unfortunate that Absa was initially the 
only bank to be associated with this kind of fraud even though later reports started 
to regard identity theft as an industry issue.  The perception appeared to persist 
even though it was revealed that the suspect, J J Fourie, also allegedly stole 
money from an FNB and a Standard Bank client. 
 
It’s safety first Standard tells its online clients (Business Report 2003:1) 
Absa’s competitors used the opportunity to promote their advanced security 
systems already in place at the time of Absa’s crisis and were quick off the mark to 
introduce additional security measures, which gave the impression that Absa 
lagged behind in this regard.  Standard Bank in particular, was quick to supply their 
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clients with free anti-virus software and an on-line screen pad as an alternative to a 
keyboard to guard against fraud. Nedbank and FNB already had an SMS 
beneficiary notification in place, which alerts customers of every single transaction 
that takes place on their accounts.  Immediately following the crisis, Absa 
accelerated the rollout of its online security measures planned for the financial year 
ahead, but Absa was criticised for not having done this sooner,  as in prior to the 
crisis,  to prevent the fraud from occurring. 
 
Specialist IT writers criticised Absa media spokespeople for being vague and for 
not knowing the full facts, or the difference between spyware, Trojan horses, 
keyloggers and antivirus software (eg. Anti-virus software does not prevent 
spyware).  This gave the impression that Absa was not viewing the matter as 
serious and/or that its personnel were ill-informed. 
 
Absa was also criticised for suggesting that identity theft using software was the 
latest international trend in internet fraud, when in reality it had been around for the 
past 15-20 years.  Specialist IT journalists suggested that the banking industry as a 
whole should have known this and found comprehensive ways to protect its clients 
before the fraud occurred.  Mistaken though it may be, the media’s perception was 
that Absa, the largest internet bank in South Africa had not put additional security 
measures in place as quickly as other banks had done. The customer should come 
first in a crisis, at any cost (Business Report: 2003:2). 
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Absa was initially disparaged for shifting responsibility for this kind of fraud to the 
client.  Absa basically stated that because the fraud was initiated at the clients’ 
computers, it was their fault for not having the right software, not updating their 
anti-virus package as often as they should, or for opening suspicious looking e-
mails.  While Absa’s legal team were adamant that the bank was not liable for 
client losses experienced through identity theft, this stance did not endear the bank 
to the media or to the public.  There was a need for damage control, but the full 
implications of this stance was not realised by the crisis team until the onslaught of 
negative publicity was received. 
 
For example, an Absa call centre operator was depicted in an amusing cartoon in 
The Star (2003:1) with the caption: How can we fob you off? Sensationalist 
headlines continued to feed public paranoia.  The perception was that Absa was 
unconcerned about its clients, which angered the journalists.  Absa needed to do 
something to rebuild broken trust. 
 
Competitor banks such as FNB seized the opportunity for positive publicity by 
reassuring its customers of the safety of their money online.  In particular, FNB 
was direct and clear in its assurances promising its customers that it would refund 
any amount illegally removed together with charges and lost interest. The 
guarantee reflects the bank’s confidence in both its security precautions and the 
efficiency of its early warning service (The Star: 2003:2). 
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It was unfortunate that an additional fraud scare hit Absa in the Pietermaritzburg 
area hot on the heels of South Africa’s first alleged e-robber being arrested.  This 
fuelled public paranoia as it suggested that there were additional incidents of 
identity theft and that they were not limited to the Western Cape region or to a 
particular fraudster, as had been reported.  Investigations quickly revealed that 
these incidents of fraud were not related to identity theft however, the damage had 
already been done.  Both the media and the public inferred that internet banking 
had again been shown to be vulnerable.  Clients sent letters to publications and 
the media across the country picked up on the story again.  At the same time, a 
fraudster gained access to 52 South African websites in less than 18 hours 
including one bank site - African Bank and although there was no indication that 
this fraudster was involved in any of the Absa incidents, the implication was 
certainly conveyed.  These kinds of incidents gave journalists covering the “Absa 
hacker” story additional angles to write about with the result that Absa’s crisis 
continued to dominate headlines and opinion pages. 
 
Given the continued negative backlash against its seemingly aloof stance, Absa 
made a strategic decision to take the industry lead in fighting the crime of identity 
theft and relayed to the journalists that it would initiate discussions with other major 
banks to share information.  This helped to shift the focus from Absa and reflected 
positively on Absa’s image as the bank started to be perceived as pro-active in 
developing the means to make internet banking safer across the industry for all 
South African internet banking users. The tactic was that Absa wanted to be 
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viewed as the bank that discovered the fraud and brought it to the attention of the 
market.  Absa stated that it was the only bank to conduct forensic audits of each 
affected client’s PC to ascertain the modus operandi of the fraudsters. 
Over time it emerged that Standard Bank and FNB clients had also been affected.  
This assisted Absa in regaining the high ground and lent credibility to Absa’s claim 
that this was an industry issue and not just an Absa issue. 
 
Online banking faces security crisis (Business Day: 2003:1). 
Absa’s strategy to make identity theft an industry issue began to pay off.  
Journalists started to report on what the banks collectively needed to do to rectify 
the situation and the responsibility of the banks to educate consumers on the best 
way to protect themselves from this crime.  The industry as a whole was criticised 
by the South African Consumer Union for not educating its customers before the 
crime hit.  However, finally the criticism was directed at the banking industry, not 
just at Absa.  In addition, some reports carried references to the fact that identity 
theft is an international threat for all internet-based transactions, including online 
shopping sites, which helped to deflect the spotlight from Absa alone. 
 
Absa also started a campaign to counteract earlier criticism, by showing that it 
cared for its customers by disseminating additional security tips together with an 
assurance that it would refund any money in confirmed cases of identity theft. The 
net effect was that journalists began to reflect the facts accurately, stating that 
Absa’s systems had not been infiltrated. Absa’s close co-operation with the police 
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and the arrest of a suspect appeared to boost public confidence in internet 
banking.  Absa had a new story to take to the media.  The perception was also that 
the fraud was restricted to one perpetrator and to one geographical area – the 
Western Cape.  This perception worked in Absa’s favour.  The tracking of the 
fraudster, his arrest, appearances in court, bail hearing, police recovery of the 
“cyber thief’s loot”, as well as the possibility of his having accomplices, was 
followed with interest by the public. 
 
As more and more people started to understand the nature of identity theft, so the 
media began to reflect these sentiments.  From market research conducted by 
Absa during the period July – August 2003, it was evident that the number of new 
registrations of internet banking during the media scare far outweighed the 
cancellations.  It is clear that Absa’s client base was not put off by the crisis 
reported in newspapers, on radio and television. 
 
A.3   Critical Analysis:  Insights, comments and lessons learnt about crisis 
 
This analysis was constructed by the researcher with the cooperation of the head 
of media communication at Absa, who was responsible for managing the 
communication strategy to the media at the time of the crisis. 
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A.3.1   Customer first, customer reassurance 
 
The media criticised Absa for its aloof, defensive, hands off approach and of trying 
to shift the blame to the client in cases of identity theft.  Absa had initially focussed 
its communication almost exclusively on warning customers of their duty to protect 
their computers from viruses and crimes as well as supplying tips on how to do 
this.  The head of Absa’s media communication explains: We first made the 
mistake of blaming the customers and then we had a crisis on a crisis.  You must 
be very careful.  Lesson number one for Absa was you never blame your 
customers.  Never build a wedge between your stakeholders and yourselves when 
you have a crisis – rule number one.  Rule number two – refer to rule number one. 
 
Absa at the time had a good relationship with the police, the analysts, the banking 
regulators.  What we didn’t have was a relationship with the customer in terms of 
internet fraud and that caused a scandal.  We did have a good relationship with the 
media, but remember, once you face a crisis and you’ve been negligent or you’ve 
been perceived as negligent, that relationship with the media goes out the back 
door.  When it comes to the crunch, the relationship between the media and the 
bank is basically adversarial.  The journalist’s job is to find news stories and you 
can be pretty sure that it won’t be good news that he or she is looking for.  It’s bad 
news that sells newspapers. 
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The media can be extremely unforgiving especially if you blame your customers; 
as was the case in the hacking crisis; and especially if you’ve acted like an idiot 
and acted aggressively towards them, saying that it’s their own fault that they lost 
their money.  When managing any crisis, those dealing with the media must bear 
in mind that regardless of any legal niceties, it’s the journalist’s opinions that will be 
printed in the newspaper the following morning.  They will not easily forgive you. 
 
It took us longer than it should have to correct internet fraud and we spent R8 
million on ads alone.  After a shaky start, day after day, week after week, we had 
meeting after meeting to make sure we communicated the right message. 
 
Absa realised that it needed to give its customers a sense of security and 
reassurance.  The customers had to feel that their money was safe when banking 
online.  The reassurance took the form of a guarantee.  Absa guaranteed that it 
would refund money stolen in confirmed cases of identity theft (after a full 
investigation into each case).  Absa also said that they would work together with all 
affected organisations, including the police to fight cyber-crime.  The head of 
media communication at Absa explained: From a legal perspective it appeared we 
were covered.  The advice from the bank’s legal team was that we were not liable 
in cases of identity theft.  That’s where the original defensive strategy came in; “it’s 
your (the customer’s) fault” because you didn’t have the necessary protection in 
place.  But after the reaction from the public and from the media we had to change 
our tune.  Legal issues are legal issues, but in an emotive case such as this, you 
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don’t base your crisis communications on legalities.  People don’t want to know 
about legalities because they don’t understand it. 
 
A.3.2   Healthy tension between members of the crisis communications team:  
a multi-perspective approach to the crisis 
 
From the Absa case, it appeared that at times, the head of media communication 
had different views from that of other members of the crisis team - such as the 
head of the legal department.  The head of media communication has, as a key 
concern, the reputation of the organisation, while the head of legal has the letter of 
the law close to heart.  Sometimes this may mean making decisions to protect the 
Group’s reputation at a financial cost to the company.  In Absa’s case, it meant 
refunding the customers in confirmed cases of identity theft, even though, from a 
legal perspective, Absa was not liable.  The tension between members of the crisis 
communication team could be seen as healthy, in that each member has an 
agenda to defend, and the crisis can be viewed from all perspectives.  By having 
different representatives as members of the crisis communication team, the 
organisation can be assured of a comprehensive view of the crisis and can 
address possible consequences of communication decision taken in advance. 
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A.3.3   React quickly, be responsive to customer concerns 
 
Absa’s offer of free anti-virus software and extra security in terms of adding an 
online keypad followed a little too late after Standard Bank’s similar offering.  Absa 
could have perhaps have reacted more quickly to market concerns.  The head of 
media communication at Absa explained: We were a little on the heels of the other 
banks when it came to offering extra protection to customers for their PCs.  We 
should have reacted more quickly. 
 
Nevertheless, Absa was flexible in its communication strategy and did respond to 
the changing needs of its audience as feedback was received through the media 
and directly from customers.  Absa stepped up its activities to show care for its 
clients and started a strong consumer education campaign on how to protect one’s 
identity on the internet.  The head of media communication at Absa explained: 
What also contributed to changing negative perceptions was that we changed our 
messaging.  We started to communicate to our clients the tips of what and what 
not to do.  Yes, keep your PC safe, but Absa will help you – here’s a virus 
protection CD.  You must always remember, you must be on the correct website, 
this is the address.  Be careful on the net.  Don’t visit porn sites and download 
suspicious items otherwise you’re going to get spyware.  Don’t open unsolicited 
emails.  So what we’ve actually created at Absa is much more than internet 
banking. We actually created a much greater awareness over that period.  People 
were saying:  I was not very sure about these things, but now my bank, my big 
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strong good bank is telling me these things and you know what, I feel safer now 
going onto the internet, so I’m going to get into it and I’m going to do internet 
banking.  It’s bizarre, but we grew our internet banking base faster than ever, 
because the awareness was so strong. So sometimes a crisis can work in your 
favour. 
  
A.3.4   Be wise with your strategy 
 
In a wise move, Absa made the internet fraud issue, quite rightly, an industry one – 
one that all banks needed to be concerned about. The head of Absa’s media office 
explained how Absa called a meeting with its competitors, Nedbank, Standard 
Bank and First National Bank, as well as internet service providers to discuss the 
issue in an open forum. This strategy was conveyed to the media and helped to 
spread the spotlight from just being focused on Absa – to other banks. 
 
A.3.5   Keep messages simple pitched at the audience 
 
The head of Absa’s media communication believes that messaging in a crisis must 
be kept simple, free of jargon, with two or three key messages at most to reassure 
customers.  He also stressed that the communicator must know his/her customer. 
We must remember that in our country, the average level of education of media 
consumers is standard eight.  We’ve got to know where to pitch our crisis 
communications.  If we’re going to be very academic about it we’re not going to 
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succeed.  We’ve got to talk in very simple language with one or two, maybe three 
reassuring messages.  The message has to be clear to everybody. The information 
should be clear and simple, not fact overdose.  One or two or three facts are all 
most people, uneducated or not, can remember.  Be honest and never be 
defensive.  Admit, be honest.  The moment you start resisting, you cause 
resistance on the other side. 
 
A.3.6.   Spokesperson likeability critical 
 
In the early stages of the crisis, members of middle management were 
occasionally used as spokespeople.  According to the head of Absa’s media 
communication this was inappropriate.  He believes that even though top 
executives are understandably busy, a senior executive should be the public face 
of the company, especially in a serious crisis because a false impression given to 
the media can sink any organisation. 
 
During the period of the crisis, Absa broadcast a television advertisement featuring 
an attractive actor to express Absa’s concern for its online clients.  The head of 
Absa’s media office considers this to be a mistake.  He said that during a crisis, 
customers want reassurance from a top management person, preferably the CEO.  
Failing that, there should be a media spokesperson, who is known to the media 
and who will become known to the public.  He explained: In a situation such as this 
Absa should have followed the example set by Pick ‘n Pay’s CEO, Sean Summers, 
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who faced the media during that company’s extortion debacle. As a general rule of 
thumb, the policy should be to put a face to the crisis.  Not simply the issuing of a 
press statement.  Have a person talking to the people - on television, radio, in the 
press.  Call a press conference.  A face, a human person at the end of the day is 
worth much more and I think in hindsight, for Absa’s internet fraud, if the CEO was 
unavailable, we should have had a face, a friendly, good, trustworthy person, 
talking to  the public at large all the time, to say, guys we have this problem.  Not 
your security expert because they are militarists, not your technical expert – you 
need a communicator, a facilitator, you need to give the people a warm and fuzzy 
– a message with integrity.  Then people change their minds.  Whenever you have 
a problem, put a face to it.  That’s what I say. 
 
What would have been ideal was for Absa’s CEO to have gone on camera.  It 
shows the CEO knows what’s going on.  And the CEO is close to the customer.  
His messages must be managed correctly.  He should have said something like:  
“Guys, I’m in charge of Absa bank and I’ve heard about this whole thing and let me 
tell you I’m deeply concerned for your safety if this is the truth.  I give you my 
promise that I am doing everything possible to protect you.  I’m the CEO and I will 
make sure it will be done.” People want to speak to the man at the top.  When 
people complain, who do they want to speak to? The CEO.  It’s human nature to 
want to talk to the boss.  You don’t want to talk to the secretary.  You want to 
speak to the senior guy. It’s human nature.  Play on human nature. 
 
 275
The head of Absa’s media office was emphatic that the media spokesperson 
should be the human face of the crisis and should face it head on. Stand in front of 
the media – answer the questions honestly – repeat the messages – expose 
yourself – then the crisis will die down.  
 
He said that the only thing a company can do, especially if it has not built up good 
media relations before the crisis, is to select the spokesperson very carefully and 
make sure that the spokesperson is available to the media. Therefore, if you do not 
have prior relationships with the media, the only thing you can do is to be honest, 
try and come across as nice as possible.  In that way try and build the relationship. 
Use your most friendly face possible, the best communicator, even if it’s not the 
CEO and this person has to run for days and days and talk to everybody.  You 
need to create a friendly face so that people who see him or her will think:  
“They’re not so bad.” It must be a likeable person.  Physical and emotional appeal 
is so important.  The first thing that hits the mind when people look at an image is, 
is it nice, is it pleasing?  Does it sound nice?  The third element is what is being 
said.  In that combination people will decide whether to listen to your message or 
not and decide how to perceive your company.  It’s all about public perception. 
 
A.3.7   Third party endorsement 
 
According to the head of Absa’s media communications, that which helped Absa to 
change the negative perceptions surround the crisis, was to get third party 
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endorsement, such as from international research company, Lafferty, the results of 
which made Absa look good in terms of having world-class security systems.  The 
head of Absa’s media communication said: I think constant messages from 
independent sources such as Lafferty, helped to shift negative perceptions. 
 
A.3.8   Keep management calm  
 
The head of Absa’s media communication recalls that during a crisis, 
management, understandably, are under a lot of stress but they have to learn not 
to react to each negative statement made in the media.  It is not possible to control 
what journalists will write in an article.  He explained: We do not control the media.  
This is a democratic society.  If you pay for advertising, you can control every 
word, but not with editorial.  It is only if the journalists get facts wrong that one can 
take them on.  Otherwise, management have to remain calm and ride the media 
wave of negative publicity. 
 
A.3.9   Communicators must be given all critical information about the crisis 
 
In Absa’s case, it seemed that not all the facts were initially given to the 
communicators.  Before the Sunday Times broke the story in the media, Absa’s 
security experts who were already investigating the fraud should have informed 
Absa’s crisis communicators that they were doing so, so that Absa’s crisis 
communication team were not caught unawares.  This would have given the crisis 
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communication team some time to plan a strategy and even to make the 
recommendation that Absa reimburse the affected clients so that they did not feel 
sufficiently aggrieved to go and tell their story to the newspapers. The crisis could 
have been averted in this way.  Also, in this instance, Absa’s spokespeople 
appeared to be a bit confused. The head of Absa’s media office explained: In a 
sense, we had to deal with something we didn’t really understand because key-
logging software only became known once it was used.  Our security experts had 
heard about it in America, India and China.  It hadn’t really affected South Africa, 
so we didn’t really think that this would hit us.  So it hit us very quickly and caught 
us unawares. 
 
In a crisis such as this, it is necessary for the organisation’s communicators to be 
informed thoroughly on all the issues surrounding the subject.  Nothing should be 
withheld from the communicators and even the most probing questions should be 
answered as thoroughly as possible according to the head of Absa’s media 
communication. Just as lawyers do not want any surprises in court and prepare 
themselves well in advance with the facts, the organisation’s communicators do 
not want to be taken unawares by journalist reports.  An organisation’s 
communicators need to know every detail of the situation in order to prepare an 
acceptable communication strategy to the various publics. 
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A.3.10   Reputation prior to the crisis critical 
 
The head of Absa’s media communication considered Absa to be fortunate in that 
its history of having a strong, trusted brand reputation in the South African market 
helped it to get through the crisis.  He believed that Absa had a reputation of 
having good strong leadership and a good vision, without which it would have been 
more difficult to deal with the crisis in the media. Absa is also very active in the 
communities in which it operates with its pervasive corporate social investment 
programme which lends goodwill to its name.  The head of Absa’s media 
communication explained: If you hit a crisis and you don’t have that image already 
in the market your crisis is going to be very severe because you have to put in 
much more resources to convince people that this company is under good 
leadership and that they will overcome this problem. When Absa hit internet fraud, 
we were seen as a very strong brand and that’s the only thing that saved Absa’s 
backside with internet banking.  That people didn’t have a run on the internet bank 
was because of the strong brand.  We really were not seen as that innovative or 
technologically advanced.  Our competitors were seen in that light more than us.  
But people had trust in this brand - the Absa brand is very strong.  Yes, branding is 
very important but if you do not communicate all the other things that you do, such 
as corporate social investment initiatives, your crisis becomes so much more 
difficult to manage. 
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A.3.11   How a crisis can force a positive change in the perception of a 
company 
 
The crisis forced Absa to roll out a programme of security enhancements to help 
clients to protect their identities on the internet.  Prior to the crisis Absa was not 
really perceived as innovative or technologically advanced, but the Group’s 
response to the crisis has put its security systems in line with world class 
standards.  This is clearly an example of how a crisis can be good for a company.  
According to study conducted by independent research housel, Lafferty (2003), 
Absa’s security measures have been ranked by experts as being amongst the best 
in the world.  Although the crisis was a public relations nightmare for Absa, it 
spurred a renewed focus on internet security and the rules governing the industry.  
New laws introduced to govern cyber crime could be tested in court for the first 
time when the Absa hacker comes to trial.  Perhaps the Absa case will be the spur 
to establish a body of cyber inspectors (Business Day 2003:3). 
 
A.4   Conclusion 
 
Absa learnt valuable lessons from the identity theft crisis.  Customers must come 
first regardless of the legalities of a situation.  Customer reassurance and empathy 
are important as is prior education of customers.  All strategies must take these 
important factors into consideration.  In spite of having good media relations prior 
to the crisis, journalists will take the organisation to task if it is not seen as having 
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customer needs as a priority.  In addition, the choice of spokesperson is critical, 
especially in a situation as serious as this in which the safety of customer money 
(the core business of the bank) was in question.  Absa learnt also not to be 
defensive on the issue.  Instead it took the strategy of informing the industry of the 
first cases of identity theft recognised in South Africa, and started a bold education 
campaign to customers.  This helped to dissolve the negative coverage.  The fact 
that Absa is a trusted brand in the consumer environment in South Africa also 
played a big role in helping it to retain the loyalty of its customer base, and even 
growing it, in spite of the crisis. 
 
A good outcome of the crisis for the industry is that the banks and internet service 
providers started to become more pro-active in advising clients of the latest trends 
in security and in providing educational tips and tools to assist clients. The average 
consumer had been ill informed prior to the publicity Absa received during this 
crisis. 
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Actual print media coverage of the Absa internet “hacking” crisis drawn from 
the Web 
 
July 2003 – October 2003 
 
National Newspapers: 
 
• Business Day  
 
• Business Report (The Mercury, The Star, The Saturday Cape Argus, 
The Pretoria News, Cape Times, Sunday Tribute, The Sunday Argus, 
The Sunday Independent, The Saturday Star and The Weekend 
Argus.   
 
• Business Times (Sunday Times) 
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ANNEXURE B:  A CASE STUDY OF A HOSTILE TAKE-OVER ATTEMPT 
OF STANDARD BANK SOUTH AFRICA BY COMPETITOR BANK 
NEDBANK SOUTH AFRICA 
 
B.1     Purpose of this chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the crisis communication strategies 
to the media employed by Standard Bank (Stanbic) and to analyse the media 
coverage surrounding the well-publicised take-over bid by Nedbank (Nedcor) 
of Standard Bank in 1999. This was considered to be a big crisis for Standard 
Bank as the media and the market were initially in favour of the take-over, to 
which Standard Bank was completely opposed.  Information gleaned for this 
chapter was obtained from archived media reports and from two separate 
interviews with the head of Standard Bank’s media office and the chief advisor 
to Standard Bank from a respected communications firm who was responsible 
for advising Standard Bank on how to deal with the crisis.   The full story of 
the crisis is described in the section that follows. 
 
B.2     Full story 
 
On 15 November 1999, Nedcor Limited, a South African bank, made an 
unsolicited bid for Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Stanbic), its larger 
rival.  If the bid had been successful, it would have become South Africa’s 
biggest merger in the financial sector, at that time.  The new super bank 
would have been 95 per cent larger than its nearest competitors (Business 
Report 2000: 1). The media interest was intense during the entire period of 
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the protracted year-long crisis and sensationalist headlines fuelled public 
debate about the issue. 
 
Stanbic rejects Nedcor’s merger overtures (Business Report 1999:1) 
On 25 November 1999 Stanbic started its public defence against the merger 
in the media.  The chief executive of Stanbic, Jacko Maree, put forward the 
following arguments against the merger: the premium offered by Nedcor for 
Stanbic shares was too low; the performance forecast for the proposed 
merged entity too optimistic, and the implementation risk too high. Referring to 
a recent study of US bank mergers, Maree argued that earnings for the two 
years following completion of a merger are always below expectations.  He 
avowed that hostile takeovers are more likely to end up as partial or complete 
failures if the proposed merger is not friendly and negotiated (Business Report 
1992). He postulated that Nedcor did not have the required experience to 
integrate the computer systems of both banks and that should the merger go 
through, there was a threat of 10,000 job losses that would take its toll on 
employee morale and performance.  Moreover, since only some staff 
reductions would take place through natural attrition, those threatened may 
choose to strike, a tool often used in South Africa, or key officers at Stanbic 
may leave the merged entity.  
 
In contrast Nedcor, led by its chief executive Richard Laubscher, brandished 
an attractive ROE of 30% for the proposed merged entity and listed several 
unfavourable events that had hit Stanbic over the past year and negatively 
affected its value.  Nedcor’s arguments in favour of the merger were the 
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following:  cutting excess capacity and using lower cost-platforms would result 
in a stronger capital structure of the merged entity.  Nedcor further argued that 
domestic mergers remained the norm worldwide and that building a national 
champion in South Africa with a market capitalisation of R57bn and assets of 
R270bn would be a good idea.  Nedcor explained that it would be preferable 
to have a local merger and cautioned that if the merger did not go through, an 
international player would grab the opportunity instead (Business Report 
1999:3).  
 
In the two weeks after Nedcor’s announcement, the share price of Stanbic 
remained fairly stable but the share price of Nedcor fell by some 3.5%.  This 
reflected the fact that Nedcor’s shareholders were actually more concerned 
about the consequences of the merger than their counterparts at Stanbic. This 
is not surprising perhaps given that the performance of Nedcor at that time 
was superior when measured in terms of operating profits (a compound 
annual growth rate of 24% for Nedcor against 11% for Stanbic between 1994 
and 1998), cost-to-income ratio (56% for Nedcor against 62% for Stanbic) and 
return-on-equity (ROE) (21% for Nedcor against 16% for Stanbic). 
 
Towards the end of 2000, Finance Minister Trevor Manual eventually ruled 
against the proposed merger.  This was a victory for Stanbic, whose counter-
offence, over a protracted period, against the merger proved successful.  The 
crisis brought Stanbic and its new management team into the limelight and 
since then, the Group has been on a steady climb to centre stage in the 
media and in banking circles as a whole.  Stanbic had proved to the market 
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that it had a good growth strategy and could deliver good returns without 
having to merge with Nedcor. 
 
Geoff Candy (2004), banking journalist from Moneyweb in a retrospective look 
at the crisis, wrote the following: When Nedcor announced its bid for Standard 
Bank in late 1999, many people believed it was the end of Standard Bank, 
which at the time was trading at around R19.  Six years later the bank has 
survived a hostile takeover attempt, seen its share price jump almost four fold 
and, pipping another banking giant FirstRand to the post, is the sixth largest 
stock on the JSE with a market capitalisation of R93 billion. By contrast, 
Nedcor has, since losing the merger bid, fallen into disrepute.  Once the 
darlings of the sector, the Group seems to have made one strategic mistake 
after the other.  Its CEO at the time of the merger bid, Richard Laubscher, has 
since left the Group and a new team at Nedcor headed by Tom Boardman, is 
currently trying to turn the company around.  Although now the poor cousin of  
the South African banking community, Nedbank once ruled the roost trading 
as high as R163 before falling ignominiously from grace.  This fall was 
precipitated by an ill-advised hostile bid for Standard Bank and a disastrous 
involvement in Dimension Data shares.  At the end of 2004, the group 
announced a three-year plan designed to clean up its balance sheet and 
streamline the business. 
 
B.3    Analysis, comments and insights into the crisis 
 
This analysis was co-constructed by the researcher from two separate 
interviews:  one with the head of Standard Bank’s media office and one of the 
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partners at an international public relations firm, who was brought in to advise 
Standard Bank on how to deal with the crisis.   
 
B.3.1  Context/history important 
 
At the time of the crisis for Standard Bank, its suitor, Nedbank, was doing well 
financially and had excellent media relations. Its CEO Richard Laubscher, 
was well respected in the sector and the media initially covered the bid in 
Nedbank’s favour. Laubscher was even named Business Report newspaper’s 
top business newsmaker of 1999. In contrast, Standard Bank had no real 
media relations profile to begin with.  The timing for the bid by Nedbank was 
thus perfect.  The advisor to Standard Bank explains: So if I think about the 
Standard Bank bid to start with.  We were not advising Standard Bank when 
Nedbank launched their bi.  We were approached subsequently and by the 
time we arrived, Standard Bank were very much in that sort of scrambling 
mode because they were under attack and they were so completely on the 
back foot.  Now, the timing of the bid was perfect because Nedbank were the 
darling of the sector.  Richard Laubscher was this hugely charismatic man 
and those people are very difficult to fight in the press because those people 
have got fantastic relationships and they’ve got a lot of good will and he was 
very glamorous and very charismatic and the management of Standard Bank 
at that time hadn’t built any relationships with the press. Their rating was at an 
all time low because they had spent a lot of money on their franchise and had 
spent a lot of money in Africa. They were spending money internationally as 
well. They were basically in fact spending money on the stuff that has come 
through for them now (in 2006), but they did that seven, eight years ago.  So 
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their cost-to-income ratio was huge and Nedbank’s cost-to-income ratio was 
very, very, very low at that time.  But I think what came to pass in that bid was 
that Laubscher had pretty much cut all the muscle out of Nedbank and was 
looking for a strategy for growth.  He didn’t have one.  His business had run 
out of road and he needed to buy Standard Bank and he came at absolutely 
the most perfect time because his currency with the market and with the press 
was very high, Standard Bank’s was at an all time low. 
 
This context formed the backdrop of the challenges that the communications 
team had to cope with.  The strategy was to try and get the media on the side 
of Standard Bank to use the media as a tool in the fight against Nedcor which 
was a high expectation considering the context described. 
 
B.3.2 Strategic decisions taken by the business that help or hinder the 
communication strategy 
 
One of the strategies employed was to attack the business proposition made 
by Nedbank as justification for the take-over.   Standard Bank had to convince 
the market that it had a sound growth strategy and that it could deliver better 
shareholder returns than if Nedbank bought Standard Bank.  A few strategic 
decisions made by the business assisted the communication team with this 
task.  One of these strategic decisions was that Standard Bank, just after the 
crisis started, changed their CEO from Mike Vosloo to Jacko Maree.  This 
proved useful because it provided a new positive story to take to the media – 
there was a new management team at the helm, one that didn’t have the 
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legacy of having to explain a lot of the previous regime’s actions.  This worked 
in Standard Bank’s favour. This decision was reflected in newspaper reports:  
Stanbic shores up merger defences. The besieged bank is to beef up its top 
team (Business Times 1999:1). Stanbic takes Transnet boss and Stals on 
board (Business Day 2000:1). While the press were initially on the side of 
Nedbank, they quickly got to like Maree, the new CEO and this proved 
enormously useful.   
 
The advisor to Standard Bank explains: Now, Standard Bank did a couple of 
clever things very quickly which had nothing to do with the communications 
and that is that they changed the CEO. They changed from Mike Vosloo to 
Jacko Maree.  Jacko then came on.  So to a certain extent you started with 
somebody who didn’t have the legacy of having to explain a lot of the actions 
that had taken place and by making that change you immediately had a 
positive story to go onto the front foot with.  There were two strategies:  one of 
going on the front foot and telling the new story.  It was tactically very 
fortunate that we could go with a new story and a new management team.  
And the second one was to attack Nedbank’s business proposition.  Now a lot 
of people say that the reason Standard Bank got away from Nedbank was just 
because the competition commission ruled against it.  Now I do disagree. I do 
think that Standard Bank managed to convince the market that it had a good 
growth strategy and that it could deliver better shareholder returns than 
Nedbank buying Standard Bank.  But I do think the competition commission 
thing was the death blow to the transaction.  If I think about the sort of things 
that we did, I have to be truly honest – I truly think that the communications 
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was a key part of the defence but it wasn’t the only part and I don’t think it was 
necessarily the most important part.  They had very good investment banking 
advice and the way they managed the shareholders was particularly good.   
 
This comment is fairly significant as it makes the point that the role of 
communications is assisted, or by implication, hindered, by the decisions 
taken by management.  It was fortunate that Stanbic management made wise 
decisions throughout the merger bid, decisions that the crisis communications 
team could capitalise on.   
 
In contrast, the Nedbank team had to put up with ill informed decisions taken 
by their management, one of which was that the CEO, in the end, stopped 
listening to advice from his communications team.  The advisor to Standard 
Bank explains: I heard, from a senior peer of mine at Nedbank, that towards 
the end, Richard Laubscher stopped listening to anybody.  He stopped 
listening to his advisors and very early on he stopped listening to the media 
communication team. He felt that he knew more than them, that he had better 
relationships with the journalists than they did.  He was on such a big ego trip.  
So I do think that often in crises if you’re the kind of person who doesn’t listen 
to your advisor. .They (Nedcor) actually changed advisors half way through as 
well, which I think was very damaging for them.  They had outside people as 
well, much like Standard Bank but without the experience that the team had 
who came down from London to support Standard Bank.   
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B.3.3   Attitude of spokesperson/company important 
 
Even though the new Standard Bank CEO had not established positive 
relationships with the media prior to the crisis, because he was appointed just 
after the crisis broke, his likeable personality soon earned him favour with the 
media.  He also made himself extremely accessible to the media. The head of 
Standard Bank’s media office explained: Also, the press were, in the 
beginning, very much on the side of Nedbank but they quickly got to like 
Jacko.  I mean as an individual, Jacko made himself incredibly available and I 
guess that’s rule number one.  He came out of the background.  He was the 
new CEO and he was just available to any journalist who wanted to talk to him 
and he has a very engaging personality and he also has charisma and he 
managed to claw back very quickly some goodwill in the press just by doing 
that.  
 
It is clear that the likeability of Standard Bank’s CEO and his open door policy 
with the journalists, even without a history of prior good media relations, was 
an important factor in facilitating the success of Stanbic’s counter bid in the 
media.  Although Nedcor’s CEO, Laubscher, had a good relationship with the 
media, he became increasingly inaccessible and arrogant, as previously 
mentioned, which did damage to Nedcor’s reputation.  The arrogance and 
determination of Nedcor to proceed is reflected in the following headlines:  
Nedcor blows its IT trumpet (Business Report 2000:2). Nedcor launched a 
new charm offensive yesterday aimed at reviving lagging interest in its bid for 
Stanbic (Business Day 2000:4) 
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Humility and honesty were very important in winning the media over to 
Nedbank’s side.  Journalists do not respond well to arrogance.  The advisor to 
Standard Bank explained: And then the third thing was that we were honest in 
the sense that in every engagement with the press we were very careful to 
always talk about the things that we had done wrong in the past, so we were 
honest and humble which they found appealing…It wasn’t like we were 
aggressive/defensive when we came back.  Like a lot of companies, 
particularly if the management are also responsible for a lot of mistakes that 
have been made in the past that have resulted in them being vulnerable, can 
be very defensive and not acknowledge that shareholders or press or 
anybody have a reason to be unhappy whereas with Jacko he said, yes, we 
have been spending money, our cost-to-income ratio is very high, but there 
are very good reasons for that and maybe we’ve made some mistakes in 
some areas but we will rectify that.  I think people got a sense of humility but a 
sense of new vigour in the business which I think people bought into.  So I 
guess just those three rules:  Jacko was very accessible; we got very 
proactive, we didn’t just sit and wait to be smacked around by Nedbank – we 
went back at them quite quickly.  And the third thing was that we told the truth 
in the sense that we acknowledged areas of weakness and mistake.  I think 
really Standard Bank has delivered 150% of what they promised at the time of 
the bid. I mean nobody can be unhappy with what they did so I think it was a 
combination of a number of things and just sticking to those.  
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As the bid’s progress was reported on and Stanbic kept up its counter attack 
in the media, Nedbank, in contrast, made the mistake of becoming too 
complacent and too arrogant in the media.  Standard Bank’s advisor explains: 
It was hugely successful but partly because Nedbank made some terrible 
mistakes which we were very thankful for.  I mean, they were hugely arrogant.  
They relied too much on the stock of irrevocable goodwill that they had from 
the shareholders, they relied too much on their currency.  They didn’t work 
hard enough at re-energising their attack.  They got lazy and slow and 
complacent and we were working very, very hard to keep the pressure up, but 
obviously we were the ones being attacked so it was very important. So it was 
hugely successful but I think it was a number of different dynamics not just 
the communications and I truly think that if you stick to those three rules and 
you have the communications people in your war- room every day 
understanding what the issues are and obviously it does help to have 
communications people who’ve got good relationships with the journalists that 
the journalists trust not to spin to them or not to lie to them or mislead them. 
The Standard Bank/Nedbank thing is always held up as a great victory but 
Nedbank also - they made such fundamental communications errors that if 
they’d been better it might have been harder.  They relied so much on their 
previous positive history.  I mean the bid went on for a year, you’ve got to 
keep the momentum up and I don’t know who did Nedbank’s, but they didn’t 
do a very good job and I think that also Standard Bank got better advice, they 
got a better merchant banker. 
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So, while Stanbic expressed a favourable attitude to the media, it seems that 
Nedbank’s arrogant attitude cost them media favour. The turning of the tide of 
sentiment against Nedbank is reflected in the following newspaper headlines 
which showed a critical attitude towards the merger:  Nedcor’s takeover bid 
may have a degree of desperation (Business Report 2000:2), Post-merger 
banks often lose their edge (Business Report 2000:3), Bid for Stanbic not 
smart thing (Business Day 2000:1), Market seems to be turning away from 
optimism over chance of bid’s success (Business Day 2000:3). While initially 
Nedbank’s positive history helped them to garner favour in the media, they 
could not rely on this solely to extract them from their crisis.  They needed be 
more flexible and respond strategically to the defences posed by Stanbic. 
 
C.3.4     Pro-active stance with the media 
 
Rather than just being on the reactive side of journalist queries, Standard 
Bank took a very pro-active stance with the media and set up briefings for 
them.  In one sense, the take-over bid could be described as one of the most 
exciting things happening in financial circles at the time, and Standard Bank 
took advantage of the atmosphere of interest and set up dramatic media 
conferences using special effects to explain Stanbic’s defence.  The advisor 
to Standard Bank explains: The second tactic was to get very aggressive in 
the press from a proactive perspective so we set up press conferences and 
press briefings to try to tell the story in a way that would be more exciting for 
the press.  We got very proactive, we didn’t just sit and wait to be smacked 
around by Nedbank – we went back at them quite quickly.  Briefings were 
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always very useful for analysts and press.  We’d often do joint analyst and 
press briefings. We did a couple of very big press conferences.  When Jacko 
was appointed we did one and then when we presented our defence strategy 
we had a big press conference up a Vodaworld and we invited the world to 
that.  We made it an exciting event.  We didn’t want to give the impression in 
any way that we felt undermined or under siege by this Nedbank thing. 
 
The in-house head of Standard Bank’s media communication (who was also 
interviewed for the study) explained that to be pro-active with journalists it is 
necessary to understand how the media works and what it is they seek.  In 
this way, Standard Bank was able to use the media to its advantage to swing 
public opinion to its side. He said: You’ve got to understand what the 
journalists are looking for.  You’ve got to understand their time constraints, 
their deadlines and what kind of facts they need for their stories.  You can 
even use the media to your advantage – to get facts out to your public.  The 
media helped us with the Nedcor bid.  They helped us tell our side of the story 
and swing the public attention in our favour. 
 
B.3.5   Communication practitioners must be part of the inner circle 
 
 
Standard Bank’s advisor believes that what helped Stanbic to be successful is 
that the communications team became part of the so called inner circle or 
executive team.  They knew what was happening on a daily basis in the 
organisation and could make arrangements to capitalise on decisions taken 
by management in their communications with the media. This was, according 
to the advisor, more important than having a theoretical strategy.  Being part 
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of the management, decision making team, and agreeing on plans of how to 
handle the media on a daily basis, was critical. She explains: We didn’t have a 
huge big communication strategy.  We used to have early morning meetings 
where the advisors, us and the company – the little war cabinet – would agree 
on a daily and weekly basis how we were going to manage.  So we didn’t 
have a high-faluting, let’s write down some big strategy.  It was very practical.  
It generally is in that kind of situation.  I mean we didn’t write lots and lots of 
big documents that say we’re going to do this.  It was day-to-day tactical.  But 
the communications people could be effective because they also were part of 
the inner circle.  Now if you have your PR people or your press people and 
you view them as just as the people who talk to the press and you don’t have 
them as part of your inner circle, it’s very difficult.  It’s very important that you 
have your communications people as part of your inner circle and everybody 
agrees in that meeting in the morning what are we going to say to the press, 
what are we going to say to the analysts, what are we going to say to the 
shareholders and let’s make sure that we say the same thing to everybody 
rather than the merchant bank and the company sitting and agreeing and then 
telling the PR people what to say.  It doesn’t work like that.  You’ve got to be 
part of that decision making process so that you can see if the merchant bank 
have a defence strategy how can working the media or working the analysts 
support that on a tactical basis on a day-to-day basis and that’s basically how 
it was managed. It was a great bid to work on, great team, fantastic people.  
Standard Bank have also got great media people internally that are still there 
and everyone felt like we were in the trenches and there was a great 
camaraderie and all the advisors got on really well.  We had huge respect for 
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the merchant bank and the broking teams and they treated us with respect.  
They didn’t treat us like idiots.  They made us part of the whole process. 
 
Yes, it’s often put forward as a real bench-mark transaction and it was a 
benchmark transaction in a lot of interesting ways.   But I have worked on 
much worse crises than that, much more difficult bids.  I did not find that to be 
difficult because the team were so close, they were wise.  They had a good 
structure.  They had those 8am meetings every morning where all the 
advisors would sit together for an hour and just debate what would be said to 
the press.  As the bid went on - we initially used to have those meetings daily, 
then every other day and then towards the end we were having two a week.   
 
B.3.6    Use of emotive persuasion tactics 
 
 
In their defence strategy against Nedcor, Stanbic chose to focus on one of the 
most emotive elements against the merger – one that would no doubt elicit 
sympathy on the part of the public and disapproval from staff, trade unions, 
shareholders, analysts and government circles – the possible job losses that 
could have resulted. According to Standard Bank’s advisor, Stanbic cleverly 
got staff involved in the counter-attack and by rallying their support, made 
their counter-defence stronger. She explained: Stanbic also got McKinsey’s 
(management consulting firm, particularly in the field of strategy) in to do a lot 
of research to look at the kind of value destruction that had taken place 
overseas around bank bids, particularly hostile ones and then when we 
realised that hostile bids were particularly destructive to shareholder value 
because of the people issues we then decided to get the Standard Bank staff 
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involved because I think then the shareholders thought my god even if Nedcor 
buy Standard Bank they’re going to lose half the staff, they’re not going to be 
able to make this work.  So, we operated on a lot of different fronts so it was 
shareholders, sell-side analysts, journalists and also we finally used the 
employees. We got them (the staff) T-shirts, we sent out lots of mails 
internally saying that this could be the impact on jobs if Nedbank were to take 
us over. We got people to feel very proud and sort of defensive around 
keeping Standard Bank as Standard Bank and they did things like they made 
banners and hung banners down from the building in bank city and we got 
journalists to come and run a photo call.  You know, stuff like that.  We got the 
staff (and the unions) up in arms about the fact that the greens were going to 
come and take us over.  So it was all those things really, but one thing about 
crisis is – just keep it very simple.  Keep it very tactical.  Don’t get bogged 
down in what a manual will say or let’s have a crisis communications manual.  
Those things don’t work in a real crisis.  They don’t. So that was my 
experience. 
 
The defence strategy of rallying staff support and inciting the unions worked 
in Standard’s favour as is evidenced by the following headline in Business 
Day (1999:1): Battle for Stanbic – Unions threaten legal action to prevent 
merger.  
 
B.3.7     Keep messages simple 
 
 
The crisis communications team kept the messages to the media simple, 
clear and consistent. For example, the CEO used plain understandable 
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phrases or soundbytes in his rhetoric such as: Bigger is not always better, 
says Maree (Business Day 1999:1).  Standard Bank never attacked Richard 
Laubscher from Nedcor directly - they just counter-argued his reasons for the 
merger. Standard Bank’s advisor explained that the arguments could be 
easily understood: Basically our attack was – they’ve run out of road, they 
need to buy us because they have cut so much muscle out of their business, 
they can’t grow, they need Standard Bank to grow but we feel that we’ve 
made the investments in growth, this new management team can deliver on 
that growth and in fact, Nedbank will destroy shareholder value if they take 
over.  They will destroy that potential if they take over the business, because 
you’ll lose half the management, you’ll spend a year trying to extract 
synergies, cut costs and you’ve lost a whole year of growth so it never got 
personal.  No-one ever attacked Richard, we attacked the strategic premise of 
the take-over all the time to undermine the credibility of their story. 
 
Clients and readers of newspapers gave further indication that the consistent 
strategy employed by Standard Bank worked, by writing emotive letters and 
opinion pieces in the newspapers. For example a client wrote in Business 
Day (1999:10):  Goodwill cannot be bought, it has to be earned.  As a 
Standard Bank client for 49 years, I must express my disgust at the hostile bid 
engineered by Chris Liebenberg to gain control of the bank. 
 
B.3.8    Positive outcome from the crisis 
 
It seems as if Stanbic has gone from strength to strength since the crisis.  
Although Stanbic seemed to be making all the right strategic internal business 
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decisions before the crisis, according to Standard Bank’s advisor, it hadn’t 
been working on its relationships with the media, the shareholders or the 
analysts.  The crisis seemed to get the company to re-think this side of the 
business.  Nedcor, in contrast, had been doing all the right things with regards 
to relationship building with the key stakeholders – media and analysts, but 
making the wrong strategic business decisions and since the crisis, these 
decisions have been exposed and the company, once the darling of the media 
and the industry, appears to have lost favour. Standard Bank’s advisor said: 
Astonishing, yes, at the difference between Nedcor then and Nedcor today.  
Really, everybody says that Standard Bank got a kick up the bum from the 
Nedbank story.  I think to a certain extent it speeded up the process but they 
were making all the right strategic decisions but they hadn’t played the game, 
they hadn’t smoozed shareholders, talked to the sell-side, they hadn’t made 
friends with the press.  Now, Richard Laubscher had done all those things but 
he hadn’t actually made the right strategic decisions in his business.  So that 
was the difference.   
 
The in-house head of Standard Bank’s media office said: We now have a very 
good crisis communications policy in place and recently practised it with a 
mock crisis.  It worked very well.  It is critical to have this in place. 
 
The official sentiment was also that the battle for Stanbic presented by 
Nedcor was beneficial to the country and the industry as a whole.  There 
emerged much more clarity on South Africa’s policy on mergers and about 
whose responsibility these kinds of decisions are.  There had been debate on 
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whether this responsibility rested with the courts, the Competition 
Commission, or the Registrar of Banks and whether the Banks Act was the 
principal law governing mergers.  Trevor Manual made the ultimate decision 
in this case and the Competition Act changed as a result. Business Report 
(2000:2) published the following:  Last week’s courtroom shenanigans 
between the parties to Nedcor’s proposed takeover of Stanbic illustrates that 
our regulatory and legal framework and even our corporate culture is still far 
from ready for the sort of hostile – or even agreed – takeovers that are routine 
in the UK and US. 
 
B.3.9   Conclusion 
 
 
What was evident in the handling of Standard Bank’s crisis in the media was 
the humility and accessibility of the CEO to the journalists.  His candid 
demeanour endeared him to the media and his strong, persuasive, consistent 
messages, particularly those with emotive content (the threat of staff 
reductions) ensured that media coverage worked in Standard Bank’s favour. 
Nedbank’s complacency and arrogance, when compared against Standard 
Bank’s pro-active and humble media approach, clearly did not earn Nedbank 
any favours.  It helped that the crisis communications practitioners formed 
part of the top management decision-making team, and could plan their 
communication strategy with full knowledge.  The crisis seemed to have 
awoken Standard Bank’s management to the importance of having a good 
media profile and the company has since given this aspect of its business 
more attention. Standard Bank has, since this crisis, gone from strength to 
strength in the industry and in the media, whereas Nedbank seemed to suffer 
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irreparable damage from the failed bid and is starting, only at present, under 
the leadership of its new CEO, Tom Boardman, to regain its former reputation. 
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Actual print media coverage of the hostile take-over attempt of Standard 
Bank by competitor Nedbank 
 
October 1999 - March 2001 
 
National Newspapers: 
 
• Business Day  
 
• Business Report (The Mercury, The Star, The Saturday Cape 
Argus, The Pretoria News, Cape Times, Sunday Tribute, The 
Sunday Argus, The Sunday Independent, The Saturday Star 
and The Weekend Argus.   
 
• Business Times (Sunday Times) 
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ANNEXURE C:  A CASE STUDY OF A NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
BEING CHARGED OF CORRUPTION AT SOUTH AFRICA’S FIRSTRAND 
BANK 
 
C.1   Purpose of this annexure 
 
The purpose of this annexure is to investigate the crisis communication 
strategies to the media employed by FirstRand during the well-publicised case 
where a non-executive director of FirstRand, Mr Mac Maharaj, was accused 
of corruption. This was considered to be a big crisis for the Group, in that a 
substantial amount of intensive negative publicity was incurred and questions 
regarding its corporate governance policy were raised in the eight-month 
period of the crisis.  Information gleaned for this chapter was obtained from 
archived media reports and from interviews with the head of FirstRand’s 
media communication who was responsible for advising FirstRand on how to 
deal with the crisis. She joined FirstRand just after the crisis broke in the 
media.   In order to provide context, the full details of the crisis together with 
supporting commentary from selected newspaper articles is described.     
 
C.2   Details of the crisis  
 
The Sunday Times of 16 February 2003 reported that non-executive director 
of FirstRand and former transport minister, Mr Mac Maharaj, and his wife 
Zarina accepted payments and gifts worth R500 000 from Durban-based 
businessman Schabir Shaik after the transport ministry, that Maharaj then 
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headed, awarded lucrative licensing and toll-road contracts to companies 
associated with Shaik. Shaik was, at that time, under investigation by the 
South African police elite unit, the Scorpions, for his alleged involvement in 
corruption in a multi-billion rand arms deal.  Most of the payments and gifts 
were given before Maharaj left the cabinet in 1999.  Shaik, who was the 
personal financial adviser to then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, was the 
chief executive of Nkobi holdings and a director of Nkombi Investments.  
Nkombi investments was part of the N3 Toll Road Consortium, which was 
awarded a R2,5-billion tender to upgrade the road from Johannesburg to 
Durban by the Department of Transport while Maharaj was the minister.  An 
Nkobi Holdings subsidiary, Kobitech, was part of the consortium Probida, 
which won a R265-million contract to produce new credit-card driver’s 
licences.  The paper reported that documents in its possession suggested that 
the payments made by Shaik to Maharaj and his wife, were paid in the four 
months after he announced N3 Toll Road Consortium as the preferred bidder. 
 
The board of directors of FirstRand gave Maharaj leave of absence from his 
role as non-executive director of the company, while, with Maharaj’s 
agreement, FirstRand appointed a leading firm of attorneys to conduct an 
independent enquiry into the newspaper allegations of corruption.  Maharaj 
offered to resign when the original allegations appeared in the Sunday Times 
newspaper.  The Board felt that to accept his resignation at that point would 
have led to a presumption of guilt, and therefore chose the option of granting 
Maharaj leave of absence until an investigation by an independent third party 
was complete. 
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Mr Laurie Dippenaar, FirstRand Chairperson, explained at the announcement 
of the appointment of the attorneys to investigate the matter that FirstRand 
was seeking to clarify the uncertainty, regarding the allegations, in an 
objective and transparent manner, while abiding by the principles of due 
process and sound corporate governance. 
 
After the four month enquiry, Maharaj resigned from FirstRand, even though 
the findings were not conclusive:  The team did not find any evidence linking 
payments from Mr Shaik to Mr Maharaj with the awarding of the N3 Toll Road 
tender of the drivers licence card contract to Shaik (Sunday Times 2003:2). 
But the media felt that the statement put out by FirstRand suggested that the 
Bank believed Maharaj has been tainted by a succession of poorly explained 
payments from Shaik. More questions than answers.  FirstRand’s guarded 
report on its investigation into Mac Maharaj’s business dealings fails to 
exonerate the former transport minister (Sunday Times 2003:1). 
 
In a lengthy article printed in the opinion pages of Business Day (2003:15), 
Dippenaar wrote that the company had three choices when the allegations 
against Maharaj had surfaced.  We could have taken the easy way out and 
argued that the allegations related to a set of circumstances that was none of 
our business. We could have sidestepped the issue, and argued that if there 
were questions about Maharaj’s conduct while he was transport minister, 
these should be addressed by his “employer” at the time – namely the South 
African government. To take the other extreme, if we had had something to 
hide as FirstRand we could have accepted Maharaj’s resignation there and 
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then. He said that when the allegations were first published, there was no 
suggestion that Maharaj had since, joining the FirstRand board, been involved 
in any sort of impropriety. Dippenaar wrote in the Business Day that the 
allegations against Maharaj had grown, and along the way have collected a 
series of insinuations:  insinuations of a “swinging door” that brings politicians 
into business. He wrote in Business Day that there had been suggestions that 
FirstRand was a beneficiary of contracts granted by Maharaj while he was 
transport minister and there had been suggestions that FirstRand had 
something to hide, for example the situation relating to the awarding of the N3 
toll road contract. Dippenaar said FirstRand believed they had done the 
correct thing in ordering a full investigation into the initial allegations. These 
are not the actions of an institution engaged in a cover up, he wrote in 
Business Day. Dippenaar wrote that it was important to comment on their 
approach to corporate governance and conflicts of interest. Concerns have 
been raised about perceived conflicts of interest regarding non-executive, 
independent directors of FirstRand who sat on the board of the National 
Roads Agency at the time of the award of the N3 contract. He wrote that 
FirstRand had absolute faith that the actions taken by their directors had been 
beyond reproach, saying that the real issue was not that conflicts of interest 
may exist, but that the real issue was the manner in which they are managed.   
 
He wrote in Business Day, that: It is not feasible to tell our independent 
directors that once they join the FirstRand board they cannot sit on any other 
board for fear of conflicts.  We must trust them and the well established and 
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proven regulatory mechanisms at their disposal, to manage these conflicts in 
an honest and professional manner. 
 
C.3   Critical Analysis: Insights, comments and lessons derived from the       
crisis 
 
Themes derived from an analysis of FirstRand’s crisis are explained. 
 
 
C.3.1   Avoid being defensive; be transparent 
 
Initially, FirstRand had been moderately defensive with the journalists.  
Internally, it seemed that they were doing all the correct things.  They 
appointed a board of independent auditors to investigate the allegations and 
were following the correct procedures.  But externally, according to the head 
of media communications at First Rand, they were not being clear or 
accessible in their communications.  This caused a problem, in that the 
journalists because suspicious of FirstRand in the crisis.  The head of media 
communication at FirstRand explained: Every time a journalist phoned they 
were a bit defensive about what they had done and they certainly were 
accused of being not particularly transparent by the time I arrived. The 
management were stressed and they were very lost around how to deal with it 
and I do think that to a certain extent they tried to deal with it in an honest 
way, but they were under siege because they weren’t really communicating 
very well.  They were doing all the right things internally from a governance 
and reputation perspective but they weren’t communicating that properly.  
They were on the defensive.   
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C.3.2      Be proactive with journalists 
 
The head of media communication at FirstRand believes that one of the key 
considerations in a crisis is for the company spokesperson to be available to 
journalists.  In this way, they are able to get information on the crisis from the 
source, and are not left to search for information second-hand or third-hand.  
The company is then able to control the messages imparted to the journalists 
and there is a greater chance of accurate information being reported.  In this 
case, FirstRand seemed to be so intent on conducting themselves in a proper 
manner, that they didn’t open themselves to media scrutiny and were 
criticised for this. FirstRand needed to be more pro-active in their 
communications.  The head of media communication at FirstRand said: I think 
there are three basic rules to managing a crisis.  The first one is – don’t hide.  
Be completely and 100% accessible to anybody who wants to talk to you 
whether it’s a customer or a journalist or an analyst or whatever.  The second 
thing is to be proactive, so therefore, don’t constantly be on the end of a 
response.  Try and get statements out and try and set the agenda from your 
perspective rather than constantly be responding to somebody else’s agenda. 
 
Journalists would phone and they’d (management) speak to them on the 
phone.  They’d feel hugely uncomfortable and unprepared and generally the 
dynamic between the management and the press was very poor. I already 
had existing relationships with the journalists that were writing on it so that 
was quite helpful. 
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After coming on board, the head of media communication at FirstRand 
decided that instead of responding just on the phone to journalists, FirstRand 
should get the four or five key journalists that were reporting on the story to 
meet individually with management and hear its side of the story, in a one-on-
one fashion.  This proved to be successful in that Laurie Dippenaar, Chairman 
of FirstRand, the lawyers and the head of media communication were able to 
sit with each of the journalists on an individual basis and explain that when the 
allegations came out they had not been proved – they were just allegations.  
FirstRand felt that they couldn’t fire Maharaj just on the basis of unfounded 
allegations.  They believed that there was a due process required.  They were 
able to explain the due process and the steps that they were taking.  This 
helped to take away the sense among the journalists that FirstRand was 
trying to hide something or was part of the conspiracy surrounding Maharaj. 
The head of media communication said:  It was just to explain to journalists.  
There was a disconnect (a misunderstanding) between what they thought we 
were doing and what we were saying to them and what we were actually 
doing.  So it was just a little perception gap we had to deal with and that 
helped hugely because suddenly journalists could look Laurie in the eye and 
he could explain exactly what we were doing.  Now, it was those rules that we 
talked about.  One, he made himself very available to people on a one-on-one 
basis and would answer all their questions.  Two, we got pro-active, we got 
people in and said can we explain what’s going on and three, it was just a 
very honest conversation about what we were trying to do.  So that took the 
heat out of it and people stopped accusing us then of hiding something.  Then 
everyone was aware of what the process was. 
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But then the head of media communication at FirstRand faced another 
perception issue.  FirstRand was discontent with the initial investigation 
because it did not stand up to scrutiny.  The executives felt that the process 
had not been robust enough and their sense was that if they tried to explain it 
to the outside world, they would be accused of not having conducted the 
investigation properly.  FirstRand then contracted forensic auditors to do a 
proper forensic analysis of the Maharaj/Shaik relationship. However, this 
process took longer than expected and FirstRand was accused of delaying 
tactics.  The media started to believe that FirstRand perhaps was not happy 
with the results of the investigation and so were delaying the process.  The 
perception was that possibly FirstRand was implicated in the whole saga with 
Maharaj and the awarding of the Toll Road contract.  The head of media 
communication at FirstRand again proactively released another formal 
statement, and called the journalists in for another round of one-on-ones with 
the CEO. She explained: We said we actually felt that it wasn’t a robust 
enough analysis and it hadn’t gone into enough detail and we wanted more 
detail, not less, and we’re not trying to hide anything and we will fully update 
you when we get the report. 
 
The media communication strategy for FirstRand was to make every effort to 
be transparent.  FirstRand could not afford to be accused of hiding anything, 
so tactically, they communicated every step of the way to everyone, including 
the media. The head of media communication explained: Every time we made 
a decision we would tell the analysts, journalists, issue a statement, to try and 
get people to understand that we weren’t going to whitewash this thing.  We 
 489
were going to see it through, warts and all.  We wanted to make sure that it 
was properly done and that we followed every governance procedure. 
 
C.3.3   Know when not to tackle a journalist 
 
Another issue the FirstRand media communications team had to face was 
that Noseweek, a weekly investigative magazine, which is known for its 
acerbic, sometimes jaundiced commentary, printed articles in which it 
blatantly accused FirstRand of being part of a massive conspiracy because 
Maharaj had had a relationship with an existing director at Rand Merchant 
Bank, and Maharaj had been the minister of transport when FirstRand won 
the N3 Toll Road contract.  Noseweek started a conspiracy theory which 
abounded.  This is an example of how a crisis can be perpetuated in the 
media through negative publicity. 
 
The head of media communications at FirstRand advised the CEO against 
having a one-on-one interview with the Noseweek writer of the conspiracy 
theory.  Because it had been shown that individual interviews with journalists 
had helped to clarify matters in an open and transparent way, the CEO 
considered it best to tackle the writer head on.  She explains: I said:  “We’re 
wasting our time.  Don’t expose yourself to the guy.”  Anyway I hadn’t been 
here (at FirstRand) very long and he didn’t listen to me.  So anyway, we went 
along, and he (the CEO) subsequently said it was a mistake because the man 
(writer at Noseweek) drove him into a fury and the meeting went really badly.  
So that was a mistake.  We should not have done that.  Certain journalists 
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you can engage with and certain journalists you are actually exposing yourself 
unnecessarily so that was an error of judgement.  We shouldn’t have done 
that – and we battled with Noseweek for months on that deal. So anyway, we 
came away from the meeting and I said to him (the CEO):  “Laurie, let’s write 
a letter instead.  Let’s formally go on the record in terms of our position and 
let’s insist that he publishes it because that meeting did not go well.”   
 
From the above discussion, the lesson is that the organisation must know 
which journalists are acceptable to engage with and in which cases it is best 
not to do so.  Noseweek is well known for its strong-arm, aggressive writing 
style.  It did not help for the Chairman of FirstRand to try and engage a 
particular journalist in a discussion as his aggressive style was not acceptable 
to the Chairman and an altercation occurred between the journalist and the 
Chairman.  Very often, organisational spokespeople in very senior positions 
are used to being in control of situations but the one situation it is dangerous 
to even try and control, is that involving a journalist.  At the end of the day it is 
the journalist who can create the headlines and is thus in greater control. 
 
C.3.4    Have a script and stick to it 
 
One of the strategies followed by FirstRand’s media communication team was 
to make sure that all the spokespeople had an official script, or party line, and 
repeated the key messages in all the interviews so that there were no 
discrepancies or contradictions.  The key messages were clear and simple.  
They were: We’re following due process, you can ask us any question, we’ll 
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try and answer it.  We are fully transparent, when we get the report, we 
promise to brief you. The head of media communications at FirstRand 
explained: We kept falling back on the expression that we’re following due 
process and the one thing that I’ll say about the Mac crisis, is that we had a 
script and we stuck to it.  Everybody stuck to it.  We didn’t deviate from it. By 
repeating the key messages at every possible opportunity, consistency was 
ensured and media perceptions were controlled. 
 
C.3.5    Third party endorsement 
 
Another technique the head of media communications and her team 
employed to address the fact that FirstRand could not release the full report to 
the media because of the legalities involved, was to give it to third parties who 
were credible, such as the Reserve Bank, the Financial Services Board, the 
regulators. This helped to dispel the misperception that FirstRand was trying 
to conceal something. The head of media communication at FirstRand 
explained: We got criticised in the press for not releasing the full report.  You 
see, we got around that by giving the full report to third parties.  We gave the 
full report to Gill Marcus who was then with the Reserve Bank.  Now, that’s 
the one thing I forgot to mention.  This whole strategy of third party 
endorsement, getting credible third parties to be a sponsor because we 
couldn’t give it to the press.  So we said to the press, we can’t give it to you 
for all these reasons – sub judice etc.  But you can’t accuse us of hiding 
anything.  We’ve given it to the Reserve Bank.  So it’s using third parties who 
are credible.  We could say that we’re not hiding anything – otherwise we 
wouldn’t have given it to the Reserve Bank - and the Financial Services 
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Board. We gave it to all the regulators.  We gave them the full thing.  We said 
to the press that you have to understand, we can’t give it to you, we are giving 
you as much as we can, but we have given it to the regulators.  So hey,  
there’s no cover-up here.  And Mac couldn’t disagree with us giving it to the 
regulators. There’s a big difference giving things to the regulators as opposed 
to the media.  I mean, you give documents to the media, they can quote 
things out of context, they could have really hurt Mac.  They could have hurt 
us.  But he couldn’t stop us giving the report to the regulators, because they 
weren’t going to leak it.  The only fear we did have was that we also gave it to 
the Scorpions, the full report.  So no one could say we covered anything.  So 
that was also our position.  We’ve given the press as much as we can.  We 
wrote an eight-page press release with all the key findings, with extracts from 
the report.  But we wouldn’t give them the report.  It annoyed them that we 
couldn’t give them the report because they knew there was stuff in there that 
they wanted to see.  But we had to stick to our guns. 
 
As is evident from the discussion with the head of media communication, it 
proved difficult to balance the needs of various parties and a lot of negotiation 
was involved before releasing a statement to the media. In response to a 
question of whether this tactic satisfied the media, she said: It did, to some 
degree.  Not completely.  It certainly satisfied the regulators.  The media were 
unsatisfiable - absolutely unsatisfiable.  Unless we said, “yes”, they were not 
going to be satisfied.  But then we had to come up with all credible reasons of 
why we couldn’t and you know companies often duck and dive behind sub 
judice and client confidentiality and all that sort of thing, they do, its one of 
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their favourites.  So that didn’t really wash with them, but, to a certain extent, 
you have to rely on whether they trust you or not.  Yes, they were irritated, 
because they wanted the story, but fundamentally, in the end they stopped 
hounding us because they trusted Laurie, because Laurie wears his heart on 
his sleeve and he’s a very open and transparent person.  In the end they just 
had to stop and give in and accept that what they got was what they got and 
we took the high ground by saying, well, we’ve given it to the Scorpions, the 
SRP, FSB, the Reserve Bank, they’ve got the full thing. 
 
C.3.6   Accept that you’re not going to win every battle in the 
press 
 
According to the head of media communication at FirstRand, any crisis 
communication team must acknowledge that it will be inevitable that no matter 
what you do, or what strategy you follow there will be some negative publicity 
to contend with during a crisis.  The key to managing the media successfully 
is not to respond to every single media report.  She explained: Accept that 
you are not going to win every single battle in the press.  They (the other side) 
will have their day in the press.  You then have to accept that it’s their day in 
the press.  You then have to work very hard to make sure you have your day 
in the press.  So, you’re not going to win every single skirmish, you’ve got to 
stick to your battle plan, win the key ones and hope that you come out at the 
end clean.  Don’t pick up the paper every single day and stress about what’s 
been written and then have a knee jerk response. There might have been 
some really stupid articles in that week that you might have really wanted to 
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respond to in a knee-jerk fashion but your thinking gets muddled as soon as 
you do that.  You’ve got to stay really focussed on what you’ve agreed, what 
your tactics are, and keep it very simple. 
 
When journalists get the facts wrong in the media, she explained that she 
doesn’t usually contact the individual with the express purpose of demanding 
a retraction or an apology.  She considers that this serves no purpose except 
to create tension with a journalist.  She has, however, on one occasion, had a 
quiet word with a journalist on something that he had got horribly inaccurate, 
which had a favourable outcome, but it is not her usual practise to do so.  She 
said: I tend not to contact the journalists.  I tend not to phone journalists up 
and say, you’ve got that very, very wrong and I want a retraction or I want you 
to…..It’s never the same even on the next day when they print a retraction.  
No, generally what we would do is…I would just phone the journalist up and 
have a quiet word with them, but I would never ever…I don’t think I’ve ever 
insisted on a retraction in my entire life because I think you just make enemies 
of journalists. You make them feel stupid and journalists have very fragile 
egos.  So you can’t afford to make them feel stupid.  Generally what we found 
was that one or two would get it wrong, like xxxxx at the xxxxx (note: the 
name and publication of the journalist has purposely been removed).  He is 
such a disaster.  He got so many things wrong.  But it was more a question of 
the 80/20 rule.  Well, xxxxxxxx got it wrong, but lots of other journalists got it 
right.  So at the end of the day it’s degrees of right and wrong.  As long as you 
think that fundamentally you’re getting your message across even though 
there are one or two pockets of dissent or disagreement.  My entire 
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profession, I have made a rule not to reprimand journalists.  Having said that, 
now and again, I suppose you can phone one (a journalist) up and have a 
conversation, but never in a way that you demand anything.  In fact the time 
that I had a quiet word with a journalist - a week later he actually wrote 
something without me asking him.  He found an opportunity to set the record 
straight in a much more powerful way in his column.  What happened was, he 
had written something very negative and I phoned him up and said: “You 
know I never phone and moan but really, this is so wrong.”  We had a very 
mature debate about it and then two weeks later in his column he wrote 
something much more positive and it was fine.  It was a mature comment. 
 
C.3.7   Manage your own management 
 
During a crisis, one of the challenges is, according to the head of FirstRand’s 
media communication, to manage the organisation’s senior executives.  What 
happens during a crisis is that management are under severe stress and 
every time they see something in the paper, there is a tendency to react.  It is 
very difficult for them to realise, because they are in positions of power in the 
organisation, that they cannot use this power externally to control journalists 
or the media.  A lot of time must be spent by the crisis communication team, 
to calm the management down and encourage them to stick to the prepared 
messages. She said: The problem with crises – the big challenge is to 
manage your own management.  I mean, every time they see something 
really negative in the press, they go berserk and get into a frenzy and want to 
phone and shout at everybody.  Now you’ve got to manage that.  You’ve got 
 496
to calm them down.  You’ve got to get them to see sense.  You’ve got to get 
them to stick to the rules and the plan and the script because often they don’t 
want to.  Often they go mad if they read something and that is another part of 
crises:  do not get sidetracked and do not let your management get 
sidetracked and do not let them lose the plot. You know, a lot of these very 
senior guys are control freaks.  That’s why they are what they are and the 
thing they find so unbelievably difficult is the press.  There are so few 
management teams that you talk to that find the press easy.  It’s because 
they’re not in control of what’s going to appear the next day in the press and 
that’s the thing that they hate.  They hate that feeling of powerlessness 
because they’re powerful people and they don’t like to feel powerless or at the 
mercy of somebody and that’s a serious problem.  The additional problem I’ve 
had at FirstRand is that these guys are owner-managers. I mean, they’ve built 
this business from nothing, so to attack them, to attack their company, is to 
attack them as people.  It’s not like for professional managers where it’s just a 
job.  I mean these guys built this thing from nothing to a R90 billion rand 
business in 30 years.  I mean the blood, sweat and toil that went into that and 
suddenly somebody’s attacking your integrity.  It’s hard.  So in effective crisis 
management you must not forget to manage your own team and make sure 
that they don’t get sidelined by bad press.  Just make sure they focus on the 
important stuff and never be knee-jerk.  The moment you knee-jerk in a crisis, 
you’re dead.  The moment you have a thought and immediately act on it, 
you’re in serious trouble. 
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C.3.8   Different perspectives make a team 
 
The head of media communication at FirstRand believes that having a crisis 
team comprising various different members who can bring different 
perspectives to managing the crisis is important.  This is what helped her 
manage the crisis at FirstRand. Having the expertise of the lawyers, internal 
communications, the operations staff etc. was helpful. She said: I also believe 
that in a crisis, have a team.  Don’t have one or two people in a corner 
managing a crisis.  Open it up.  Get lots of people thinking about it and lots of 
people working on it so that you can bounce ideas, you can control mavericks.  
Have a team.  Have your little war cabinet.  Meet every day, agree what 
you’re going to do and stick to it and always act with thought. Never allow 
emotions to carry the day, ever, because then you’re also in trouble.  Those 
are the rules really, for me. 
 
C.3.9   Spokesperson likeability important 
 
Although Laurie Dippennaar, the Chairman of FirstRand and spokesperson on 
the Maharaj crisis did not have an extremely proactive networking relationship 
with the media before the crisis, his being such an engaging man, allowed him 
to win the trust of the journalists during the crisis. The head of FirstRand’s 
media communication explains: They trusted Laurie because Laurie wears his 
heart on his sleeve and he’s a very open and transparent person.  In the end 
they just had to stop and give in and accept that what they got was what they 
got. No, I mean, prior to this crisis, he was very sort of low key, met them at 
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the results, had no real relationship with them.  Because he’s such an 
engaging man – you know when we had the first set of one-on-one’s when we 
got journalists in and we took them through the due process – that’s really 
when that process (of relationship building with the journalists) started.  But he 
built good relationships - funnily enough, very positive relationships through 
the crisis which have lasted him till now.  And he’s got a reputation of being 
straightforward and honest, even though it was incredibly painful for him, it’s 
given him a good standing with the press.  And I think journalists have grown 
to trust him.  And when we’ve had other crises in the meantime, that credibility 
with journalists has served him very well. 
 
 C.3.10   Benefits flowing from the crisis 
 
The head of FirstRand’s media communication believes that FirstRand grew 
from the crisis as an organisation. One of the positive aspects that happened, 
as already mentioned, was that the Chairman’s relationship with the 
journalists was cemented. FirstRand seems to have come out of the crisis 
unscathed and with its reputation intact. She explained: Yes, it was hugely 
painful, but we came out in many ways a stronger organisation because of it.  
I don’t think there is still any stigma attached to the Group from that and 
mainly because of our strategy. We didn’t try and hide anything.  In 
September 2003, FirstRand showed solid growth in its retail, corporate and 
new business growth despite the year of controversy (Business Report 
2003:1). 
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C.3.11   Respect for role of the media  
 
The head of media communication at FirstRand is cognisant of the important 
role that the media plays in a crisis and it is this respect for the media that the 
researcher believes is critical in dealing with the journalists.  She said: With 
any crises, there is always a legal strategy, an investor relations strategy, 
there’s a media strategy - another stakeholder strategy. The media obviously 
plays a key role around sentiment.  For instance, you could say, if institutional 
shareholders believe that the media has whipped up a frenzy in the retail 
shareholder base, they have to take that, they have to bear those things in 
mind with their decision-making.  So the media plays a role. The media keeps 
everybody honest and on their toes.  So they are in my view, an important 
part of the process because without the media all these things would happen 
behind closed doors and that’s not a good thing.  So I’m a believer in the 
press.  It frustrates me if they don’t check their facts and they’re one-sided 
and they’re bloody minded and stupid - some of them are all of the above and 
some of them are some of the above - but fundamentally I think they play a 
crucial role in making sure that people’s interests are protected.  It’s just that it 
can be very painful for management to deal with them.  They keep 
management honest too. 
 
C.3.12   How to deal with an issue when you can’t tell the media 
 
The researcher enquired of the head of FirstRand’s media communication 
how she deals with an issue which she can’t really relay to  the media, and 
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one which she can’t hide behind the sub judice rule.  She answered as 
follows: You tell them something.  At the end of the day they just want to write 
something. You might not be able to tell them something that you know but 
you can tell them something that’s not a lie, but that gives them something to 
say because fundamentally that’s all they need to do.  They need to say 
something.  You don’t lie to them, but you find a way of saying something to 
them. It’s not telling them what’s really going on, but it’s telling them 
something that they will never look stupid if they print and it solves their 
problem, the fact that they’ve got to fill column inches. They’ve got to look as 
though they know what’s going on so you find something to tell them. But 
never lie to them.  The day that you lie to them, is your downfall.  Better to say 
that I don’t know or I actually know but I can’t tell you.  But don’t lie.  Often to 
say I don’t know, is a lie, so best not to say that either, because that can also 
come back and hurt you.  So stay honest.  Honesty is the best policy, like in 
life.  And no manual is going to help you.  I remember at the communication 
agency I worked for we used to make a lot of money writing crisis manuals.  
It’s bullshit.  Just chuck that thing out the window when it starts and rely on 
instincts and experience. 
 
C.4   Conclusion 
 
In summary, judging from the media coverage received, and from the position 
in which FirstRand is today, the Maharaj crisis at FirstRand was handled 
admirably.  In fact, so successful was it, that Laurie Dippenaar, chief 
executive of FirstRand, was a contender for the 2005 Deloitte Good 
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Governance Awards. This success can be ascribed to a policy of 
transparency, availability and honesty on the part of the spokesperson 
concerned.  This strategy worked favourably even though Dippenaar did not 
have a significant relationship with the journalists prior to the crisis.  The 
messages to the media were consistent and clear and every step of the 
process concerning the investigation was communicated to the media.  Even 
when it was not possible to reveal all to the media, the crisis team used the 
strategy of third party endorsement – they released the full report to credible 
third parties which helped to still the negative perception that FirstRand was 
concealing aspects of the report from the media.  It was a systematic process 
followed by the media communication team at FirstRand and they did not 
deviate from the key messages. Having a healthy respect for the journalists 
helped to build relationships of cautious trust and credibility between the 
organisation and the media which served FirstRand well in subsequent crises. 
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Actual print media coverage of a non-executive director accused of 
corruption at FirstRand 
February – November 2003 
 
National Newspapers: 
 
• Business Day  
 
• Business Report (The Mercury, The Star, The Saturday Cape 
Argus, The Pretoria News, Cape Times, Sunday Tribute, The 
Sunday Argus, The Sunday Independent, The Saturday Star 
and The Weekend Argus.   
 
• Business Times (Sunday Times) 
 
 
 









































